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ABSTRACT 
Unlike other security methods, steganography hides the very existence of secret messages rather 
than their content only. Both steganography and steganalysis are strongly related to each other, 
the new steganographic methods should be evaluated with current steganalysis methods and 
vice-versa. Since steganography is considered broken when the stego object is recognised, 
undetectability would be the most important property of any steganographic system. Digital 
image files are excellent media for steganography, as they have redundancy in their 
representation. Also, the most widely used method of image steganography is the least significant 
bit (LSB) embedding. 
This thesis investigates the latest methods of pixel domain steganography and provides new 
efficient approaches to improve them in three perspectives: embedding, detection, and the digital 
forensics investigation process. Firstly, the probability of detection is considered for non-adaptive 
LSB and 2LSB image steganography even for the embedding rate of 1. The proposed method 
noticeably reduced the probability of detection for different detection methods via improving the 
embedding efficiency of both LSB and 2LSB methods, which is not restricted to a specific 
steganalysis attack.  
The extensions to LSB steganography methods have received great attention from 
steganographers, especially 2LSB, because it is easy to implement, has a higher capacity, is visually 
imperceptible, brings complex changes to the image pixel values and is harder to detect. The 
proposed method improves the detection accuracy of the current state of the art targeted 2LSB 
steganalysis methods via a novel approach pixel value grouping and statistical analysis of the 
image pixel values histogram. Moreover, a discrete classifier version of the proposed method is 
developed which gives a label (‘Stego’ or ‘Clean’) to the analysed image and avoids the overhead 
of setting a right threshold value. 
The last perspective of this research considers the evaluation process of the steganalysis tools and 
simplifying the digital forensics investigation process. Hence, a novel statistical method is 
proposed to effectively simplify the investigation process by showing the area of differences 
between the testing image set and the random set of images that is used as a baseline. It also 
indicates whether the difference is significant or not. 
All the above mentioned novel approaches included in this thesis are proven, in both theoretical 
and practical perspectives, to be better than the current state-of-the-art methods and add some 
value to the knowledge in the field of steganography, steganalysis and its applications. 
Key words: Steganography, Steganalysis, LSB embedding, 2LSB embedding, Forensic steganalysis, 
LSB embedding, 2LSB steganalysis  
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measure the amount of distortion in the stego image made by the embedding process using 2LSB 
replacement, which is directly proportional with the embedding rate. It is shown that it can 
accurately estimate the length of the hidden message and outperform the other methods of the 
targeted 2LSB steganalysis in the literature. The proposed method is also more consistent with 
the steganalysis methods in the literature by giving the amount of difference to the expected 
clean image. According to the experimental results, based on analysing 3000 never-compressed 
images, the proposed method is more accurate than the current targeted 2LSB steganalysis 
methods for low embedding rates.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Steganography is the art and science of hiding communication by embedding secret data in public 
cover media without raising suspicion. Due to the availability of the Internet, lack of trust, and the 
demand for secret communication, people try to secure their private messages using more 
advanced steganography techniques rather than traditional cryptographic methods. The idea of 
hiding secret messages in multimedia files like images and video gives an opportunity to a variety 
of application areas beyond steganography, collectively known as information hiding. Any digital 
media with some redundancy in their representation could be used by steganographers for 
embedding secret messages. Hence, digital images became one of the most common cover media 
used for this purpose. Also, the most widely used method of steganography is least significant bit 
(LSB) replacement in digital images, due to its extremely easy implementation, imperceptibility, 
and reasonable capacity. However, LSB steganography is very easy to attack and there are many 
methods in the literature that can accurately detect them. 
Many studies consider imperceptibility to be the most important property of steganography (Al-
Mohammad, 2010), but this research considers undetectability, because nowadays almost all 
steganographic methods generate imperceptible stego objects, but they are still detectable by the 
statistical methods of steganalysis. Moreover, any steganographic algorithm is considered broken 
when the stego media is recognised, even if the secret message itself is not recovered (Böhme & 
Westfeld, 2004). Thus, undetectability is essential and is considered as the most important 
property of steganography. 
The hard truth for steganographers is that LSB method is reliably detectable by current 
steganalysis methods with a very accurate estimation of the length and the embedding locations 
of the secret message. Thus, the modified versions of LSB embedding became the field of interest 
by steganographers in the last few decades (Luo, Liu, Yang, Lian, & Zeng, 2012; Yang, Liu, Luo, & 
Liu, 2008; Xiaoyi Yu & Babaguchi, 2008; Xiaopi Yu, Tan, & Wang, 2005). Also, there was a growth 
of interest of using the extensions of LSB steganography, such as using more than one LSB for 
data embedding. More specifically, the 2LSB steganography as it is could be implemented very 
easily, is visually imperceptible, has higher capacity than LSB steganography, and also results in 
more complicated changes in the pixel values, which makes it harder to detect. However, they are 
again detectable by the current steganalysis methods. 
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One of the most realistic applications of steganalysis methods is its usability as a detection tool for 
hidden contents by digital forensics analysts, especially for cases that related to cybercrime, child 
pornography, and terrorist activities. In this case, as the embedding methods are continuously 
improved, the digital forensics analyst also needs better detection methods to reduce the 
probability of false alerts in their investigation process. 
Thus, this thesis considers steganography in three perspectives: embedding, detection and its 
applications. Firstly, from the steganographic point of view, this research focuses on improving 
the embedding efficiency and reducing the probability of detection for both LSB and 2LSB image 
embedding methods even for the embedding rate of 1. Secondly, from the steganalysis point of 
view, this research concentrates on improving the detection accuracy of 2LSB image 
steganography, especially for low embedding rates. The last point of view is the application of 
steganalysis methods; this research proposes a statistical method to be applied on the detection 
results. This method can be used for evaluating the steganalysis tools and also helping the digital 
forensics analysts in their investigation process while analysing a bulk of images to show the area 
of differences between two samples of images. This approach helps the forensics analyst by 
narrowing down the investigation process to the area of interest and neglecting the insignificant 
parts of the detection results. 
1.2 Motivations and Research Problem 
There has been an explosive growth in image steganography, steganalysis, and their applications 
in the past few years, particularly in signal processing (Fridrich, 2009). Images are excellent media 
for steganography due to having redundancy in their representation, and the most widely used 
method of image steganography is LSB embedding. 
There are two main types of LSB steganography, adaptive and non-adaptive methods. The 
adaptive method takes the content of the image into consideration and leaves some parts of the 
image unmodified. This method results in less probability of detection, but with less capacity, and 
it differs from one image to another. The non-adaptive method embeds data into the image 
regardless of its content. This embedding method usually has a higher capacity with higher 
probability of detection. 
However, there are few opportunities to improve embedding efficiency for non-adaptive methods 
of LSB, especially when all pixel values are involved in the embedding process (in other words, 
when the embedding rate is 1). Also, most detection methods of the extended methods of LSB 
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embedding belong to universal steganalysis methods (Luo et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2008; Xiaoyi Yu 
& Babaguchi, 2008; X. Yu et al., 2005), and there are few targeted methods, especially 2LSB image 
steganography, which are more common but not very accurate for low embedding rates. 
Moreover, from the application point of view, most steganalysis methods give the probability of 
stego class membership instead of giving labels (‘Clean’ or ‘Stego’) to the analysed image. Hence, 
choosing the right threshold value is left to the analyst, which could be very challenging by having 
a direct effect on the rate of false alarms (false positives and false negatives). This could be even 
more essential and problematic for digital forensic analysts involved in analysing a bulk of images. 
Thus the evaluation of steganalysis methods is very complex and the digital forensics analyst has a 
very wide area for investigation. The literature lacks having an easy and efficient method to 
narrow down the investigation process in relation to steganalysis tools. 
In this research, the embedding efficiency of both LSB and 2LSB embedding of non-adaptive 
image steganography are improved, even for the embedding rate of 1, by introducing the concept 
of single mismatch embedding method. In addition to improving the embedding efficiency it 
reduces the overall bit-level cost of pixel value changes and results in lower probability of 
detection by the current steganalysis methods. 
Regarding the detection of the extended methods of LSB steganography, 2LSB steganography 
proposes a new method in two different forms: as a discrete classifier that does not need the 
threshold value to be set, and directly giving the label to the analysed image (‘Clean’ or ‘Stego’). 
Also as a probabilistic classifier that gives the probability of the stego class membership, or the 
length of the embedded secret message. This method outperformed the current targeted 
steganalysis methods of 2LSB embedding, especially for low embedding rates. 
From the digital forensics point of view, as a realistic application, an efficient statistical method is 
proposed to process the detection results for identifying the significant parts of it for further 
investigation and neglecting the insignificant ones. This statistical approach could also be used to 
evaluate a certain steganalysis method. 
1.3 Research Aim 
The motivation and research problem section stated that it is a three-fold research: 
steganography, steganalysis and its application. This thesis proposes some innovative non-
adaptive methods, called single mismatch, to improve the embedding efficiency with less bit-level 
cost of pixel value changes for both LSB and 2LSB image steganography, and reduce the 
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probability of detection by the current targeted steganalysis methods. This method can be applied 
even if the embedding rate is 1. 
It also proposes a new method of detecting 2LSB embedding of digital image steganography, 
called extended pairs of values, in such a way that outperforms the current targeted 2LSB 
steganalysis methods in terms of detection accuracy and usability as a discrete binary classifier. It 
can also maintain its accuracy for low embedding rates. This is because, instead of the 
probabilistic model of the clean image, it relies on the arithmetic mean of the frequency of 
occurrences in each extended pair of values, which stay unmodified before and after the 
embedding process has taken place. 
The third aim of this research is proposing an easy and efficient statistical method to simplify the 
evaluation process of the steganalysis methods by people like digital forensics analysts using 
steganalysis methods as a tool (black box). This could be done by applying more than one 
steganalysis method and comparing the statistical results on the same set of images. Also, to 
show the area of differences between the random set of images as a baseline and the testing set 
of images. This would be very useful as it simplifies the investigation process by specifying the 
area of interest (significant area of differences) for further investigation in order to reduce time, 
cost and complexity. 
1.4 Contributions 
The contributions of this thesis could be classified into three main areas in relation to information 
hiding and detection. The first contribution is the development of a novel non-adaptive 
embedding method that can be applied in both LSB and 2LSB steganography. This embedding 
method, in both cases, can be applied even if the embedding rate is 1, without having any 
restrictions on the cover image and the saturated pixel values. 
As shown in chapter four, the proposed embedding method (single mismatch) improves the 
embedding efficiency (ENMPP) of LSB replacement from 0.5 to 0.375 pixels per message bit and 
the 2LSB replacement from 0.75 to 0.687 pixels per two message bits. In addition to the 
embedding efficiency, the proposed method reduces the bit-level cost of pixel value changes that 
directly affects the probability of detection by methods relying on the binary similarity measures 
in pixel values. The single mismatch embedding method also remarkably reduces the probability 
of detection by current targeted steganalysis methods without restricting it to a certain type of 
steganalysis attack (e.g. histogram attack). 
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All the above mentioned advantages of the proposed method (single mismatch) are theoretically 
and experimentally proven in chapter four. The only limitation with this method is that it results in 
slightly lower value of Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR) compared to other methods in the 
literature. However, this amount (nearly 1.7 dB) can be neglected as it still stays very close to 
other methods and very far from the lower limit of the PSNR value discussed in chapter four. 
The second contribution is the detection method of 2LSB image steganography, which is applied 
as discrete and probabilistic classifier. This method relies on a new grouping scheme of image 
pixel values by considering the characteristics of the 2LSB embedding method in relation to pixel 
value transitions. This method is named as extended pairs of values, or EPoV for short. EPoV 
outperforms the current targeted 2LSB steganalysis methods in the literature in terms of 
detection accuracy and the estimation of the hidden message length. 
This method, as shown in chapter five, firstly takes the application of digital forensics analysis into 
consideration. Hence, it mainly focuses on giving labels to the analysed images (‘Clean’ or ‘Stego’) 
rather than the membership probability to the stego class. In this case, the overhead of setting a 
right threshold value is eliminated and the method is thus a ready to use detection tool. 
Therefore, two sets of compressed and uncompressed images are used in the experiment, not 
only considering the ‘in laboratory’ conditions. This method can maintain its accuracy even for 
small embedding rates (0.6 for the embedding rate of 0.05, 0.879 for 0.1, and 0.962 for 0.2), 
where the embedding rate is the percentage of the cover image pixel values involved in the 
embedding process. These classification results are also shown as a Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) graph in the results section in the same chapter. 
Probabilistic classification is considered (again discussed in chapter five) in calculating the 
probability of stego class membership from the analysed image. This detection method combines 
the new grouping scheme with the standard deviation of the intensity histogram. The value of the 
standard deviation of the histogram of EPoV, after subtracting 1 or the expected value for clean 
images, ranges from 0 to 0.5, which implies the amount of the image portion changed by 2LSB 
embedding method. 
This method outperforms the current targeted 2LSB steganalysis methods in terms of detection 
accuracy even for very low embedding rates, because it relies on the arithmetic mean of the 
histogram of the EPoV, which stays the same before and after the 2LSB embedding process. 
The third contribution is the novel statistical approach for analysing the results of steganalysis 
tools (methods). This can be used for two different purposes, the evaluation of steganalysis 
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methods and simplifying the investigation process of digital forensics analysis. The evaluation 
process can be achieved by applying two different steganalysis methods on the same set of clean 
and stego images and statistically analysing their results to see whether the difference between 
the results are significant or not. 
Simplifying the digital forensics investigation process is performed by applying statistical method 
on the detection results of two sets of images, the first of which consists of a bulk of random 
images to be used as a baseline for comparison, and the second of which is the testing set 
selected for investigation by digital forensics analysis. The proposed method shows the area of 
differences and specifies whether the difference is significant or not. Significant difference is 
determined if the digital forensics analyst can focus on this area and do further investigations. 
Therefore, this effectively simplifies the investigation process and saves time, cost and 
complexity. 
Hence, the contributions of this research add many important aspects to the current knowledge 
of information hiding and detection in three perspectives: data embedding, detection of hidden 
messages, the evaluation of steganalysis methods, and their application as a tool for digital 
forensics investigation process. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. Chapter one provides an overview and the motivations of 
this research. It explains the research problem and the main motivations of this three-fold 
research with a well-defined research aim. Moreover, it states the main contributions in the area 
of pixel domain steganography, steganalysis and its application. 
Chapter two presents steganography in detail, starting with a brief history of the discipline and 
defining its components then explaining the classification methods and properties of the 
steganographic methods. This is followed by showing the differences between steganography and 
other related security methods like cryptography and digital watermarking. It also goes over 
steganography protocols, attacks, applications, image steganography and its domains. The 
evaluation criteria of the steganography are another useful topic discussed in chapter two 
pertinent to any new method proposed.  
Chapter three presents a detailed study of the steganalysis field including its definition, categories 
and requirements. It prioritises the main requirements of steganalysis according to importance 
and usability. It then explains the typical approaches of steganalysis and its three main types: 
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blind (or universal), semi-blind, and targeted steganalysis. As there are a number of steganalysis 
attacks, just like cryptanalysis, this chapter states and explains all attacks. The main objective of 
steganalysis is binary classification; this chapter also gives a detailed explanation about the true 
and false alarms with the confusion matrix. Another important aspect of steganalysis included in 
this chapter is evaluating its performance and showing some ways to find the best classifier. 
Moreover, this chapter clarifies the relation between steganalysis and digital forensics, as it could 
be considered as an important tool for digital investigators in relation to cybercrime, child 
pornography, and terrorist crimes. This chapter ends with stating some significant algorithms of 
steganalysis and a very useful summary about steganalysis in general. 
Chapter four is about the new proposed embedding method applied in both LSB and 2LSB image 
steganography to improve the embedding efficiency and reduce the probability of detection by 
the current targeted steganalysis methods. After discussing the related works, it explains the 
proposed method for both LSB and 2LSB image steganography. It then shows their experimental 
results and compares them to the other embedding methods using the most accurate detection 
methods. It also analyses all the embedding methods and explains their extraction process for the 
proposed methods. This chapter ends with conclusions about the proposed embedding method. 
Chapter five is about the new proposed targeted detection method of 2LSB steganography, EPoV. 
This chapter starts by explaining the 2LSB steganalysis methods and discussing the related works, 
then describes the concept of EPoV and applies it as a discrete and probabilistic classifier. It is 
experimentally shown that both classifier types are more accurate than the current targeted 2LSB 
steganalysis methods, and the probabilistic method gives the most accurate estimation of the 
embedded message size even for very low embedding rates. This chapter then ends with 
conclusions about the proposed detection method and its related works. 
In chapter six, the application of the steganalysis is considered in relation to the digital forensics 
investigation process. It starts with a brief introduction and discusses the assessment of 
steganalysis tools, then it gives some information about this topic and explains the Stegdetect 
steganalysis tool, which is capable of detecting many types of steganographic algorithms. As a 
strongly related subject, the digital investigation process is discussed. Then, the methodology and 
the process of this part of the research are explained and detailed analyses of the results are 
given. Next, a new method of comparing the detection results is proposed. This method applies a 
statistical method to help the digital forensics analyst to narrow down the scope of the 
investigation process. The chapter ends with a conclusion that highlights the important points 
raised in this chapter. 
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Finally, chapter seven summarises the research findings and conclusions about the whole three-
fold research presented in this thesis and presents an overview of the main contributions to 
knowledge and states the limitations of the research. It also discusses some directions for further 
researches that could be done in this research area. 
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CHAPTER 2: STEGANOGRAPHY 
2.1 Introduction 
With the development of the Internet, information became available online and could be 
accessed from everywhere, anytime. Along with that there is a rapid increase of interest in hiding 
information in digital media (Popa, 1998). This is simply because communication is increasingly 
vulnerable to eavesdropping and unwanted interventions, which could not be solved using 
traditional methods of cryptography (Cox, Miller, Bloom, Fridrich, & Kalker, 2008). 
Digital steganography is a younger security method than cryptography, which could be defined as 
an art and a science of hiding secret messages in different digital media files (image, audio, video, 
text, etc.), so that it can be correctly received by the second party without raising the suspicion of 
observers (Bailey, Curran, & Condell, 2004). Steganography is considered broken when the 
existence of the secret message is detected. Therefore, the most important property or 
requirement of steganography is undetectability, which means that the message cannot be 
detected by any existing detection method (Fridrich, Pevný, & Kodovský, 2007). 
Almost all types of digital media where there is some sort of redundancy could be used for 
steganography. Multimedia objects are considered excellent media for hiding secret messages 
because there are numerous formats with a high degree of redundancy (Chandramouli & Memon, 
2001). 
This chapter presents the basics of digital steganography. It starts by defining steganography and 
identifying its main components. Like any other systems, steganography has its own classification 
methods that are briefly described in this chapter. Then, it goes through the properties of digital 
steganography and highlights the main differences with digital watermarking and cryptography. 
The steganography protocols and attacks are also explained. At the end of this chapter the 
steganography in digital images and its evaluation criteria are explained. 
2.2 Steganography Throughout History  
Steganography is derived from two Greek words, Steganos and Graphy, which means “covered” 
(i.e. secret) “writing” (Cole & Krutz, 2003). The first written evidence about steganography dates 
back to nearly 440 BC, by the Greek historian Herodotus (Dunbar, 2002). Different methods of 
information hiding have been used throughout history. Ancient Greeks wrote messages on wood 
tablets covered with wax to be unseen. They also shaved and tattooed a message on the 
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messenger’s head, which could be sent when the hair is grown back (Neil F Johnson & Sushil 
Jajodia, 1998). During World War I, the Germans developed microdot technology by several 
stages using non-suspicious cover materials like magazines (Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 
2000). In World War II invisible inks were used to write messages between the lines of innocent 
letters. The open-coded messages were also used during World War II by German spies, as they 
did not seem to cause any suspicion (Neil F Johnson & Sushil Jajodia, 1998). For more details on 
the history of steganography, a large body of literature is devoted to this subject (Neil F Johnson 
& Sushil Jajodia, 1998; Judge, 2001; N. Provos & Honeyman, 2003). 
Nowadays, with the availability of the Internet and powerful computers, steganography has 
developed different and clever methods of embedding in various digital media like image, video, 
audio and text. 
2.3 Components of Steganography 
The easiest way of describing the components of steganography is to consider the first invisible 
communication model of the prisoners’ problem proposed by (Simmons, 1984). In this model, 
Alice and Bob are two criminals confined in two separate jail cells who want to develop a runaway 
plan. The warden, called Wendy, will let Alice and Bob communicate, but she monitors all their 
communications. Thus Alice and Bob will not be able to use encryption methods, as Wendy will 
stop their message exchange if she notices any suspicious communication.  
Thus, they need to use a covert communication method like steganography. Hence, Alice tries to 
exchange a secret message m with Bob by embedding it into a randomly harmless message c, 
called cover object, to create a stego-object s that looks similar to c and avoids raising suspicion. A 
secret key could be used by the embedding process, called a stego-key k. Alice then sends s over 
an insecure channel to Bob, hoping that Wendy will not notice the embedded message. Then, Bob 
can extract the secret message m’ from the stego-object s, since he knows the embedding 
method used by Alice and has access to the key used in embedding process. The extraction 
process should be possible without referring to the original cover (Stefan Katzenbeisser & 
Petitcolas, 2000). This is illustrated in Figure ‎2.1. 
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Figure ‎2.1: Schematic description of Steganography Framework 
 
The warden, Wendy, could test the stego object to see if there is any secret message hidden by 
Alice. If she did not find any sign of hidden data, she will let the stego object pass to Bob (passive 
warden). However, Wendy could be an active warden and modify everything exchanged between 
them irrespective of whether there is any indication of having hidden information or not 
(Chandramouli, 2002). 
The followings are very short definitions of some naming conventions of steganography 
framework notations adopted after the first Information Hiding Workshop (Embedded, 1996). 
2.3.1 Cover Object 
The cover object could be any type of digital media with some redundancy in their representation 
format, like text, image, audio, video etc. Each cover object has a specific embedding capacity 
depending on the media type and the embedding method. The steganographer is free to choose 
any cover object, unlike digital watermarking, in which the selection of the cover object is 
restricted. 
2.3.2 Secret Data 
Secret data could be any stream of binary representation that needs to be transmitted over an 
insecure channel without raising suspicion. Hiding more data in general increases the probability 
of detection, so choosing an appropriate cover is crucial.  
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2.3.3 Embedding Process 
The embedding process usually has three inputs; cover object, secret data, and an optional stego 
key. It uses a particular method, for example LSB replacement, to embed the secret data into the 
cover object and create the stego object as an output. 
2.3.4 Stego Object 
This is the modified version of the cover object after embedding the secret data, which should 
look similar to the cover object. The stego object should at least maintain the imperceptibility 
property, explained in section ‎2.5.2, and not be degraded by the embedding process. 
2.3.5 Stego Key 
The stego key is a secret key used in the embedding process to make the secret data 
computationally infeasible to extract by the extraction process without having access to that 
secret key. It can be a number generated via a pseudo-random number generator (Chandramouli, 
Kharrazi, & Memon, 2004), or just a password for decoding the embedding location. The secret 
data may also be encrypted before embedding; in this case the recipient needs two keys to get 
the secret data, one for extracting and the other for decrypting the secret data (Cox et al., 2008). 
2.3.6 Extraction Process 
This is an opposite function of the embedding process; it takes the stego object and an optional 
stego key as an input and extracts the secret message as an output. This process could be 
achieved without referring to the original cover. However, it is possible to extract the hidden 
message by comparing both stego and cover object. Both cases are explained in sections ‎2.4.3.1 
and ‎2.4.3.2. 
2.4 Classification Methods of Steganography  
There are many methods of classifying steganographic systems. These classification methods are 
very useful for studying and developing embedding and detection methods, as each type of 
steganography has its own properties and attributes. The main classification approaches are 
based on the cover type, hiding method and extraction method (Cole & Krutz, 2003; Cox et al., 
2008; Kipper, 2004). 
2.4.1 Based on the Cover Type 
As there are many different types of digital media that can be used as cover files for embedding 
secret data (Cole & Krutz, 2003), steganography methods could be classified based on the utilised 
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cover type; for example, image steganography is a method of embedding secret data into digital 
images. 
The cover-type method of classification is very important as different media files have different 
properties, which could be exploited in such a way that possibly gives minimum probability of 
detection. It is also useful for steganalysers, as they develop detection methods by finding 
abnormality in properties of a specific digital media. 
2.4.2 Based on Hiding Method 
Another approach of classifying steganographic systems is the method of embedding. In general 
there are four different ways to hide secret data in cover files; insertion based, substitution based, 
generation based, and cover lookup based (Cole & Krutz, 2003; Cox et al., 2008; Kipper, 2004). 
2.4.2.1 Insertion Based 
Since there are some areas in cover files that are usually ignored by the application that reads the 
file, insertion based steganography inserts the secret data into these areas of the cover file. 
Hence, this method keeps the readable areas unchanged, which is an advantage of this 
embedding method. Thus a huge amount of secret data could be inserted to any cover file 
without limiting the embedding capacity. However, the size of the stego file would be much larger 
than the size of the cover file by adding the secret data to the cover file without removing any bit 
of it (Cole & Krutz, 2003). This difference in size could sometimes make the stego file suspicious, 
without looking at the content.  
A good example of such a method is inserting a secret message in the area between end-text and 
begin-text markers of a Word document. This is because the Microsoft Word application is 
configured to ignore anything written in this area and the secret data will not be displayed at the 
time of viewing the document file (Cole & Krutz, 2003). 
2.4.2.2 Substitution Based 
Substitution based or cover modulation is the most common and the most advanced method of 
steganography (Cox et al., 2008). This method, unlike the insertion based method, looks for some 
insignificant areas in cover files and replaces them with the secret data (Cole & Krutz, 2003). 
Therefore, the quality of the stego file would be degraded by the embedding process compared to 
the quality of the cover file. Also, according to the insignificant amount of information in the 
cover file, there is a limitation on the size of the secret data that could be hidden. However, both 
stego and cover files will have the same size, because they only modify some insignificant parts of 
the cover file without inserting any additional data. 
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The embedding process should rely on some methods for selecting the location of the change. In 
general, there are three selection rules to follow in order to control the selection of the location 
of change; sequential, random and adaptive (Cox et al., 2008). 
A sequential selection rule modifies the cover object elements individually by embedding the 
secret message bits in a sequential way. For example, it is possible to embed the secret message 
by starting from the top-left corner of the image to the bottom-right corner in a row-wise 
manner. This selection rule (sequential) is very easy to implement, but has very low security 
against detection methods. 
A pseudo-random selection rule modifies the cover object by embedding the secret message bits 
into a pseudo-randomly chosen subset of it, possibly by using a secret key as a pseudo-random 
number generator (PRNG). This type of selection rule gives a higher level of security than 
sequential rule. 
An adaptive selection rule modifies the cover object by embedding the secret message bits in 
selected locations based on the characteristics of the cover object (e.g. choosing noisy and high 
textured areas of the image, which are less detectable than smooth areas for hiding data). 
Adaptive selection rule gives higher security than sequential and pseudo-random selection rules 
in terms of detection. 
2.4.2.3 Generation Based 
Generation based method steganography, or cover synthesis, is different from the two previously 
mentioned methods. In this method, no cover files are used by the embedding process; rather it 
uses the secret data to generate a suitable stego file (Cole & Krutz, 2003; Cox et al., 2008). 
Therefore it cannot be detected by the detection methods that rely on comparing stego with the 
cover file, as the cover file does not exist. 
However, this method has a limited number of stego files that could be generated; also, it may 
generate impractical files like images with lots of random shapes and colours that make no sense, 
or generating a text with no meaning (Cole & Krutz, 2003). In other words, the generated stego 
file might look suspicious to human perception, which is less predictable than automated 
detection methods. 
Mimic functions is a good example of steganography by synthesis (Wayner, 1992). It encodes a 
short message into a proper spam document. Another example of synthesizing the cover work is 
data masking (Radhakrishnan, Kharrazi, & Memon, 2005), whereby a secret message is shaped 
into a stego cover whose statistical properties are like a normal cover file, such as music. 
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2.4.2.4 Cover Lookup Based 
This method looks for a pre-existing cover file so as the secret data embedding does not need to 
modify anything in the cover file. It assumes that it can find the appropriate cover file that already 
holds the desired secret data. Therefore, as the size of secret data increases, this solution 
becomes unusable very quickly. For example, if sending 20-bits of secret data requires a million 
cover files, then 30-bits requires a billion cover files (Cox et al., 2008). 
2.4.3 Based on Extraction Function 
The steganographic systems can also be classified as blind and non-blind (or informed) schemes 
according to whether the original media is used or not respectively by the extraction process. 
However, this type of classification is missing in steganographic literature (Cox et al., 2008). 
2.4.3.1 Blind Steganographic Scheme 
Steganographers usually assume that the cover medium is unnecessary for the extraction process 
by the recipient in their proposed steganographic methods. Hence, the extraction process does 
not need the original cover media and can get the hidden information back from the stego media 
only (Cox et al., 2008; L. M. Marvel, Boncelet, & Retter, 1999). Consequently, it enables Alice to 
use any cover media, even if it is not accessible by Bob. 
2.4.3.2 Non-blind Steganographic Scheme 
In non-blind or informed steganographic scheme, the original cover medium is considered 
necessary by the extraction process and the retrieval of hidden information would be impossible 
without it. Unfortunately, this steganographic scheme is generally neglected by steganographers, 
despite its potential practical utility. For example, if Alice and Bob both agreed to use the same 
set of images, the informed extraction process would help the embedding process to embed the 
hidden information in a less strong manner. As a result, the probability of detection by the 
attacker would be smaller than blind embedding methods (Cox et al., 2008). 
2.5 Properties of Steganography 
As steganography belongs to a wider field called information hiding, all properties of information 
hiding could be considered for both steganography and digital watermarking. However, 
steganography defines and prioritises these properties slightly different from watermarking, as 
explained below. 
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2.5.1 Undetectability 
The main purpose of steganography is to hide data in such a way that makes the existence of the 
hidden message secret. Thus, undetectability is the most important property of any 
steganographic system, which means that the existence of the secret data cannot be noticed by 
the use of statistical approaches of detection. If someone could easily recognise the stego media, 
then using such a steganographic method makes no sense (Cole & Krutz, 2003). There are a 
number of factors that directly affect the undetectability, for example the choice of the cover 
media, the method of embedding and the number of changes introduced to the cover media 
(Fridrich, Lisoněk, & Soukal, 2007). 
However, there is no steganographic method that can embed data into a certain media file 
without leaving some artefacts. Hence, the lower probability of detecting these artefacts denotes 
a better steganography method. That is why developing a new steganographic method is not 
enough if it does not confer less probability of detection by current steganalysis methods. 
2.5.2 Imperceptibility 
Imperceptibility is another property of steganographic systems, which means that the stego 
media should not have any noticeable artefacts after embedding secret data (B. Li, He, Huang, & 
Shi, 2011). Hence, most steganographic methods utilise the limitation of the Human Visual System 
(HVS) or Human Auditory System (HAS) in their embedding process (VenkatramanS, Ajith, & 
Paprzycki, 2004). For example, the stego image should look like an innocuous image by HVS. 
There are multiple evaluation criteria for imperceptibility, which could be considered according to 
the type of steganographic method and/or the type of the used cover file for data hiding. For 
example, the file size could be an indicator of having hidden data in text files or insertion based 
steganography, whereas image quality could be an indicator for hidden data in substitution based 
image steganography. However, currently most steganographic methods have a high level of 
imperceptibility, but they suffer from statistical detection. 
2.5.3 Security 
The term “security” in steganography literature is used as an equivalent word to 
“undetectability”; thus a steganography method is considered secure when it is statistically 
undetectable (Cox et al., 2008). Most current steganographic methods are considering passive 
wardens, whereas active wardens, as discussed by (Craver, 1998), have been considered much 
less in the literature. 
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2.5.4 Capacity 
There are two different types of capacity in relation to the field of steganography: the embedding 
capacity and the steganographic capacity (Cox et al., 2008). Embedding capacity is the maximum 
number of bits that can be embedded in a certain media file. For example, the embedding 
capacity for a grey-scale image with LSB replacement would be equal to the total number of pixels 
in the image. The steganographic capacity is different from embedding capacity and is not easy to 
determine even for a very simple embedding method. It could be defined as the maximum 
number of bits that can be embedded in a certain media file with such a probability of detection 
that can be neglected by the attacker. 
2.5.5 Robustness 
In general, there are two factors that affect the robustness in steganography. First, is the 
undetectability, which is explained in previous sections. Second is the ability to defeat the active 
attack, which is more important for digital watermarking (Wang & Wang, 2004), which means that 
the secret message should be recovered by the second party even if the cover media faced some 
data processing (Cole & Krutz, 2003). A steganography method could be considered as robust if 
both the detection and the destruction of the hidden data are hard. 
However, as claimed by (Cox et al., 2008), defeating the active attack is rarely considered for 
steganography because it is assumed that the stego object will be sent over the Internet, whereby 
there would not be any degradation and the second party would receive exactly what the first 
party sent. 
2.5.6 Conflicts Between Requirements 
The main goal of improving any steganographic method is to enhance its requirements in terms of 
undetectability, imperceptibility and capacity (Chang, Lin, & Wang, 2006). However, enhancing a 
certain requirement may negatively affect others. For example, the undetectability and capacity 
cannot be maximised at the same time. The amount of artefacts produced in the cover media by 
the embedding process is directly affected by the amount of hidden data (L. Marvel, Boncelet, & 
Retter, 1998). 
As a result, there should be a trade-off among these requirements. Steganographic systems must 
achieve a high imperceptibility and a high capacity, but they are not necessarily robust in terms of 
defeating active attacks. However, the robustness would be the highest priority requirement for 
digital watermarking schemes (L. M. Marvel et al., 1999). 
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The embedding domain also satisfies these requirements in different levels. Data embedding in 
the frequency domain is more robust than in the spatial domain. However, spatial domain data 
embedding has a higher capacity than frequency domain schemes (Y.-H. Yu, Chang, & Hu, 2005). 
Therefore, most digital watermarking schemes are developed based on frequency domain 
embedding schemes. Moreover, most steganographic methods are proposed to enhance the 
security and the capacity of steganography methods (Chen & Lee, 2003; Hsien-Wen & Chin-Chen, 
2004; Y. K. Lee & Chen, 2000; Qingzhong, Chen, & Dongsheng, 2006; Rufeng, Xinggang, Xiangwei, 
& Xiaohui, 2004). 
It is possible to find a clash between undetectability and the imperceptibility requirements as 
well. For instance, the stego media could be statistically undetectable using cover generation 
methods, while visually suspicious due to unrealistic media, such as random shapes and colours in 
images or a text that makes no sense (Cole & Krutz, 2003). 
2.6 Steganography and Cryptography 
Steganography and cryptography are intended to accomplish different goals; steganography 
keeps the existence of the message secret, whereas cryptography keeps the content of the 
message secret (Lou & Liu, 2002). Therefore, even though the message is encrypted, the existence 
is still a major weakness of cryptography methods. Thus steganography intended to supplement 
cryptography, rather than replacing it, and putting both methods together will add another layer 
of security by making a scrambled message hidden. 
Although both steganography and cryptography systems offer secret communications, they have 
dissimilar breaking definitions. A steganography system is considered broken if the eavesdropper 
could detect the existence of the secret message. However, a cryptography system is considered 
broken if the eavesdropper could read the content of the secret message (Zöllner et al., 1998). 
2.7 Steganography and Watermarking 
Both steganography and watermarking are related to a broader subject known as information 
hiding. They both share some properties like imperceptibility, robustness, capacity and security. 
However, they prioritise these properties differently; for example, imperceptibility is the most 
important requirement for steganography (Morkel, Eloff, & Olivier, 2005), while for watermarking 
the robustness has higher priority (Boato, Conotter, De Natale, & Fontanari, 2009). 
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However, in some cases the imperceptibility is not an issue in steganography, for example when 
changing the colour of a certain object in the image. This change may still be undetectable, since 
the third party has no access to the original image (Cox et al., 2008). 
Steganography and watermarking are intended to achieve different functions; steganography is 
used to protect the secret message using another digital object to provide hidden communication, 
whereas watermarking is intended to protect the cover object by embedding a special watermark 
for copyright protection. Watermarking and fingerprinting are very close; they both mark objects 
in the same way, except in watermarking all objects have the same marking embedded for 
copyright protection, whereas in fingerprinting objects are marked separately for each customer 
to prove the ownership (Anderson & Petitcolas, 1998). 
Another difference is the cover object itself. In the case of steganography, Alice is free to select 
which cover object to use; thus she can avoid cover objects in which it is difficult to conceal a 
message. Conversely, in digital watermarking the cover object is specific and cannot be avoided 
(Cox et al., 2008). 
2.8 Steganography Protocols 
Generally there are three types of protocols: pure steganography, secret key steganography, and 
public key steganography. 
2.8.1 Pure Steganography 
Pure steganography is a class of steganography system whereby there is no prior information 
shared by two communication parties (Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000). In this case, both 
Alice and Bob must have access to embedding and extraction functions, and these functions 
should not be known by the third party. In practice, pure steganography is not very secure 
because it is not consistent with Kerckhoff’s principle, which assumes that the embedding 
algorithm is known to Wendy (Francois Cayre, Fontaine, & Furon, 2005). 
2.8.2 Secret Key Steganography 
According to Kerckhoff’s principle, as Wendy has access to the extraction method, she is able to 
extract the hidden information from every stego media exchanged between Alice and Bob. 
Therefore, the security of the hidden data should depend on some secret information exchanged 
by Alice and Bob, called the stego-key. Without having this key, nobody should be able to obtain 
the secret information from the stego media (Francois Cayre et al., 2005). However, the additional 
transmission of the secret key is inconsistent with the main purpose of steganography, which is 
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invisible communication; it could be assumed that Alice and Bob had agreed on a stego-key 
before detention. 
2.8.3 Public Key Steganography 
The public key steganography uses two keys: the public key and the private key. The public key is 
stored in a public database and used by the embedding algorithm, whereas the private key is used 
by the extraction algorithm to recover the secret message. Thus the public key steganography can 
be built using public cryptosystem, in which Alice and Bob do not need to exchange the secret 
key. Again, it is assumed that Alice and Bob have exchanged their public key before imprisonment 
(Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000). 
As it is considered that the embedding method is known to Wendy, she can try to extract the 
hidden message in the stego media. However, in this case, she will not be able to recognise the 
secret message because it should look like a random string of bits due to encryption. 
2.9 Attacks on Steganography 
As steganography system is mainly presented in the form of prisoners’ problem (Simmons, 1984), 
so the warden would be the attacker and she has the possibility to attack the steganographic 
communication between Alice and Bob in three different ways: passive, active and malicious 
warden. 
2.9.1 Passive Warden 
The passive warden monitors the communications between both parties (Alice and Bob) and tests 
for the existence of hidden information. If a hidden message is detected, then she blocks the 
transmission. Otherwise, if it is not detected, then she lets the communications to be forwarded 
(Cox et al., 2008). 
2.9.2 Active Warden 
The active warden, unlike the passive warden, is capable of modifying communication between 
Alice and Bob. Thus, the communication could be altered even if the hidden message is not 
detected in order to destroy any undetectable hidden message (Chandramouli et al., 2004).  
2.9.3 Malicious Warden 
The malicious warden may have further capabilities, like sending false messages to Alice and Bob. 
In this case, in addition to detecting the hidden message, the warden knows the steganographic 
algorithm used by Alice and Bob and also any keys related to their embedding algorithm 
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(steganographic and cryptographic keys) (Chandramouli et al., 2004). Hence, the complexity of 
the steganography method and the amount of prior knowledge will indicate the difficulty of the 
warden’s task (Chandramouli, 2002; N. Provos & Honeyman, 2003). 
2.10 Applications of Steganography  
Steganographic methods could be used by any two parties that might wish to protect the secrecy 
of their communication. Also, there are numerous reasons why people or agents want their 
communication to be secret. For example, they could be two lovers who wish to hide their 
relationship, or forbidden political organisations that want to communicate among themselves, or 
even criminals who want to organise a crime or a terrorist operation (Cox et al., 2008). 
There are other specific uses of steganography methods like controlling copyright protection, 
improving the robustness of image search engines, and smart identity cards (Jain & Uludag, 2002). 
Moreover, steganography methods could be used for embedding checksums and error correction 
codes (Bender et al., 2000; Chang, Hu, & Lu, 2006). Another application of steganography 
methods is to maintain the link between image data and the patients’ information, whereby the 
separation is considered necessary for confidentiality purposes, by embedding patients’ 
information into the image (Stephan Katzenbeisser & Petitolas, 2000). Some other methods of 
steganography have been discussed in relation to patient records and data concealment in digital 
images (Anand & Niranjan, 1998; Shaou-Gang, Chin-Ming, Yuh-Show, & Hui-Mei, 2000; Yue, 
Chang-Tsun, & Chia-Hung, 2007).  
Secret communication may be used in the business sector as well, and in the modern economic 
climate the security of corporations is no less important than the security of countries, all large 
organisations must protect their online information using steganography and other security 
methods. 
2.11 Steganography in Digital Images 
Many methods of secret communication have been developed in the last few decades, among 
which image steganography is one of the major areas (Chandramouli et al., 2004; N. Johnson & S. 
Jajodia, 1998; B. Li et al., 2011; N. Provos & Honeyman, 2003; Wang & Wang, 2004). This is 
because there are millions of images on the web in which anyone can embed their own messages 
for the purposes of covert communication (Wayner, 2002). Also, digital images have a high degree 
of redundancy in representation, and small changes to digital images cannot be observed by HVS. 
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Moreover, they can easily be used as cover media for data embedding without raising suspicion 
due to omnipresence on the web (Artz, 2001; Liu & Liao, 2008). Therefore, digital images are the 
most widely used cover media for steganography. 
Almost all steganographic systems exploit the characteristics of human visual system in their 
embedding methods (Artz, 2001; Chang, Chen, & Chung, 2002; Chang & Tseng, 2004). Hence, 
steganographers are interested more in noisy and edge regions in the image than smooth areas, 
as the HVS is less sensitive to the degradation in noisy and edge regions (Zeng, Lin, & Yu, 2006). 
In spite of having some progress of image steganography in binary images (Liang, Wang, & Zhang, 
2007; Min, Tang, & Lin, 2000) and 3-D images (F. Cayre & Macq, 2003), researchers mostly focus 
on hiding data in grey-scale and colour images. Although the luminance component of a colour 
image is equivalent to a grey-scale image, some experts consider grey-scale images as best cover 
for steganography (Aura, 1996; Fridrich, Goljan, & Du, 2001b). This is because the embedding 
process changes the correlation between colour components, which makes the trace of 
embedding easier to reveal. 
In general there are two main types of image steganography, spatial domain and transform 
domain, as explained in brief in the following sections. However, there are some other types of 
image steganography that are less common. For example, appending the secret messages to the 
end of file (EOF) tag of the JPG image file is very simple, and it will be ignored by image viewer 
applications for display. This type of data embedding is very simple, does not affect the image 
quality, does not change the image histogram, and it is imperceptible when opened by image 
viewer applications. However, if the stego image is opened by other applications like Notepad, the 
message will be shown as the Notepad is not configured to deal with EOF tag of the JPG file. 
Another example is appending hidden data to the image’s extended file information (EXIF), which 
is used by manufacturers of digital cameras to store information like the camera’s make and 
model, the time of capturing the photo and its resolution etc. As claimed by (Alvarez, 2004), the 
EXIF information could help verifying the authenticity of a picture in an investigation process in 
relation to child pornography. 
The most important thing is that appending hidden data into metadata tags of the image file 
cannot resist any kind of editing or attacks (Cheddad, Condell, Curran, & Mc Kevitt, 2010). Also, it 
could be noticed from the size of the file, especially when the hidden data is relatively large (Cole 
& Krutz, 2003). 
23 
 
2.11.1 Spatial Domain Image Steganography 
The general idea of image steganography in spatial domain is to directly modify the value of 
image pixels in order to embed the secret message. The simplest and the most common spatial 
domain image steganography is LSB replacement, which directly replaces the LSB of the selected 
(sequentially or randomly) image pixel values with one bit of the secret message (Mielikainen, 
2006). This type of embedding, LSB replacement, is the most widely used embedding method in 
special domain, which has a low computational complexity and a high embedding capacity (L. Yu, 
Zhao, Ni, & Li, 2010). Another reason behind the popularity of LSB steganography is that it has a 
large embedding capacity without introducing noticeable distortions (Bender, Gruhl, Morimoto, & 
Lu, 1996). However, it produces pairs of values (PoV) in the stego image histogram and gives 
steganalysers an opportunity to successfully detect the hidden content (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 
2000). 
In order to avoid the statistical attack on the resultant pair of values, LSB matching (X. Li, Yang, 
Cheng, & Zeng, 2009; Mielikainen, 2006; Sharp, 2001) is developed. LSB matching is a modified 
version of LSB replacement, which randomly adds or subtracts 1 to the pixel value with 
mismatched LSB instead of simply flipping the LSB value from 0 to 1 or vice versa. This type of 
embedding, ±1 embedding, causes the distortion to the cover image as an additive independent 
identically distributed (i.i.d.) noise, which may lead to a successful steganalysis (Giacomo Cancelli, 
Doërr, Cox, & Barni, 2008; Harmsen & Pearlman, 2003; A. D. Ker, 2005b; J. Zhang, Cox, & Doërr, 
2007). 
Although there is a difference in embedding function between LSB replacement and LSB matching 
steganography, their extraction methods are the same. The secret message could be extracted 
directly from the LSBs of the image pixel values. Another noise adding steganography method, 
stochastic modulation, is presented by Fridrich (Fridrich & Goljan, 2003). It embeds the secret 
message by adding a weak noise signal with a specified arbitrary probabilistic distribution. This 
embedding method enables the user to mask the embedding distortion as noise generated by a 
particular image acquisition device. 
There are a number of image steganography tools, some with open source codes, that use the 
spatial domain embedding methods of steganography in digital images; more details could be 
found in a survey article by (Hayati, Potdar, & Chang, 2007). 
The extensions of LSB steganography and steganalysis received less attention by researchers prior 
to the last decade. However, nowadays there are many steganography tools that allow the use of 
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more than one LSB for data embedding; SilentEye (Chorein, 2008) is a very good example of such 
a steganographic tool. 
In spite of extreme easiness of implementing data hiding in multiple bit-planes, the non-adaptive 
multiple bit-plane steganography may negatively affect the imperceptibility and the quality of the 
stego image, because the high bit-planes may involve in modification (B. Li et al., 2011). However, 
the local property of the image pixel could be considered for developing an adaptive multiple bit-
plane data embedding. The bit-plane complexity segmentation (BPCS) developed by (Kawaguchi & 
Eason, 1999) is a good example of considering the local property in each block. The BPCS uses the 
cover image as vessel data and embeds the secret message in its bit-planes. It also utilises the 
human vision system and replaces the “noise-like” regions with the secret data. 
Also, ±k steganography (Fridrich, Soukal, & Goljan, 2005), of which ±1 embedding is a special case, 
is another extension to LSB steganography. Instead of simply replacing the k bit-planes of the pixel 
value with k bits of the secret message, the ±k embedding increases or decreases the pixel value 
by k to match the k-LSBs of the pixel value with k bits of the secret message. The distortion of 
non-adaptive ±k embedding could be represented as an additive independent identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) noise signal with the following probability mass function. 
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Where,   is the embedding rate in bits per pixel. 
Therefore, 2LSB steganography would be a very good extension method for LSB steganography, 
because it is still imperceptible, easy to implement, and even has a higher capacity. Moreover, it 
introduces complex modifications of pixel values, which makes existence of the secret message 
very hard to detect (Niu, Sun, Qin, & Xia, 2009). 
2.11.2 Transform Domain Image Steganography 
The embedding of secret data in transform domain steganography is done by modulating the 
coefficients in transform domain, such as in discrete cosine transform (DCT), discrete Fourier 
transform (DFT), and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) (Amin, Salleh, Ibrahim, Katmin, & 
Shamsuddin, 2003). Transformed domain data embedding is commonly used to perform high 
capacity embedding in steganography and to obtain a robust data embedding in digital 
watermarking (Wang & Wang, 2004). In general, the insignificant areas of the transformation 
coefficients would be used to have a high capacity and imperceptibility, whereas significant areas 
are used to get robust data embedding against active attack. 
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The transform data hiding technique could be integrated with compression algorithms like JPEG 
(Joint Photographic Experts Group), whereby the secret message is embedded by modifying the 
DCT coefficients of the transformed cover media, and then it takes the inverse DCT to create the 
modified image (stego). This method of data hiding is very attractive due to the massive 
availability of JPEG images on the web (Wang & Wang, 2004). 
Another approach is spread spectrum steganography (L. M. Marvel et al., 1999; Smith & 
Comiskey, 1996), which could be used in both domains. It embeds the secret data by spreading it 
throughout the cover image by modulating a carrier function (a common choice is Gaussian 
random vector) to make it less detectable. There are three common spectrum spreading schemes 
(Smith & Comiskey, 1996): direct sequence, frequency hopping and chirp. 
2.11.3 Adaptive and Non-Adaptive Image Steganography 
Non-adaptive image steganographic techniques modify the cover image for message embedding 
without considering its features (content). For example, LSB replacement and LSB matching with 
sequential or random selection of pixels modify the cover image according to the secret message 
and the key of random selection of pixels without taking the cover image properties into account. 
Adaptive image steganography techniques modify the cover image in correlation with its 
features(Fridrich & Du, 2000). In other words, the selection of pixel positions for embedding is 
adaptive depending on the content of the cover image. The bit-plane complexity segmentation 
(BPCS) proposed by (Kawaguchi & Eason, 1999) is an early typical method of adaptive 
steganography. 
As the adaptive steganographic schemes embed data in specific regions (such as edges), the 
steganographic capacity of this method is highly dependent on the cover image used for 
embedding, it is expected to have a lower embedding rate than non-adaptive schemes. However, 
steganographers have to pay this price in order to have a better security or less detectable stego 
image.  
2.12 Steganography Evaluation Criteria 
Currently there is no standard measurement available to evaluate the performance or 
effectiveness of steganographic systems. However, it is very important to have such an evaluation 
scheme. In order to decide which steganographic system or method has superiority over another, 
there are some evaluation criteria that can be considered for evaluating any steganographic 
system in terms of its most important requirements: security, capacity and imperceptibility (B. Li 
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et al., 2011). These evaluation criteria could also be used to improve the current embedding 
techniques. 
2.12.1 Evaluation of Security 
The security or undetectability is the main requirement of any steganographic system; the 
optimum scenario is to make the probability of detection no more than a random guess (Fridrich, 
Lisoněk, et al., 2007). It also could be tested practically by looking at the specific current 
steganalysis methods to estimate the probability of detection. However, it is almost impossible to 
have a completely secure steganographic method as they embed the secret messages in the 
actual component of the cover object and thus modify it. Instead, steganographers evaluate the 
security of the embedding method by its relative probability of detection. 
2.12.2 Evaluation of Capacity 
Capacity, for evaluation purposes, means the steganographic capacity and not the embedding 
capacity. The steganographic capacity is the maximum number of bits that can undetectably be 
hidden (Cox et al., 2008), which is not easy to find even for a very simple embedding method. As 
there is a trade-off between the capacity and both undetectability and imperceptibility, a 
significant contribution is achieved if a certain steganography method could maintain the same 
steganographic capacity with higher imperceptibility (N.-I. Wu & Hwang, 2007). Also, it is good to 
have a higher steganographic capacity and maintain an acceptable level of imperceptibility. 
Another significant contribution could be considered if a certain steganography method could 
maintain the same probability of detection with a higher capacity. 
2.12.3 Evaluation of Imperceptibility 
In signal processing systems, two types of evaluating the imperceptibility can be distinguished; 
fidelity and quality. The perceptual similarity between signals before and after processing is 
known as fidelity, whereas the absolute measure of the goodness of a signal is called quality 
(Almohammad, 2010). For steganography in digital images, the fidelity is the perceptual similarity 
between the original cover and the stego image. Hence, both images are considered important for 
fidelity evaluation. 
There are two main methods of measuring the quality of images: objective (automated) or 
subjective (human based) (Stoica, Vertan, & Fernandez-Maloigne, 2003). The objective methods 
consider the physical aspects of images using mathematical calculations or model. Typical 
examples of objective methods are Mean Square Error (MSE), Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR), 
27 
 
Structural Similarity (SSIM), Multi-Scale Structural Similarity (MSSIM), Visual Information Fidelity 
(VIF), and Visual Signal to Noise Ratio (VSNR). 
The subjective methods are perceptual based assessment of the image quality. According to the 
availability of the original (unmodified) image, the subjective image quality metrics can be 
classified into three main categories (Zhou, Bovik, Sheikh, & Simoncelli, 2004): full-reference, no-
reference, and reduced-reference. The full-reference assumes that both the original and test 
images are available, whereas no-reference assumes that the original image is not available. 
However, reduced-reference assumes that the original image is partially available (i.e. only some 
information or features) (Ponomarenko et al., 2008). 
Moreover, to avoid attracting attention by the third party, suspension, and also detection, 
steganography systems should use very good quality images (Cox et al., 2008). Therefore, 
evaluating the quality of stego images is a very important indicator of the performance of any 
image-based steganography method (N.-I. Wu & Hwang, 2007). 
Despite of being fidelity metrics by definition, PSNR and MSE are generally known as quality 
measures used to measure the amount of distortion added to an image in the form of perceptual 
distance metrics. Therefore, the fidelity is defined as the perceptual quality of stego images, and 
both PSNR and MSE characterise the imperceptibility of the secret message (Cox et al., 2008). 
2.13 Summary 
The key concerns and considerations of steganographers have been explained in this chapter. Any 
steganographic scheme is considered broken when the existence of the hidden message is 
detected, thus the statistical undetectability of the embedded data is the most important 
property for any steganographic system. Regarding the embedding methods, LSB embedding is 
the most common steganographic method in spatial domain because it has a reasonable capacity, 
is easy to implement, and visually imperceptible. 
The steganalysis methods could be utilised to improve the security of the steganographic 
methods. This could be achieved by reducing those artefacts that cause the detection and 
defeating or reducing the probability of detection. The average number of random bits per one 
embedding change is called embedding efficiency. In general, improving the embedding efficiency 
will reduce the probability of detection by producing fewer changes in the stego image. The 
embedding efficiency of a typical LSB embedding is two random bits per one embedding change. 
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Considering all classification methods, the most widely used steganographic method is LSB 
embedding in images, which is a blind substitution based method of embedding. 
There is a difference between embedding capacity and the steganographic capacity. The 
embedding capacity is the maximum number of bits that can be embedded in a certain file, 
whereas the steganographic capacity is the maximum number of bits that can be embedded in a 
certain media file with an insignificant probability of detection. 
There are a number of evaluation criteria for steganographic systems, including security, capacity 
and imperceptibility. However, the security of the steganographic system could be maintained 
when the probability of detection is low, because nowadays almost all steganographic methods 
are merged with some kind of data encryption. Moreover, the modern steganographic schemes 
have a high level of imperceptibility, but the capacity (steganographic capacity) is still an issue 
that could be further improved. 
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CHAPTER 3: STEGANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduction 
To illustrate steganalysis, we can imagine the scenario of Simon’s prisoner problem (Simmons, 
1984). In this scenario, Alice and Bob are imprisoned in a jail and are monitored by a warden, 
called Wendy. Alice and Bob want to discuss an escape plan and they can do so only if they could 
make their communication hidden by using a steganographic method for hiding their secret 
message exchanges. Now, as discussed by (Chandramouli et al., 2004), steganalysis can be defined 
as a set of methods that help Wendy to detect the existence of a secret message inside the stego-
object without requiring any knowledge of the secret key, and in some cases even the algorithm 
of the embedding process. The absence of prior knowledge about the embedding process makes 
the steganalysis process in general very complex and challenging. In this setting, Wendy (the 
active warden) can sometimes actively stop and modify any message she feels uncomfortable 
with, and in other cases she is only supposed to pass messages between the two communicating 
parties (passive warden). 
The detection of a hidden message in digital media is usually represented as a classification 
problem. In other words, steganalysis algorithms receive digital objects as an input and classify 
them into either ‘Clean’ or ‘Stego’ objects. Therefore, some other classification tools like pattern 
recognition and machine learning can be used for steganalysis as well. Since, the classification of 
digital media into clean and stego objects only has two classes, the term detection is more 
commonly used than classification for steganalysis methods (Cox et al., 2008). 
As steganography hides information in plain sight, it becomes almost impossible for law 
enforcement to detect the existence of hidden content in digital images through visual 
examination (Craiger, Pollitt, & Swauger, 2005). That is why steganalysis tools have recently 
became very important and essential to law enforcement, especially in cybercrime and copyright 
protection (Fridrich & Goljan, 2002). Also, there is a claim that steganography has been used by 
terrorists and child pornographers; however there is no definitive evidence for that (Cox et al., 
2008). 
In this chapter, the main aspects of steganalysis are explained, starting by categorising the 
steganalysis methods and showing the levels of their requirements. Some typical steganalysis 
approaches are then stated with their main types according to the range of detection. The 
different types of steganalysis attacks are also listed and explained in this chapter. As steganalysis 
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could be modelled as a classification problem, a separate section is specified in this chapter to 
deal with steganalysis as a binary classifier. Moreover, it shows the performance evaluation of 
steganalysis and gives very good information about its relation to digital forensics. Finally, some 
significant steganalysis algorithms of LSB embedding and their detection principles are explained, 
and this chapter ends with a summary in the area of steganalysis. 
3.2 Steganalysis Categories 
The main objective of developing any steganalysis technique is to classify the analysed digital 
media into clean and stego objects. However, in certain cases like digital forensics investigations, 
there might be further requirements like recovering the secret message. Hence, the requirements 
of steganalysis may vary from one application to another. Therefore steganalysis techniques could 
be divided into two main categories; passive and active staganalysis. 
3.2.1 Passive Steganalysis 
This is the most common type of steganalysis technique; it can only detect the existence of the 
secret message, without giving any information about the type of steganography used or the 
attributes of the secret message itself (Chandramouli, 2002). The majority of current steganalytic 
methods can be classified as passive steganalysis, and the general idea is the utilisation of first-
order or high-order statistics according to the steganography technique. When the steganography 
technique is unknown, there are two other approaches to follow; considering the image 
characteristics as an a priori model, or using a large image database as training set (Chandramouli, 
2003). Irrespective of how good the detection method is, a very general steganalysis method may 
not perform very well on a specific steganography method. For that reason, the choice of the right 
steganalysis algorithm itself is an open research problem. 
3.2.2 Active Steganalysis 
This type of steganalysis techniques is less common, and is sometimes referred to as forensic 
steganalysis (Cox et al., 2008). Apart from detecting the presence of the secret message, it tries to 
extract an approximate version of the secret message or at least extract some attributes of it, like 
the message length, the location of hidden data or the secret key. However, extracting the secret 
message is much more complicated than mere detection (Chandramouli, 2003). Hence, the 
difference between active steganalysis and an active warden could be noted. Active steganalysis 
tries to extract the secret message without destroying the stego-object, whereas active warden 
tries to modify the sego-object, aiming to destroy the secret message. 
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3.3 Steganalysis Requirements 
Although the main requirement of any steganalysis approach is the detection of hidden contents, 
other requirements may become important according to the purpose of applying a particular 
steganaysis method. In general, there are different levels of requirements which could be listed as 
detection only, and further requirements like indicating the steganography type to retrieve the 
embedded secret data. 
3.3.1 Detection or Classification Only 
The scope of steganalysis is usually focused on detecting the secret message and not extracting it, 
which is reasonable enough as the main goal of steganography is to conceal the secret message 
(Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000). This type of steganalysis technique is known as passive 
steganalysis (Chandramouli, 2002). In this case, detecting the existence of hidden messages in 
digital media is considered as a classification problem. Hence, it is required from the steganalysis 
method to distinguish between clean and stego media only, without any considerations about the 
retrieval of the embedded message.  
3.3.2 Further Requirements 
After the first level of requirement, which is detection, there might be other requirements like 
recovering some attributes of the hidden message (e.g. estimating the message length and the 
location of embedding), revealing the class of steganography algorithm (Cox et al., 2008), or even 
retrieving the embedded message from the stego object. This type of steganalysis technique is 
also known as active steganalysis (Chandramouli, 2002). As mentioned previously, recovering the 
secret message is much more complicated than detection only, requiring the knowledge about 
the embedding algorithm, estimation of message length, and probably both encryption key and 
algorithm (Fridrich, Goljan, Hogea, & Soukal, 2003). 
3.4 Typical Steganalysis Approaches 
Steganography hides the secret message in different media types in such a way that makes the 
existence of the hidden message secret. However, due to the modifications in the carrier media, 
there should be some artefacts that could indicate the existence of the embedding process. 
There are different approaches that could be applied to observe the artefacts caused by the 
embedding process, the basic approaches are visual, structural and statistical steganalysis. 
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3.4.1 Visual Steganalysis 
Visual attacks (and aural for audio files) are the simplest approach of steganalysis. The visual 
attack removes significant parts from the media file and utilises human senses for examination 
(i.e. seeing and hearing), as human senses are capable of complex analysis that can outperform 
the power of computers in many ways (Wayner, 2002). 
The most common visual attack on images is done by displaying the least significant bits of an 
image and analysing its randomness with human eyes. (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000) clearly 
stated and proved that the least significant bits of luminance values of digital images are not 
completely random, whereas many authors wrongly assumed the complete randomness of the 
least significant bits in the image’s luminance values. Therefore, the existence of the hidden 
message could be noticed by having a completely random noise, as shown in Figure ‎3.1 (Westfeld 
& Pfitzmann, 2000). 
 
Figure ‎3.1: The visual attack; (a) is a clean image and (b) is a stego image with an embedding rate of 0.5 
3.4.2 Structural Steganalysis 
Embedding secret messages into any digital media leads to some changes in the data file format 
(or characteristic structure) (Wayner, 2002). Identifying these changes in the characteristic 
structure of any digital object can help the steganalyser to find the presence of hidden contents. 
However, structural attacks could be difficult because there are a range of physical structures to 
represent any digital media file, like texture, colour and contrast variance in normal images 
(Watters, Martin, & Stripf, 2005). Also, there are other circumstances that can affect the 
structural detection of hidden contents, like reducing the modification rate or using a larger cover 
file. Thus, in these cases statistical or visual attacks may perform better. 
There are a number of structural steganalysis methods proposed to detect data embedding with 
LSB replacement in digital images, the most sensitive detection methods could be found in 
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previous studies (Dumitrescu, Wu, & Wang, 2003; Fridrich et al., 2001b; Fridrich, Goljan, & Soukal, 
2003; Lu, Luo, Tang, & Shen, 2005; T. Zhang & Ping, 2003b). Based on having many commonalities 
among structural detectors of LSB embedding steganography in digital images, (A. Ker, 2005a) 
proposed a general framework of structural steganalysis for LSB replacement steganography that 
uses the structure or combinational properties of the LSB embedding method to detect and 
estimate the length of the hidden message.  
3.4.3 Statistical Steganalysis 
Mathematical statistics are used by scientists to determine whether some events occur at random 
or to prove their theory of explaining the event. As embedded messages are usually more random 
than the replaced information of the cover media (Wayner, 2002), many of these statistical 
methods can be used to indicate the availability of hidden content. Chi-square (  ) is the simplest 
such statistical test to identify the randomness in an observed sequence of events. Chi-square 
attack (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000) can detect the equally distributed least significant bits in 
digital image pixel values, which result from LSB embedding process and makes the frequency of 
each pair of values equal. Low scores indicate a high degree of randomness, which means there is 
a probability of having hidden contents. 
Another statistical test of detecting LSB replacement in coloured images is measuring the number 
of close colours. These close colour pairs are different by maximum of one unit in each of their 
colour components (Red, Green, and Blue). Images with hidden content are expected to have 
more close pairs than clean ones (Fridrich & Long, 2000; N. Johnson & S. Jajodia, 1998; N. F. 
Johnson & S. Jajodia, 1998; Maes, 1998). 
Basic LSB steganography could be detected with the previously stated statistical methods. 
However, more complicated LSB embedding methods can avoid this kind of analysis, for example 
if the embedding process does not affect the histogram of the image. (Sun, Chen, & Wang, 2006) 
used a certain method to swap PoVs with each other instead of flipping their least significant bits. 
The swapping process neither changes the statistical profile of the least significant bits nor the 
overall distribution of colours in the image (Wayner, 2002). 
There are other more sophisticated statistical analyses that work by applying a number of 
functions that can be used to model images like wavelet functions (Buccigrossi & Simoncelli, 1999; 
Rinaldo & Calvagno, 1995; Shapiro, 1993), by which the coefficients of these wavelet 
decompositions could be analysed by finding the mean, variance, skewness and kurtosis to 
indicate the presence or absence of the hidden content (Wayner, 2002). 
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3.5 Steganalysis Types 
As the detection of hidden contents can be modelled as a classification problem, it divides the 
given objects into two disjoined subsets of clean and stego objects. Some steganalysis methods 
are capable of detecting a group of steganography methods, and some steganalysis methods are 
designed to detect a specific embedding method. Thus, according to the range of detecting 
steganographic methods, the steganalysis can be classified into three main types; blind, semi-
blind and targeted steganalysis (Cox et al., 2008). 
3.5.1 Blind (or Universal) Steganalysis  
If a warden has no prior information about the covert communication between Alice and Bob, 
except a certain level of suspicion, then she must develop such a steganalysis method that is 
capable of detecting all (or at least a wide range of) steganographic methods (Cox et al., 2008). 
Thus, the blind or universal steganalysis methods are intended to detect the existence of the 
secret message without having any prior knowledge about the embedding function (Lou, Chou, 
Tso, & Chiu, 2012). This type of steganalysis has the flexibility to be applied to different kinds of 
steganographic algorithms and also to be used in real-life situations like the analysis of digital 
forensics. However, they are less accurate in detection compared to targeted steganalysis 
schemes (Kharrazi, Sencar, & Memon, 2006). The fundamental concept of a blind steganalysis is 
to extract some features directly affected by message embedding, then classify the digital objects 
by using some classifiers.  
The selection of statistical features is the key concern of designing any blind steganalysis 
algorithm. The most common typical statistical features are the probability of density function 
(PDF) moment and characteristic function (CF) moment (Xiangyang, Fenlin, Shiguo, Chunfang, & 
Gritzalis, 2011). Examples of such blind steganalysis methods include that proposed by Farid et al. 
(Farid, 2002), based on wavelet-like decomposition and PDF moments, and the accuracy of the 
method was improved by extracting features from three colour components of RGB images by 
(Lyu & Farid, 2003). Many studies have explored this area in depth (Goljan, Fridrich, & Holotyak, 
2006; Gul & Kurugollu, 2010; Han, Fenlin, & Xiangyang, 2009; B. Li, Huang, & Shi, 2008; Y. Q. Shi et 
al., 2005; Xiaochuan, Yunhong, Tieniu, & Guo, 2006; Xuan et al., 2005). 
3.5.2 Semi-Blind Steganalysis 
If a warden is expecting the steganographic communication between Alice and Bob and has an 
idea about the possible steganographic algorithms they use, then she must have a special 
steganalaysis algorithm that can detect this range of steganographic schemes. The semi-blind (or 
semi-universal) steganalysis scheme could be applied on a selected set of steganographic 
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algorithms (Gireesh Kumar, Jithin, & Shankar, 2010). For example, steganalysis methods proposed 
in previous studies (Chunhua & Shi, 2008; Fridrich, 2005; Pevny & Fridrich, 2007; Y. Shi, Chen, & 
Chen, 2007) can accurately detect many JPEG steganographic schemes, but they may not be 
effective for spatial steganography (B. Li et al., 2011). 
3.5.3 Targeted (or Specific) Steganalysis 
If a warden is certain about the existence of covert communication between Alice and Bob and is 
also aware of the steganographic method they used, then she must develop a steganalysis 
method that is capable of detecting hidden messages embedded with their steganography 
method only. The targeted or specific steganalysis schemes use full knowledge of a specific 
(targeted) steganographic algorithm and are designed specifically to detect such a scheme (Cox et 
al., 2008). They are more reliable with better performance in detection than the universal 
schemes (Lou et al., 2012). Hence, many current targeted steganalysis methods are extended and 
could be classified as active steganalysis techniques, as they estimate the embedded message 
size. For example, these include LSB replacement steganalysis methods like regular and singular 
(RS) methods (Fridrich et al., 2001b), weighted stego (WS) (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004; Andrew D Ker 
& Böhme, 2008), sample pair analysis (SPA) (Dumitrescu et al., 2003), difference image histogram 
(DIH) (Tao & Xijian, 2003), and least squares method (LSM) (Lu et al., 2005).  
3.6 Steganalysis Attacks 
The possible attacks on steganographic schemes are similar to cryptography in terminology with 
some considerable technical differences. The steganalyst applies steganalysis methods in order to 
detect the existence of the secret message, whereas cryptanalyst applies the cryptanalysis 
methods to get the plain text from the encrypted version (Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 
2000). However, if the secret message was encrypted before embedding, then the cryptanalysis 
methods may be applied, after retrieving the hidden information by a specific steganalysis 
method, if the retrieval of the message content is considered necessary. The steganalysis attack 
techniques are stego-only attack, known cover attack, known message attack, chosen stego 
attack, chosen message attack and known stego attack. 
3.6.1 Stego-Only Attack 
The stego-only attack could be considered the most realistic technique of practical steganalysis, 
by which the stego object is the only thing available to steganalysers (Stefan Katzenbeisser & 
Petitcolas, 2000). This type of attack relies on the content (or features) of the cover object and 
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utilises some specific statistical methods to find any artefact caused by the embedding process in 
relation to the expected normal cover type. 
3.6.2 The Known Cover Attack 
The known cover attack is a less common technique of steganalysis attack in which both cover 
and stego objects are available for steganalysers (Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000). The 
attacker should consider the difference between both digital media (cover and stego) to conclude 
some information about the embedding process and the location of the secret message. 
Nowadays, it is less applicable because there are millions of digital objects on the web, especially 
images, and also creating digital objects like images specifically for steganographic purposes 
became very easy with the increasing affordability of digital equipment.  
3.6.3 Known Message Attack 
The known message attack may be very difficult and considered like stego-only attack (Stefan 
Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000). It considers the availability of the hidden message, therefore 
the attacker should analyse the stego object to find the pattern that matches the hidden message 
for future attacks on the system. 
3.6.4 Chosen Stego Attack 
The chosen stego attack assumes that both the steganography algorithm and stego object are 
available to the attacker (Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000), thus the attacker may use 
them to find an estimated version of the hidden message. 
3.6.5 Chosen Message Attack 
Chosen message attack is considered as the most powerful attack (Lin & Delp, 1999), by which the 
steganalyst has access to the steganographic algorithm and can generate a stego object from his 
own message (Stefan Katzenbeisser & Petitcolas, 2000). The purpose of this type of attack is the 
determination of corresponding patterns in the stego object to be used for detecting a specific 
steganographic method. 
3.6.6 Known Stego Attack 
A known stego attack assumes that the attacker has access to both the original and stego objects 
and knows the embedding algorithm (Alturki & Mersereau, 2001). The scrambling key is not 
known by the attacker and the retrieval of the hidden message or discovering the key may be 
considered as the main goal for this type of attack. 
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3.7 Steganalysis as a Binary Classifier 
Since the identification of embedded secret data in suspected media is the main goal of 
steganalysis, it can be modelled as a classification problem to determine whether the analysed 
media is stego or cover. 
The general approach of classification can be defined as a task of dividing some objects into a 
number of disjoint classes in such a way that each object is classified to only one class, and no 
object remains unclassified (Max, 2007). More specifically, steganalysis could be considered as a 
binary classifier that classifies a set of digital media into two disjoint classes of stego and clean 
objects.  
Before discussing the performance measurement of any steganalysis method, some details will be 
given about the classification model of steganalysis. The binary classifier of steganalysis considers 
two class labels: Positive (P) and Negative (N). These represent stego and clean classes, 
respectively. The steganalysis classifier maps each instance from Instances (I) to one element of 
the set {   }.  
Based on the classification model, the output could be probabilistic (or continuous); the estimated 
probability of instance’s class membership, or discrete class label of the instance’s predicted class 
(Fawcett, 2003). Hence, according to the discrete class labels or specifying the detection 
threshold, there are four possible outcomes in this type of classification: true positives, false 
negatives, true negatives, and false positives, as explained in the following sections. 
3.7.1 True Positives and False Negatives 
Instances from actual positive (stego) class could be classified to either positive or negative 
classes by the classifier. True positive (TP) is the case when an actual positive instance is classified 
as positive by the classifier. False negative (FN) is the case when an instance is classified as 
negative by the classifier, while it is actually positive. All instances from true positives and false 
negatives belong to the actual positive (stego) class. 
3.7.2 True Negatives and False Positives  
Instances from actual negative (clean) class could be classified to either positive or negative 
classes by the classifier. True negative (TN) is the case when an actual negative instance is 
classified as negative by the classifier, and false positive (FP) is the case when an instance is 
classified as positive by the classifier, while it is actually negative. All instances from true negatives 
and false positives belong to the actual negative (clean) class. 
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3.7.3 Confusion Matrix 
When a steganalysis method is applied on a set of testing instances of stego and cover media, a 
two-by-two confusion matrix (or contingency table) can be structured that represents the 
dispositions of the classified instances (Fawcett, 2003). The confusion matrix of steganalysis 
classification has two rows and columns, where the rows represent the actual classifications and 
the columns represent the predicted classifications (or detection results) (Max, 2007), as shown in 
Figure ‎3.2. 
 Predicted Stego (P) Predicted Clean (N) 
Actual Stego (p) True Positives (TP) False Negatives (FN) 
Actual Clean (n) False Positives (FP) True Negatives (TN) 
   
Figure ‎3.2: Confusion matrix of a binary classifier (steganalysis) 
So, the row-wise summation gives the total number of actual positive and negative instances of 
the testing data set, as in following; 
          (3.1) 
          (3.2) 
Also, the column wise summation gives the total number of classified as positive and negative 
instances of the testing data, as in the following; 
          (3.3) 
          (3.4) 
There are two types of classification errors; false positives (known as Type 1 error) and false 
negatives (known as Type 2 error). These two types of error are not always equally important and 
are highly dependent on the application. More details on this can be found in (Max, 2007). 
The perfect classifier would have the value of (TP = p) and (TN = n). Other values would be (FP = 0) 
and (FN = 0). In other words, only leading diagonal entries of the confusion matrix would be non-
zero.  
3.8 Steganalysis Performance Evaluation 
The confusion matrix forms the basis for many evaluation metrics. The most important 
measurements are the following (Max, 2007): 
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- True positive rate (or sensitivity) is the ratio of stego instances that are correctly classified 
as stego. 
       
  
 
   (3.5) 
- False positive rate (or false alarm rate) is the ratio of clean instances that are wrongly 
classified as stego. 
       
  
 
   (3.6) 
- True negative rate (or specificity) is the ratio of clean instances that are correctly classified 
as clean. 
       
  
 
   (3.7) 
- False negative rate is the ratio of stego instances that are wrongly classified as clean. 
       
  
 
   (3.8) 
- Precision (or positive predictive value) is the ratio of instances classified as stego that are 
really stego. 
          
  
     
 
  
 
   (3.9) 
- Accuracy (or predictive accuracy) is the ratio of instances that are correctly classified. 
         
       
     
   (3.10) 
- F1 Score is a combined measurement of precision and sensitivity. 
         
                         
                       
   (3.11) 
- Error rate is the ratio of instances that are incorrectly classified. 
           
       
     
   (3.12) 
The number of actual positive instances (p) and the number of actual negative instances (n) are 
fixed for a given set of testing instances. However, different classifiers will give different 
performance measurements when applied to the same set of instances. As can be observed from 
the above equations, all performance measurements could be found by knowing the true positive 
rate (TPrate) and false positive rate (FPrate), as well as the fixed values of positive (p) and 
negative (n) instances of the testing set. Therefore, the steganalysis classifier can be characterised 
by its true positive rate and false positive rate, in which their values range from 0 to 1 inclusively. 
It is generally assumed that the predictive accuracy is the best (or only) way to measure the 
performance of the classifier. However, this is not necessarily the case, because it is derived from 
values in both rows of the confusion matrix, which are affected directly by the comparative size of 
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(p) and (n). In contrast, the TPrate and the FPrate values are independent from the comparative 
size of (p and n), as they are calculated from different rows of confusion matrix (Max, 2007). 
For example, for the same classifier if we assume the confusion matrix is as in Figure ‎3.3, the true 
positive rate will be 0.89 and the false positive rate will be 0.2. 
 Predicted Stego (P) Predicted Clean (N) 
Actual Stego (p = 9,000) 8,000 1,000 
Actual Clean (n = 10,000) 2,000 8,000 
   
Figure ‎3.3: The first example of confusion matrix 
The predictive accuracy, according to equation 3.10, would be 0.842. However, increasing the 
number of positive instances from 9,000 to 90,000 would produce another confusion matrix like 
Figure ‎3.4. 
 Predicted Stego (P) Predicted Clean (N) 
Actual Stego (p = 90,000) 80,000 10,000 
Actual Clean (n = 10,000) 2,000 8,000 
   
Figure ‎3.4: The second example of confusion matrix 
So, the true positive rate and the false positive rate will not be affected by this, while the 
predictive accuracy (equation 3.10) will change from 0.842 to 0.88. Also, if we change the value of 
negative instances from 10,000 to 100,000 of the first example, another confusion matrix will be 
produced like in Figure ‎3.5. 
 Predicted Stego (P) Predicted Clean (N) 
Actual Stego (p = 9,000) 8,000 1,000 
Actual Clean (n = 100,000) 20,000 80,000 
   
Figure ‎3.5: The third example of confusion matrix 
The values of true positive rate and the false positive rate still remain unchanged, while the 
predictive accuracy will change from 0.842 to 0.807 for the same classifier. 
Hence, the three predictive accuracies above will reflect changes in the comparative numbers of 
positive and negative values in the testing set of instances without changing the quality of the 
classifier in terms of TPrate and FPrate. 
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3.8.1 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Graph 
The ROC (‘Receiver Operating Characteristics’) graph is a two-dimensional graph with a false 
positive rate plotted on the horizontal axis and the true positive rate plotted on the vertical access 
(Fawcett, 2003). 
A discrete classifier only gives a class label for each instance of the testing set, and produces a 
single point in ROC space. Each point on the ROC graph (x,y) indicates the false positive rate as x 
and the true positive rate as y, whereby their values are between 0 and 1 inclusively. There are 
some important points on the ROC graph like: (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and (1,1), each of which specifies 
a special case of the classifier (Max, 2007): 
- The point (0, 1) represents the perfect classifier, which correctly classifies every instance 
of the testing set. Hence, its number of predicted true positive instances is equal to the 
actual number of positive instances (TP = p) and its number of predicted true negative 
instances is equal to the actual number of negative instances (TN = n). 
- The point (1, 0) represents the worst possible classifier, which wrongly classifies every 
instance of the testing set. Hence, its number of predicted true positive instances is zero 
(TP = 0) and its number of predicted true negative instances is zero (TN = 0). 
- The point (1, 1) represents the ultra-liberal classifier, which always predicts the positive 
class. Hence, its number of predicted true positive instances is equal to the actual number 
of actual positive instances (TP = p) and its number of predicted true negative instances is 
zero (TN = 0). 
- The last point (0, 0) represents the ultra-conservative classifier, which always predicts the 
negative class. Hence, the number of predicted true positive instances is zero (TP = 0) and 
its number of predicted true negative instances is equal to the actual number of negative 
instances (TN = n). 
Another important component of the ROC graph is the diagonal line that connects the points (0, 
0) and (1, 1), which corresponds to the random guess. Any classifier performance point located on 
this line (points with equal values of false positive and true positive rates) indicates the random 
guess. Informally, any classifier located above the line of random guess is considered better than 
the random classifier. Also, the closer the classifier is to the perfect point (1, 0), the better it is. 
For example, in Figure ‎3.6 classifier A is better than classifier B, and they are both better than 
classifier C, which is no more than a random classifier. 
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Figure ‎3.6: An example of ROC graph 
Classifiers located under the line of random guess, like classifier D, which is worse than random 
guess, could be changed to a better classifier (classifier D’ in Figure ‎3.6) by reversing its 
predictions in such a way that replaces the predicted positive instances with predicted negatives, 
and vice versa. 
Some classifiers, like a Naive Bayes, normally produce a degree of membership for each instance 
as a numeric value known as probability or score of class membership. This type of probabilistic 
classifier could be used as a discrete classifier by setting a threshold value to output Yes or No 
labels for each instance of the testing set. Different threshold values, changing it from minimum 
possible value to the maximum possible value, produce different points in ROC space, which could 
be joined to form a ROC curve (Fawcett, 2003). 
3.8.2 Finding the Best Classifier 
For a given application, there is more than one method of finding the best classifier. The 
Euclidean distance is one of the approaches of measuring the performance of discrete classifiers; 
it measures the distance between the perfect classifier (0, 1) and the point that represents the 
performance of the given classifier on the ROC graph by the following equation (Max, 2007): 
    √                      (3.13) 
For the perfect classifier (0, 1), the     is zero, and for the worst classifier (1, 0) it is √ . Hence, 
the smaller value of     represents a better classifier. However, it does not take the relative 
importance of true and false positives into account. 
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There is also a possibility to have a weighted version of the Euclidean distance equation like the 
following (Max, 2007): 
     √                            (3.14) 
Here, setting the value of   to zero reduces the weighted equation to             , which 
means minimizing the false positive rate is the only aim. Also, setting the value of   to 1 reduces 
the weighted equation to         –        , which means maximising the true positive rate 
is the only aim. Another possible value of  is 0.5, having equal weights for both. 
For probabilistic classifiers that are usually represented by an ROC curve, the common method of 
comparing different classifiers is to calculate the area under the curve (AUC), whose value ranges 
between 0 and 1. The greater AUC represents a better average performance of the classifier. 
However, no realistic classifier should have an AUC value less than 0.5, as it is the AUC value of 
the line of random guess between the two points of (0, 0) and (1, 1) (Fawcett, 2003). 
Figure ‎3.7 shows two classifiers A and B. It can be seen that the AUC of classifier B is greater than 
the AUC of classifier A. Note that the area of classifier B also exists under the area of classifier A. 
This shows that classifier B has a better performance than classifier A. 
 
Figure ‎3.7: An example of ROC curve 
3.9 Steganalysis and Digital Forensics 
If the detection was not the only requirement and further tasks were needed, like extracting 
some attributes of the secret message or the embedding method, then forensic steganalysis is 
deployed. In some cases where other types of attack are not possible or not applicable, the 
forensic steganalysis would be the best. For example, after the warden was certain about the 
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steganographic communication between Alice and Bob, she may not have access to the resources 
to block the communication or does not want to break the communication in order to not let 
Alice and Bob know about the process of monitoring their communications (Cox et al., 2008). 
The embedding algorithm could be known by examining the characteristics of embedding 
changes, and then it would be possible to determine the location of embedding and possibly 
extract at least the approximate version of the hidden message. In general, the amount of 
information known by the warden directly affects the possible type of attack, which in most cases 
would be stego-only attack. However, if more information were available to the warden, she 
could possibly perform further actions like known cover attack. For example, in the digital 
investigation process it is possible to have the suspect’s computer for analysis, which may contain 
both cover and stego objects on the hard disk (Cox et al., 2008). Moreover, for law enforcement, 
especially cybercrime and copyright issues, the steganalysis tools are considered very important 
(Fridrich & Goljan, 2002). 
3.10 Significant Steganalysis Algorithms of LSB Embedding 
As the LSB embedding is the most common available steganographic method, it is important to 
describe three of the most well-known algorithms for both targeted and blind steganalysis in the 
spatial domain. 
3.10.1 The Histogram Attack 
The histogram attack is one of the early statistical steganalysis methods in the literature (Westfeld 
& Pfitzmann, 2000). It uses the characteristic artefacts left by LSB embedding in the histogram of 
pixel values. For instance, LSB embedding changes the even (2i) and the odd (2i+1) pixel values 
into each other; by adding 1 to even values and subtracting 1 from the odd values. This value 
transition happens when the LSB of the pixel value does not match the certain secret message bit. 
In general, it is expected that half of the pixel values will already contain the right value, and only 
the other half will change. 
If    and    denote the number of pixels with the intensity value of   in the stego and clean 
images respectively, then for the relative message length of  , the expected stego intensity 
histogram could be determined by the following equation: 
      (  
 
 
)       
 
 
 {
                  
                 
   (3.15) 
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Of course, a random bit-stream is considered as a secret message, assuming that the secret 
message is encrypted or compressed (Cox et al., 2008). So, for the embedding rate of 1, the 
histogram bins will be very close for each pair of values (2i and 2i+1). Also, the sum of frequencies 
is invariant in each pair of values before and after embedding, as shown below: 
                                  (3.16) 
Without losing generality, the even values could be taken for a statistical test. Hence, the 
expected theoretical value for even valued histogram bins could be found by the following 
formula, for the embedding rate of 1: 
  ̅̅ ̅     (               )     (3.17) 
So, the Pearson’s chi-square test is applied with       degree of freedom, which is 127, to 
decide whether          ̅̅ ̅     or not, as shown below: 
  ∑
[         ̅̅ ̅    ]
 
  ̅̅ ̅    
 
     (3.18) 
The unpopulated grey scales,   ̅̅ ̅      , will be omitted to make sure that   is approximately 
chi-square distributed. A small value of   implies the existence of LSB embedding and large values 
of   indicates that the image is clean and no message is embedded using the LSB method. The 
statistical significance of   is calculated by finding the p-value, as shown below: 
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       (3.19) 
The p-value ranges between 0 to 1; 0 indicates that there is no hidden message, and 1 indicates 
that the image contains hidden message with the embedding rate of 1. This test can be used 
when the embedding is sequential and can also indicate the existence of the hidden message for 
bit rates of less than 1. This could be achieved by testing the image from 1% to 100% of the total 
pixels of the image. Hence, if 50% of the image contains hidden message, then the location and 
the embedding rate could be visualised as shown in Figure ‎3.8. 
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Figure ‎3.8: p-value vs. percentage of visited pixels for the embedding rate of 0.5 
For pseudo-randomly selected pixels, this method stays efficient only when the majority of image 
pixels have been used by the embedding process. Therefore, this method has been generalised by 
calculating   using a sliding window over the pixel values of the image (N Provos & Honeyman, 
2001). 
Another method of extending the histogram attack to detect randomly distributed messages is 
examining the hashes (Westfeld, 2003) of small groups of adjacent pixels or colour components of 
a single pixel. This method can detect a random LSB embedding with an embedding rate of 0.3 
and above. 
3.10.2 Sample Pairs Analysis 
The histogram attack on LSB steganography cannot be applied on stego images with low 
embedding rates of pseudo-randomly selected pixels, due to ignoring the neighbouring pixels’ 
dependency in clean images. Hence, it is possible to utilise the spatial correlation in natural 
images for developing more reliable and accurate detection methods. A very good example is SPA 
(Dumitrescu, Wu, & Memon, 2002; Fridrich, Goljan, & Du, 2001a). SPA starts by declaring   as a 
set of all horizontally adjacent pixel pairs in the image, and then divides it into three disjoint 
subsets named  ,  , and   where: 
  {                                                  } 
  {                                                  } 
  {            } 
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Moreover, it divides   into  and  , where: 
  {                                     } 
      
Now, the primary sets are              , where: 
          
The LSB embedding will result in changing a given pixel pair       to transfer its membership to 
one of the primary sets according to the modification pattern, as shown in Table ‎3.1. 
Table ‎3.1: Modification patterns 
Modification pattern Changes to       
00 Both values stay unmodified 
01 Only   is modified 
10 Only   is modified 
11 Both values are modified 
 
Since the relative number of modified pixels for LSB embedding with an embedding rate of   is 
   , then the probability of having a certain modification pattern is obtained by the following: 
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Now, it is possible to denote the cardinalities of the primary sets after embedding of the relative 
message length of  . 
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After assuming         for natural images, the embedding rate for a certain image could be 
found by obtaining the smaller root of the following quadratic equation: 
 
 
                            
                  
This detection method is further elaborated in previous studies (Böhme & Ker, 2006; Dumitrescu 
et al., 2003; A. Ker, 2005b; Andrew D. Ker, 2004; Andrew D Ker, 2007b; Lu et al., 2005), and it was 
extended to groups of more than two pixels by (Dumitrescu & Wu, 2005; A. Ker, 2005a). There are 
also some other related approaches in the literature (Chandramouli & Memon, 2001; Dabeer, 
Sullivan, Madhow, Chandrasekaran, & Manjunath, 2004; Fridrich & Goljan, 2004; Fridrich, Goljan, 
& Soukal, 2003; K. Lee, Westfeld, & Lee, 2006; Xiaopi, Yunhong, & Tieniu, 2004; T. Zhang & Ping, 
2003a, 2003b). 
3.10.3 Blind Steganalysis in the Spatial Domain 
The spatial domain and JPEG domain blind steganalysis are similar, but they use different 
features; for example, the calibration based method of JPEG domain cannot be applied for spatial 
domain, rather noise reduction filters are used (Kivanc Mihcak, Kozintsev, Ramchandran, & 
Moulin, 1999). 
The spatial domain steganographic methods can be illustrated as adding noise with certain 
properties (Cox et al., 2008). Hence, the histogram of the stego image is a convolution of both 
probabilities of mass function of the cover and noise signals. As the noise signals represent a low 
pass filtering on the histogram of the image, the histogram of the stego signal will be smoother 
than the histogram of the cover signal, and the low frequencies will have more concentrated 
energy. 
Thus, the histogram characteristic function (HCF) of the stego image is represented by the 
Fourier-transformed values of the histogram. 
  [ ]    [ ]  [ ]               
Where   and   represent the HCFs of stego and cover images respectively, and   is the Fourier 
representation of the probability mass function of the added noise signal. 
There are a number of steganalysis methods based on HCF (Harmsen & Pearlman, 2003; A. D. Ker, 
2005a, 2005b), and other features used by blind steganalysis methods have been demonstrated 
(Avcibaş, Kharrazi, Memon, & Sankur, 2005; Lyu & Farid, 2003; Westfeld, 2003; Xuan et al., 2005). 
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3.11 Summary 
The main purpose of steganalysis is the detection of hidden messages in digital media files. 
Further requirements like recovering the attributes of the hidden message (its length or content) 
and identifying the stego key and embedding method are the aim of forensic steganalysis. 
Generally, there are two approaches for detecting LSB steganography. One is to use the specific 
structural properties like LSB embedding method, for example sample pairs (Dumitrescu et al., 
2003), the pairs analysis (Fridrich, Goljan, & Soukal, 2003), and difference histogram (T. Zhang & 
Ping, 2003b). These methods consider pairs of pixels with different selection schemes (A. Ker, 
2005a). Other detectors rely on extracting the feature vectors using signal processing techniques 
for some sort of learning machine. This approach could be a very simple noise detector (Harmsen 
& Pearlman, 2003) or a sophisticated wavelet method (Lyu & Farid, 2004). 
There are three main classes of steganalysis methods: blind (or universal), semi-blind and 
targeted. The universal steganalysis methods can detect a wide range of embedding methods. 
However, they are less accurate than targeted methods and do not give any information about 
the characteristics of the hidden message (A. Ker, 2005a). 
Both histogram attack and sample pairs analysis can estimate the length of the hidden message. 
However, the histogram attack can accurately detect the sequential LSB embedding, whereas 
sample pairs analysis can detect pseudo-randomly distributed LSB embedding. Moreover, passive 
steganalysis is the most common type steganalysis technique, whereas the most realistic 
steganographic attack technique is the stego-only attack. 
All steganalysis methods can be modelled as a classification problem. Hence, tools like pattern 
recognition and machine learning can also be applied. The steganalysis classifier can be 
characterised by its true positive and false positive rates, as they are not affected by the 
comparative size of positive and negative instances in the testing set. Both true positive and false 
positive rates can be visualised in a two dimensional ROC graph, to determine the performance of 
the classifier.  
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CHAPTER 4: SINGLE MISMATCH STEGANOGRAPHY 
4.1 Introduction 
LSB replacement is the most widely used embedding method because it is extremely easy to 
implement, has a reasonable capacity, and is visually imperceptible. However, it can reliably be 
detected by current steganalysis methods, so modified versions of the LSB replacement method 
have been proposed by steganographers to reduce the probability of detection and improve their 
capacity. The extensions of LSB replacement that have received great attention from 
steganographers focus on two least significant bits (2LSB) replacement, because this replacement 
method is still visually imperceptible, has a higher capacity than LSB embedding, is very easy to 
implement and results in more complex changes to the intensity histogram of the cover image. 
However, 2LSB replacement is detectable by some steganalysis methods. Additionally, high bit-
planes in the embedding process will degrade the quality of the stego image and negatively affect 
its visual imperceptibility. 
Since the probability of detection is highly dependent on the amount of changes in the cover 
image as a result of inserting a larger amount of noise, developing an embedding method with 
fewer changes to the cover image pixel values for the same amount of secret data is considered 
important to reduce the probability of detection in both LSB and 2LSB steganography of digital 
images. In this chapter, a new method of both LSB and 2LSB steganography (which depends on 
the match/mismatch cases) is proposed in still images to improve the embedding efficiency and 
reduce the probability of detection by their targeted steganalysis methods. Moreover, the 
proposed method results in less bit-level changes on the pixel values of the cover image and 
modifies the intensity histogram in a different way. 
The single mismatch, we proposed in this chapter, always creates single mismatch between two 
bits of the secret message and the LSBs of the image pixel values. We are going to demonstrate 
that the proposed method outperforms the security of different methods of LSB and 2LSB 
steganography by reducing the probability of detection with their current targeted steganalysis 
methods. Other advantages of the proposed method include reducing the overall bit-level 
changes to the cover image for the same amount of embedded data and avoiding complex 
calculations. However, the new method results in small additional distortion in the stego image, 
which could be tolerated as discussed in later sections. 
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This chapter is organised as follows; it starts by introducing LSB steganography and steganalysis, 
and clarifying adaptive and non-adaptive LSB steganography in images, then it explains the 
concept of improving the embedding efficiency and its effect on the probability of detection and 
analyses different methods of non-adaptive LSB steganography in digital images. Later, a new 
proposed method of LSB steganography is discussed with its analysis, experimental results, and 
extraction process. After that, the 2LSB steganography and steganalysis are explained. Then, the 
concept of improving the embedding efficiency of 2LSB steganography is explained and the 2LSB 
replacement is analysed in detail. This is followed by the new proposed method with its analysis, 
experimental results and extraction process. Then, the conclusions of both proposed methods (for 
LSB and 2LSB steganography) are presented. 
4.2 LSB Steganography 
As mentioned earlier, LSB steganography is the most widely used embedding method in pixel 
domain, since it is easy to implement, has reasonable capacity, and is visually imperceptible. LSB 
replacement takes the selected pixel value and replaces its LSB value with 1-bit of the secret 
message. Since there is a probability of 50% that the LSB of the selected pixel value contains the 
desired bit value, it leaves half of the pixel values unmodified during the embedding process. 
Another well-known LSB steganography method is the LSB matching (±1 embedding). It is a 
modified version of the LSB replacement, where instead of simply replacing the LSB of the 
selected pixel value with the value of 1-bit of the secret message, the LSB matching randomly 
increases or decreases the pixel value if its LSB value does not match the value of the secret 
message bit. This again leaves the pixel value unmodified if its LSB value matches the value of the 
secret message bit. 
Unfortunately, both methods of LSB steganography (replacement and matching) are detectable 
by the current steganalysis approaches discussed in later sections. Therefore, some methods have 
been proposed to improve the capacity of LSB replacement based on pixel value differences and 
LSB replacement (D.-C. Wu & Tsai, 2003; H.-C. Wu, Wu, Tsai, & Hwang, 2005). To avoid changing 
the histogram of the cover image, another method was proposed by (Sun et al., 2006) using 
rearrangement and swapping phases, which reduce the embedding capacity by 50%. However, 
this method negatively affects the hiding capacity and the level of distortion, which affects the 
undetectability of this method. 
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4.3 LSB Steganalysis 
The imbalance distortion of LSB replacement data embedding causes the ‘Pairs of Values’ to 
appear in the intensity histogram of the stego image. This property could serve steganalysers a lot 
and enable them to propose accurate detection methods. Moreover, the LSB replacement is 
inherently asymmetric; there are many steganalysis methods that can reliably detect them 
(Andrew D Ker, 2007a), like regular-singular (RS) (Fridrich et al., 2001a), sample pairs (SP) 
(Dumitrescu et al., 2003) discussed in section ‎3.10.2, and weighted stego image (WS) (Fridrich & 
Goljan, 2004; Andrew D Ker & Böhme, 2008) analyses. 
The RS method proposed by (Fridrich et al., 2001a), divides an image into disjoint groups of 4-
neighboring pixels. They use the discrimination function (variation) to capture the smoothness in 
the pixel groups. They use two invertible operations F called flipping; F1 as 0↔1, 2↔3, …, 
254↔255 and F-1: -1↔0, 1↔2, …, 255↔256. In addition, they use an identity operation F0. 
Based on the discrimination function of the different flipped pixel groups, the pixel groups are 
divided into Regular, Singular and Unused groups.  
RS is a reliable method of detecting non-sequentially LSB embedding based on regular and 
singular groups. According to experimental results (Fridrich et al., 2001a), the upper bound of 
0.005 bits/ pixel is considered safe in terms of detection. The SP analysis (Dumitrescu et al., 2003) 
can accurately detect the LSB replacement embedding method based on a finite state machine of 
trace multi-sets, since flipping the LSBs will transfer these multi-sets into each other with given 
probabilities. Therefore, the statistical relations between the cardinalities of trace multi-sets will 
change. The concept of weighted stego image (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004; Andrew D Ker & Böhme, 
2008) can detect and estimate the size of the hidden message embedded with LSB replacement in 
random pixel positions. The problem of estimating the message length is formulated as a simple 
optimisation problem. The WS image steganalysis method was improved by (Andrew D Ker & 
Böhme, 2008) to detect a sequentially located payload by upgrading the three components of the 
detection method; the prediction of cover pixel, least-squares weight, and bias correction. 
Apart from the supervised machine learning detectors of LSB matching (or ±1 embedding) used by 
numerous studies (Giacomo Cancelli et al., 2008; Fridrich, Soukal, et al., 2005; Goljan et al., 2006; 
Sullivan, Madhow, Chandrasekaran, & Manjunath, 2006), which usually have problems in 
choosing an appropriate feature set and measuring classification error probabilities (Cogranne & 
Retraint, 2013), the methods of detecting LSB matching steganography could be divided into two 
categories: the centre of mass of the HCF and the amplitude of local extrema (ALE) (G. Cancelli, 
Doerr, Barni, & Cox, 2008). 
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A number of detection methods have been proposed based on the centre of mass of the 
histogram characteristic function (HCF-COM). That of (Harmsen & Pearlman, 2003) has better 
performance for RGB images than grey-scale. They relied on the fact that the LSB embedding 
method is equivalent to a low-pass filtering of the image histogram. This method was then 
modified and improved by Ker (A. D. Ker, 2005b), who applied the HCF in two novel ways: using 
the down sampled images and computing the adjacency histogram. 
Based on the ALE (Amplitude of Local Extrema), a targeted steganalysis method is proposed (J. 
Zhang et al., 2007) based on the fact that after applying LSB matching the local maxima of the 
image histogram will decrease and the local minima will increase. So, it considers the summation 
of the absolute differences of local extrema and their neighbours in the intensity histogram, 
which its value is expected to be smaller for stego images than the clean one.  This method was 
improved by (Giacomo Cancelli et al., 2008) after reducing the border effects of noise in the 
histogram and extending it to the ALE in the 2D adjacency histogram. 
4.4 Adaptive and Non-Adaptive LSB Steganography in Images 
The embedding process of LSB steganography relies on some methods for selecting the location 
of the change. In general, there are three selection rules to follow in order to control the location 
of change, which are either sequential, random or adaptive (Cox et al., 2008). 
A sequential selection rule modifies the cover object elements individually by embedding the 
secret message bits in a sequential way. For example, it is possible to embed the secret message 
by starting from the top-left corner of an image to the bottom-right corner in a row-wise manner. 
This selection rule, known as sequential, is very easy to implement, but has very low security 
against detection methods. 
A pseudo-random selection rule modifies the cover object by embedding the secret message bits 
into a pseudo-randomly chosen subset of the cover object, possibly by using a secret key as a 
PRNG. This type of selection rule gives a higher level of security than sequential methods. 
An adaptive selection rule modifies the cover object by embedding the secret message bits in 
selected locations based on the characteristics of the cover object. For example, choosing noisy 
and highly textured areas of the image would be less detectable than smooth areas for hiding 
data. This selection rule, known as adaptive, gives higher security than sequential and pseudo-
random selection rules in terms of detection. 
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Hence, the non-adaptive image steganography techniques modify the cover image for message 
embedding without considering its features (content). For example, LSB replacement and LSB 
matching with sequential or random selection of pixels modify the cover image according to the 
secret message and the key of random selection of pixels without taking the cover image 
properties into account. On the other hand, adaptive image steganography techniques modify the 
cover image in correlation with its features (Fridrich & Du, 2000). In other words, the selection of 
pixel positions for embedding is adaptive, depending on the content of the cover image. The bit-
plane complexity segmentation (BPCS) proposed by (Kawaguchi & Eason, 1999) is an early typical 
method of adaptive steganography. 
As adaptive steganographic schemes embed data in specific regions (such as edges), the 
steganographic capacity of such methods is highly dependent on the cover image used for 
embedding. Therefore, in general the adaptive schemes are expected to have less embedding rate 
than non-adaptive schemes. However, steganographers have to pay this price in order to have 
better security or less detectable stego images.  
4.5 Improving the Embedding Efficiency and Undetectability of LSB 
Undetectability is the most important requirement of any steganographic scheme, which is 
affected by the choice of the cover object, the type of embedding method, the selection rule of 
modifying places, and the number of embedding changes which are directly related to the length 
of secret message (Fridrich & Soukal, 2006). 
If two different embedding methods share the same source of cover objects, the same selection 
method of embedding place, and similar embedding operation, the one with less number of 
embedding changes will be more secure (i.e. less detectable) because the statistical property of 
the cover object is less likely to be disrupted by a smaller number of embedding changes (Fridrich 
& Soukal, 2006). 
The matrix encoding proposed by (Crandall, 1998), is one of the first attempts to reduce the 
number of changes during the embedding process. However, it limits the embedding capacity to 
67% and is not useful for the embedding rate of 1. 
The concept of embedding efficiency was introduced by (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2001), then 
considered as an important feature of steganographic schemes (Fridrich, Goljan, & Soukal, 2005; 
SALLEE, 2005), which is the expected number of embedded random message bits per single 
embedding change (Fridrich, Lisoněk, et al., 2007). 
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Reducing the expected number of modifications per pixel (ENMPP) is well studied in the 
literature, considering the embedding rate of less than 1, like Westfeld’s F5-algorithm (Westfeld, 
2001), which implements the matrix encoding to improve the efficiency of embedding. It uses 
permutative straddling to uniformly distribute the changes over the stego image. This method 
could improve the embedding efficiency only for short messages. However, short messages are 
already challenging to detect. Also, the source coding-based steganography (matrix embedding) 
proposed by Fridrich et al. (Fridrich, Lisoněk, et al., 2007; Fridrich & Soukal, 2006), which is an 
extension of F5-algorithm, improves the embedding efficiency for large payloads, but still with an 
embedding rate of less than 1. The stochastic modulation proposed by (Fridrich & Goljan, 2003) is  
another method of improving the security for the embedding rate of up to 0.8 bits/ pixel. 
Another method proposed by (Chan, 2009), to improve the embedding efficiency using a binary 
function for the consecutive pixels. However, this improvement relies on the cover image and 
secret message properties, which does not perform equally for different embedding cases. 
For the embedding rate of 1, there have been some methods for improving the embedding 
efficiency of LSB matching, like that of (Mielikainen, 2006), which reduced the ENMPP with the 
same message length from 0.5 to 0.375. The choice of whether to add or subtract one to/from a 
pixel value of their method relies on both the original pixel values and a pair of two consecutive 
secret bits. However, this method of embedding cannot be applied on saturated pixels (i.e. pixels 
with values 0 to 255), which is one of the drawbacks of the method. The generalisation method of 
LSB matching is proposed by (X. Li et al., 2009) with the same ENMPP for the same embedding 
rate using sum and difference covering set (SDCS), which is again has limitation when the pixel 
value is 0 or 255. Another method of improving the embedding efficiency of LSB matching is 
proposed by (W. Zhang, Zhang, & Wang, 2007) using a combination of binary codes and wet paper 
codes. The embedding efficiency of this method can achieve the upper bound of the generalised 
±1 embedding schemes. 
(Iranpour & Farokhian, 2013), also proposed an embedding method to improve the embedding 
efficiency using three binary functions to embed three bits of the secret message in three pixel 
values of the cover image. The ENMPP is 0.375 for the proposed method, but it has limitations in 
saturated pixel values (0 and 255). Hence, the maximum embedding capacity would be less than 
the LSB replacement.  
So, no method could be found in literature to improve the embedding efficiency of non-adaptive 
LSB embedding for the embedding rate of 1. Here we focus on developing an embedding method 
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that can achieve the ENMPP of 0.375 for the embedding rate of 1. Developing such a method 
could be more useful than other adaptive methods from a usability perspective. Moreover, the 
non-adaptive LSB embedding methods with higher embedding efficiency can be used by existing 
adapted embedding methods to improve the steganographic capacity and reduce the probability 
of detection. A good example of non-adaptive methods is the LSB matching revisited (Mielikainen, 
2006), which was extended in other studies (Huang, Zhao, & Ni, 2011; Kumar & Shunmuganathan, 
2012; Weiqi, Fangjun, & Jiwu, 2010). 
In this chapter, a new method of non-adaptive LSB steganography is proposed to reduce the 
probability of detection for the same amount of data embedded with LSB replacement, LSB 
matching, and LSB matching revisited (Mielikainen, 2006) by the current detection methods. The 
proposed method also results in fewer ENMPP in both pixel and bit-level to the cover image, and 
changes the histogram of the cover image in a different way, without any complex calculations. 
4.5.1 Analysis of LSB Replacement 
In this section, LSB replacement is analysed in three perspectives: the embedding process itself 
(with its embedding efficiency), its effect on the intensity histogram after embedding process, and 
the bit-level ENMPP for each bit of the secret message. Also, the main weaknesses of this 
embedding method are highlighted with the steganalysis methods that can detect it. 
LSB replacement steganography simply replaces the LSB of the cover image pixel value with the 
value of a single bit of the secret message. It leaves the pixel values unchanged when their LSB 
value matches the bit value of the secret message and changes the mismatched LSB by either 
incrementing or decrementing the even or odd pixel values by one respectively (Mielikainen, 
2006), as shown in Figure ‎4.1 for grey-scale image pixel values. 
 
Figure ‎4.1: Possible pixel value transitions with LSB replacement 
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Therefore, the embedding algorithm of the LSB replacement can be formally described as follows: 
   {
                                     
                                    
                                                        
   (4.1) 
Where,    and    represent the stego and cover image pixel values respectively, and b is the 
desired bit value of the secret message.  
To analyse the influence of the LSB replacement on the cover image intensity histogram, we 
should consider that there is a probability of 50% for the LSB of the cover image pixel value that 
already have the desired value. Therefore, the probability of modified pixel values will be (p/2) for 
an embedding rate of p and the unmodified pixel values will be (1-p/2) after the embedding 
process, which means that embedding each message bit needs 0.5 pixel values to be changed. In 
other words, it has an embedding efficiency of 2-bits of the secret message per one embedding 
change. Hence, the intensity histogram, using equation 4.1, of the stego image could be estimated 
as follows: 
      (  
 
 
)       
 
 
{
                   
                  
  (4.2) 
Where   is a grey-scale level which ranges from 0 to 255, and       and       indicate the 
number of pixels in the stego and cover images respectively, with grey-scale value of  . 
This type of embedding leads to an imbalance distortion and produces ‘Pairs of Values’ on the 
intensity histogram of the stego image. Since LSB replacement is inherently asymmetric, current 
steganalysis methods can detect it easily (Andrew D Ker, 2007a), including RS (Fridrich et al., 
2001a), SP (Dumitrescu et al., 2003), and WS (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004; Andrew D Ker & Böhme, 
2008). 
Another way of analysing LSB embedding is the bit-level ENMPP, which is the expected number of 
bit modifications per pixel. This is also important, as there are some steganalysis methods that 
can detect the existence of the secret message based on calculating several binary similarity 
measures between low bit-planes (Avcibaş et al., 2005). Hence, an embedding process with less 
bit-level ENMPP would be less detectable by such detection methods. 
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The overall bit-level ENMPP for LSB replacement could be estimated by multiplying the probability 
of having mismatched LSBs,      , which is 0.5 by the number of bits that needs to be changed in 
each case: 
                  ( )                      (4.3) 
                                                
Hence, the overall bit-level ENMPP for LSB replacement is 0.5 bits for each bit of the secret 
message. 
4.5.2 Analysis of LSB Matching (± Embedding) 
To analyse LSB matching steganography, the embedding process is considered (with its 
embedding efficiency), its effect on the intensity histogram of the cover image, and its bit-level 
ENMPP. 
LSB matching, or ±1 embedding, is a modified version of LSB replacement. Instead of simply 
replacing the LSB of the cover image, it randomly either adds or subtracts the cover image pixel 
value by one for LSB mismatched with the secret message bit (Sharp, 2001). The possible pixel 
value transitions of ±1 embedding are shown in Figure ‎4.2. 
 
Figure ‎4.2: Possible pixel value transitions with LSB matching 
The random increment or decrement in pixel values should maintain the boundary limitation, and 
pixel values should always remain between 0 and 255 (A. D. Ker, 2005b). In other words, the 
embedding process should neither subtract 1 from pixel values of 0 nor add 1 to the pixel values 
of 255. 
This random ±1 change to the mismatched LSB pixel values avoids the asymmetry changes to the 
cover image, which is the case with LSB replacement. Hence, LSB matching is considered harder to 
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detect than LSB replacement (Mielikainen, 2006). The embedding procedure of LSB matching can 
be formally represented as follows (Xi, Ping, & Zhang, 2010): 
   {
                                            
                                         
                                                                            
  (4.4) 
Where    and    represent the stego and cover image pixel values respectively, and   is an 
independent and identically distributed random variable with uniform distribution on {     }. 
For the intensity histogram we consider an embedding rate of  . There is a chance of 50% that the 
clean image pixel value contains the desired LSB, which means that       of the cover pixel 
values will change after the embedding process. Hence, the estimated unmodified pixel values 
will be        , which means that embedding each message bit needs 0.5 pixel values to be 
changed. In other words, its embedding efficiency is 2-bits of the secret message per one 
embedding change. The intensity histogram of the stego image could be obtained as follows (Xi et 
al., 2010), using equation 4.4: 
      (  
 
 
)       
 
 
[               ]  (4.5) 
As mentioned earlier, the LSB matching will avoid the asymmetric property in modifying the cover 
image. However, as claimed by (J. Zhang et al., 2007), ±1 embedding is reduced to a low pass 
filtering of the intensity histogram. This implies that the cover histogram contains more high-
frequency power than the histogram of the stego image (Xi et al., 2010), which offers an 
opportunity to steganalysers to detect the existence of the secret message embedded with LSB 
matching. 
The methods of detecting ±1 embedding, excluding the supervised machine learning detectors, 
are divided into two main categories; the centre of mass of the HCF and the ALE (G. Cancelli et al., 
2008). 
The bit-level ENMPP of LSB matching is also important and should be considered, especially for 
steganalysis methods like binary similarity measures. Since the probability of having mismatched 
LSB is also 50%, based on the equation 4.3, the bit-level ENMPP would be as follows: 
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Where     ̅  is the probability of having mismatched LSBs, which is 0.5. However, the number of 
modified bits would be more than 1, because of the random ±1 changes to the pixel values, as 
noted from the following examples: 
127 (0111111)2 + 1 = 128 (10000000)2    , 8-bits changed 
192 (11000000)2 - 1 = 191 (10111111)2   , 7-bits changed 
7 (00000111)2 + 1 = 8 (00001000)2          , 4-bits changed 
240 (11110000)2 - 1 = 239 (11101111)2   , 5-bits changed 
Hence, the overall bit-level ENMPP for LSB matching is expected to be more than or equal to 0.5 
bits for each bit of the secret message. 
4.6 Single Mismatch LSB Steganography (SMLSB) 
Based on highlighting the weakness of both LSB replacement and ±1 embedding, in this section a 
new method of LSB embedding is proposed to improve the embedding efficiency and reduce the 
probability of detection by current targeted steganalysis methods. Moreover, the new proposed 
method should also minimize the bit-level ENMPP to the cover image after embedding. 
The proposed method, single mismatch LSB embedding (SMLSB), takes two bits of the secret 
message at a time and embeds them in a pair of selected pixel values of the cover image. The 
embedding method creates a single mismatch between the 2-bits of the secret message and the 
LSBs of the selected pair of pixel values. For each 2-bits of the secret message, two consecutive 
pixel values are considered for simplicity. However, the selection could be based on other 
functions as well. 
Since the proposed method embeds 2-bits at a time, there are four cases of having match ( ) or 
mismatch ( ) between the LSBs of the selected two pixel values and the 2-bits of the secret 
message, as shown in Figure ‎4.3. 
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Figure ‎4.3: The possible cases of Match/ Mismatch 
As the embedding method creates a single mismatch (   or   ) between pixel values and 
secret message bits, the 2nd LSB of the first pixel value should refer to the index of the mismatch; 
1 for   and 0 for  . If both LSB values are matched with the 2-bits of the secret message, the 
case is   ; then it changes one of the LSBs according to the value of 2nd LSB of the first pixel 
value. If the 2nd LSB value was 0, then it flips the LSB of the first pixel value to create   . 
Otherwise, if it was 1, it flips the LSB of the second pixel value to create   . For the    case, 
where both LSB values are mismatched with the 2-bits of the secret message, the embedding will 
also change one of the LSBs according to 2nd LSB of the first pixel value, but this time, if the 2nd LSB 
value was 0, then it flips the LSB of the second pixel value to create   . Otherwise, if it was 1, it 
flips the LSB of the first pixel value to create  . 
For the other two cases,   and  , the embedding will be done by changing the 2nd LSB of the 
first pixel value based on the index of the mismatch. If it was   , then the 2nd LSB of the first 
pixel value will be set to 1. Otherwise, if it was   , then the 2nd LSB value of the first pixel value 
will be set to 0. Hence, after each embedding there is only   or   with the right index in the 
2nd LSB of the first pixel value. The embedding algorithm is shown in Figure ‎4.4. Table ‎4.1 shows 
some examples of the embedding process by the proposed method. 
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Figure ‎4.4: The embedding algorithm of SMLSB embedding 
𝑦 :  x  
𝑦 :  x  
input: two cover pixel values x  x , and two message bits   ,    
output: stego pixel values 𝑦  𝑦  
if     x      𝐴𝑁𝐷     x      
{ 
    if  𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑆𝐵 x     
        𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑦  :     
     else 
       𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑦  :     
} 
else if     x      𝐴𝑁𝐷     x      
{ 
    if  𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑥     
        𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑦  :     
     else 
        𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑦  :     
} 
else if     x      𝐴𝑁𝐷     x      
     𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑦  :    
else if     x      𝐴𝑁𝐷     x      
     𝑛𝑑𝐿𝑆𝐵 𝑦  :    
end 
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Table ‎4.1: Examples of SMLSB embedding process 
Clean pair of pixels Two message bits Stego pair of pixels 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
11 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx1 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
10 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
00 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
01 
xxxxxx10 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
11 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
10 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 
Xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 
01 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx0 
10 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx0 
 
4.6.1 Analysis of SMLSB Embedding 
To analyse the proposed LSB embedding, just like other embedding methods mentioned earlier, 
the embedding process itself (with its embedding efficiency) is considered, its effect on the 
intensity histogram of the image, and the bit-level ENMPP as well. 
SMLSB embedding modifies the pixel values based on the match/mismatch cases between LSBs of 
the selected two pixel values and the 2-bits of the secret message. As it uses the 2nd LSB of the 
first selected pixel value to refer to the index of the mismatch, it modifies the first pixel value 
differently from the second one in the selected pair of pixels. The embedding algorithm could be 
formulated in two separate forms: 
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 (4.7) 
Where   is the index of the secret message bit where 0 ≤ i < (message length/2),   
    
 and   
    
 
refer to the stego and clean pixel values respectively for the 2ith secret message bit embedding, 
and   
      
 and   
      
 again refer to the stego and clean pixel values used for embedding 2i+1th 
secret message bit, respectively. 
The possible pixel value changes with SMLSB embedding could be simplified by separating the 
first   
    
 and the second   
      
 pixel values of the selected pair, as shown in Figure ‎4.5 and 
Figure ‎4.6. 
 
Figure ‎4.5: Possible pixel value transitions for   
    
 with SMLSB embedding 
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Figure ‎4.6: Possible pixel value transitions for   
      
 with SMLSB embedding 
As could be noted from Figure ‎4.5 and Figure ‎4.6, the pixel value transitions of   
      
 are like LSB 
replacement. While   
    
 is more complicated and has more transitions between clean and stego 
pixel values. 
To analyse the impact of the SMLSB embedding on the intensity histogram, again we consider an 
embedding rate of  . Since the secret message is considered as a random sequence of 0 and 1, 
based on the fact that it will be close to its encrypted version (Chandramouli & Memon, 2001), 
equal probabilities should be considered for match/mismatch cases. Hence, for each case of 
(           ) the probability of occurrence would be 0.25. 
For    and   , the embedding process will change one of the two selected pixel values 
according to the 2nd LSB of the   
    
 to get either   or  . The change will be -1 or +1 for the 
odd and the even pixel values, respectively. So, (   ) of the pixel values will be modified by 
adding or subtracting 1 according to their values, even or odd values respectively. 
However, for    and    there is a probability of having 50% of the 2nd LSB of the first pixel 
value,   
    
, being the desired value, which needs no change. The other 50% will be modified by 
flipping the 2nd LSB of the   
    
 only. In other words, (   ) of the pixel values will either increase 
or decrease by 2 according to their 2nd LSB value. Hence, the remaining          pixel values 
will stay unchanged after embedding the secret message with the embedding rate of  , which 
means that embedding each message bit needs 0.375 pixel values to be changed. This ENMPP, 
0.375, is better than LSB replacement and LSB matching, which are 0.5 pixels per message bit.  
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Hence, it improves the embedding efficiency from 2 to 8/3 bits per embedding change. The 
intensity histogram of the stego image could be estimated by the following: 
      (  
  
 
)      
 
 
{
               
           
                
           
 
 
 
{
                    
                   
      (4.8) 
Where   is again the grey-scale level valued between 0 and 255. Both       and       refer to 
the number of pixels in the stego and clean image respectively with the grey-scale value of  . 
As only (   ) of the pixel values are modified like LSB replacement, it is expected that the 
probability of detection will be effectively reduced with LSB replacement and matching 
steganalysis methods, based on the dissimilarity in pixel value transitions and its influence on the 
intensity histogram after embedding. 
The bit-level ENMPP for the proposed method could be calculated based on the match/mismatch 
cases, in which equal probabilities are considered: 
                
∑                                                   
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The bit-level ENMPP is divided by two, as it embeds two bits of the secret message at a time. In 
this case the overall bit-level ENMPP for the proposed method will be 0.375 bits per message bit. 
Hence, the proposed method will result in fewer bit-level changes to the cover image after 
embedding the same amount of secret message. Table ‎4.2 shows the significant results from 
analysing LSB replacement, LSB matching and the proposed method. 
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Table ‎4.2: Analysis results of LSB replacement, LSB matching, and SMLSB 
Embedding 
method 
Stego noise 
probability 
Embedding 
efficiency 
ENMPP 
Bit-level 
ENMPP 
LSB 
replacement 
  
 
 
 2 0.5 0.5 
LSB 
matching 
  
 
 
 2 0.5 ≥ 0.5 
SMLSB   
  
 
 2.666 0.375 0.375 
 
4.6.2 Experimental Results 
To make the experimental results more reliable, two different sets of images are considered. The 
first set is 3000 images from ASIRRA (Animal Species Image Recognition for Restricting Access) 
public corpus pet images from the Microsoft Research website (Douceur, Elson, & Howell), which 
are random with different sizes, compression rates and texture etc. The other group is a set of 
3000 never-compressed images from the Multimedia Forensics Group image database of Sam 
Houston State University ("Never-compressed image database,"). Both sets are used after 
conversion into grey-scale images. 
To check the efficiency of the proposed embedding method, both detection methods are 
considered: the LSB replacement and the LSB matching steganalysis methods. In all experiments, 
streams of pseudo-random bits are considered as a secret message due to the fact that it will 
have all statistical properties of an encrypted version of the secret message according to 
(Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000). Also, to eliminate the effect of choosing the embedding place 
(random or sequential embedding), the embedding rate of one-bit per pixel (i.e. the images’ total 
capacity) is considered. The proposed method is tested against both LSB replacement and 
matching steganalysis methods, as shown in the following sections. 
4.6.2.1 SMLSB Against the Steganalysis Methods of LSB Replacement  
There are many methods for detecting LSB replacement steganography in the literature; this 
paper considers two structural steganalysis methods, SP analysis (Dumitrescu et al., 2002) and 
Weighted Stego (WS) (Andrew D Ker & Böhme, 2008). These detection methods were chosen 
based on their accuracy in detection and the size estimation of the secret message. As mentioned 
earlier, for each case the image is loaded with the maximum capacity of the random secret 
message twice; one with LSB replacement and the other with SMLSB embedding. 
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The experimental results show that the proposed method effectively reduces the probability of 
detection for both LSB replacement detection methods over both sets of images compared to LSB 
replacement embedding method, as shown in Table ‎4.3. 
Table ‎4.3: The overall reduction rates in probability of detection for SMLSB (in comparison to LSB). 
Image set  
(3000) images 
Detection method 
The overall reduction in 
probability of detection 
ASIRRA WS 46.5% 
Uncompressed WS 48.4% 
ASIRRA SP 30.9% 
Uncompressed SP 39.8% 
 
This reduction in the probability of detection has two advantages: the stego image would be 
considered as clean by the detector when the threshold value is a bit high or when the embedding 
rate is low; and the proposed embedding method results in a wrong estimation of the message 
length by the detection methods, therefore recovering the attributes of the secret message would 
be much more challenging, because the investigation starts after the estimation of the secret 
message as a first-level requirement of steganalysis.  
Also, there is a noticeable reduction in probability of detection by the proposed method for the 
threshold value that suits the detection of LSB replacement, as shown in Figure ‎4.7 to Figure ‎4.10. 
This implies that the proposed method is much better than the LSB replacement in terms of 
undetectability, which is the most important property of steganography. 
 
Figure ‎4.7: The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for ASIRRA images with WS 
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Figure ‎4.8: The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for uncompressed images with WS 
 
Figure ‎4.9: The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for ASIRRA images with SP 
 
Figure ‎4.10: The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for uncompressed images with SP 
As could be noticed, for the uncompressed set of images the probability of detection decreases 
sharply from 1 to, 0 which is not the case for uncompressed image set. Hence, using 
uncompressed images are better to be used for embedding. 
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4.6.2.2 SMLSB Against the Steganalysis Methods of LSB Matching  
As mentioned earlier, there are two main categories of LSB matching steganalysis methods. One 
detection method in each category is used for testing the proposed embedding method. For the 
centre of mass of the histogram characteristic function (HCF-COM) the method of (A. D. Ker, 
2005b) is used, and for the amplitude of local extrema the method proposed by (J. Zhang et al., 
2007) is used. 
Since there is no specific value to represent the best threshold for these two methods, the 
calculated values are shown in the graph. Also, due to the difficulty of showing all 3000 values 
separately in a clear manner on a single graph, the average of 30 values are taken to make one 
point on the graph. In this case for the entire 3000 images there are only 100 points, as shown in 
Figure ‎4.11 to Figure ‎4.14. 
 
Figure ‎4.11: ALE values for clean, SMLSB, and LSB matching for ASIRRA images 
 
Figure ‎4.12: ALE values for clean, SMLSB, and LSB matching for uncompressed images 
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Figure ‎4.13: HCF-COM values for clean, SMLSB, and LSB matching for ASIRRA images 
 
Figure ‎4.14: HCF-COM values for clean, SMLSB, and LSB matching for uncompressed images 
It can be seen that the proposed method (SMLSB embedding) gives better results by having the 
higher ALE and HCF-COM values than the LSB matching embedding. Thus the ALE and HCF-COM 
values for the proposed method are closer to the clean image values, which leads to a lower 
probability of detection by the LSB matching steganalysis methods. 
The ALE detects hidden content based on the amplitude of local extrema, so it is expected to 
perform better on uncompressed images. Moreover, due to changing the second-LSB of some 
pixel values by SMLSB, some stego images appear to have higher ALE values than the clean ones. 
For never-compressed images, 58% of the stego images had higher values than the clean ones. 
However, for the compressed images the rate was only 3%. Table ‎4.4, shows the better than clean 
results of stego images. 
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Table ‎4.4: The overall better results of stego images than clean ones 
Image set 
Detection 
method 
The overall better detection 
values than clean images 
ASIRRA ALE 3% 
Uncompressed ALE 58% 
ASIRRA HCF-COM 0% 
Uncompressed HCF-COM 1% 
 
The proposed method, SMLSB, outperforms both LSB matching and LSB matching revisited 
(Mielikainen, 2006) embedding methods in terms of detection. Figure ‎4.15 to Figure ‎4.18 show 
the ROC graphs for each group of images with the two selected detection methods. It can be seen 
from Figure ‎4.15 and Figure ‎4.16 that the ALE based steganalysis method is no more than a 
random classifier for the stego images embedded with the proposed method (SMLSB). Also, the 
performance of the HCF-COM based steganalysis method is considerably reduced by applying the 
proposed embedding method, as shown in Figure ‎4.17 and Figure ‎4.18. 
 
Figure ‎4.15: ROC graph of ALE steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited, and SMLSB for ASIRRA 
images 
 
Figure ‎4.16: ROC graph of ALE steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited, and SMLSB for 
uncompressed images 
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Figure ‎4.17: ROC graph of HCF-COM steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited, and SMLSB for 
ASIRRA images 
 
Figure ‎4.18: ROC graph of HCF-COM steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited, and SMLSB for 
uncompressed images 
Again, it could be noticed from the ROC graphs, the uncompressed images are less detectable 
than the compressed images. So, using the uncompressed images would give lower probability of 
detection. 
Like any other steganography methods, the SMLSB cannot avoid all limitations and cannot totally 
defeat the detection methods. As noticed from Table ‎4.3 and Figure ‎4.7 to Figure ‎4.18, it is not 
possible to entirely avoid the detection. Also, there is another weakness regarding the image 
quality measurement PSNR between the cover and a stego image. The proposed method results 
in a slightly lower PSNR compared to LSB replacement, LSB matching and LSB matching revisited 
methods, which is still imperceptible and very far from the lower limit value of PSNR (38 dB) 
according to previous studies (Petitcolas & Anderson, 1999; K. Zhang, Gao, & Bao, 2009). 
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Table ‎4.5 shows the PSNR values for some standard images, shown in Figure ‎4.19, after 
embedding random binary streams with a maximum capacity using different embedding 
methods. 
 
Figure ‎4.19: Three standard images used in steganography 
Table ‎4.5: PSNR values in dB vs. embedding methods. 
Images LSB Replacement LSB Matching LSB Matching Revisited SMLSB 
Lenna 50.88 50.88 52.13 49.12 
Pepper 50.17 50.17 51.41 48.42 
Baboon 50.28 50.28 51.53 48.52 
 
The same experiment is done for both sets of the compressed and uncompressed images, on 
average the PSNR of the proposed method was 1.75 dB less than the other LSB embedding 
methods. 
4.6.3 Extraction Process of SMLSB 
The extraction process could be simplified as follows. Let      denote the least significant bits of 
the first and second selected pixel values respectively. The process considers the 2nd LSB of the 
first pixel value in the pair of pixels. If its value is 0, then the LSBs of the pair of pixels would be 
extracted in the form of   ̅   as two secret message bits, since in this case, the mismatched LSB is 
in the first pixel value. If, on the other hand, it was 1, then it takes     ̅ as extracted message bits 
as the LSB of the second pixel value is mismatched. Table ‎4.6 shows all the different cases of the 
extraction process. Table ‎4.7 shows some examples of message bits extracted from stego pixel 
values. 
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Table ‎4.6: The extraction process 
The stego images pixel pair Extracted message bits 
xxxxxx    
xxxxxxx   
  ̅   
xxxxxx    
xxxxxxx   
    ̅ 
Table ‎4.7: Examples of SMLSB extraction process 
The stego images pixel pair Extracted message bits 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
01 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx1 
11 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 
10 
xxxxxx10 
xxxxxxx1 
00 
4.7 Two Least Significant Bits Steganography (2LSB) 
As LSB steganography in images became the most widely used embedding method, and is easily 
detectable by the current steganalysis methods, extensions to LSB steganography received great 
attention from steganographers (Luo et al., 2012; Yang et al., 2008; Xiaoyi Yu & Babaguchi, 2008; 
X. Yu et al., 2005). However, as claimed by (B. Li et al., 2011), embedding in multiple bit-planes 
may reduce the perceptual quality of the stego image, especially when high bit-planes are 
involved without considering the local property. The two least significant bit steganography has 
higher capacity than LSB embedding methods, is still easy to implement, visually imperceptible 
and results in more complex changes to the cover image pixel values, which would be harder to 
detect. The genuine superiority of 2LSB embedding to LSB embedding has been experimentally 
verified by (Andrew D Ker, 2007c). 
Embedding in two least significant bits has been divided into two main categories, excluding the 
random selection of bit positions that could be applied in both cases. The 2LSB replacement 
directly replaces the 2LSB of the cover image’s pixel value with 2-bits of the secret message. 
Independent 2LSB, known as I2LSB, replaces the 2LSB of the cover pixel values independently. For 
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instance, it can start with replacing the second-LSB of the pixel values with the secret message, 
then the first-LSB of the pixel values or vice versa. These methods of 2LSB embedding are clearly 
defined by (Andrew D Ker, 2007c) and (K. Zhang et al., 2009). 
Many methods, like LSB matching, have been proposed to reduce the probability of detection in 
LSB embedding compared to LSB replacement. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
method has been proposed in relation to 2LSB replacement to reduce the probability of detection 
or overcome the detection methods of 2LSB steganography. Enhancing 2LSB replacement is more 
complex than LSB, as there are four different cases of Match/Mismatch, shown in Table ‎4.8, which 
might be the reason for the lack of better methods for 2LSB embedding. 
Table ‎4.8: Matching cases for LSB and 2LSB embedding 
Embedding method Cases of Match/Mismatch 
LSB 
Match 
Mismatch 
2LSB 
Match Match 
Match Mismatch 
Mismatch Match 
Mismatch Mismatch 
 
Detecting 2LSB embedding is much harder than detecting LSB embedding due to the complex 
changes in the cover image pixel values. A limited number of detection methods have been 
proposed to detect multiple least significant bits embedding using different concepts (Luo et al., 
2012; Yang et al., 2008; Xiaoyi Yu & Babaguchi, 2008; X. Yu et al., 2005), as explained in more 
detail in chapter five, but they are not specific to 2LSB embedding and are expected to be less 
accurate than specific ones. Also explained in more detail in chapter five, some steganalysis 
methods have been proposed to detect 2LSB embedding (Andrew D Ker, 2007c; Luo, Wang, Yang, 
& Liu, 2006; Niu et al., 2009; K. Zhang et al., 2009). The method proposed in (Niu et al., 2009) is 
the most recent and accurate method in the literature, as claimed by the author and compared to 
the method proposed by Ker in (Andrew D Ker, 2007c). The method proposed by (Niu et al., 2009) 
constructs a weighted stego image and estimates the message length based on the least square 
method, which could be considered as a fast method of detection with high accuracy. Based on 
that, this method is selected as a detector to assess our proposed method of 2LSB embedding. 
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4.8 Improving the Embedding Efficiency and Undetectability of 2LSB 
Both LSB and 2LSB replacement are weak, as they can be readily detected by many methods 
reported in the literature, as explained in previous sections. Improving these embedding methods 
became a dedicated field of research interest warranting more attention. 
In this part of the research, a new embedding method is proposed for 2LSB steganography that 
makes fewer changes to the cover image with a lower probability of detection for the same 
amount of data compared to 2LSB replacement. The improvements of the new method are shown 
and proven in both theoretical and practical aspects. 
4.8.1 Analysis of 2LSB Replacement 
2LSB replacement data embedding technique is superior to LSB replacement, as discussed in 
previous sections. Analysing the 2LSB replacement would be very useful to specify its weak points, 
enhance its embedding efficiency and probability of detection. The analysis involves the 
embedding process, with its embedding efficiency, the changes to the intensity histogram, and 
the bit-level ENMPP for each pair of the secret message bits. 
As explained in previous sections, there are two types of 2LSB steganography. The first method, 
2LSB, directly replaces both least significant bits of the selected pixel value with 2-bits of the 
secret message. The second method, known as I2LSB, independently replaces the 2LSB of the 
selected pixel value with 2-bits of the secret message. Both embedding methods result in adding 
or subtracting the pixel value by 1, 2 or 3, according to the index of mismatch between the 2LSBs 
of the selected pixel value and 2-bits of the secret message. However, in the case of matching 
both 2LSBs of the selected pixel value with 2-bits of the secret message, the pixel value will stay 
unmodified. Figure ‎4.20, shows these value transitions between clean and stego pixel values. 
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Figure ‎4.20: Possible transitions with I2LSB and 2LSB replacement 
The embedding algorithm of 2LSB steganography could be formally represented as follows: 
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   (4.10) 
Where    and    are the pixel values of stego and clean images respectively, and b1 and b2 
represent the first and the second desired bits of the secret message to be hidden. 
The intensity histogram of the cover image is directly affected by the embedding rate. According 
to the analysis done by (Andrew D Ker, 2007c), the probability of having Match/Mismatch cases 
between 2LSBs of the selected pixel value and the 2-bits of the secret message are not equal. Ker 
has represented those cases in the form of average distortion (0, ±1, ±2, ±3), as shown in 
Table ‎4.9. 
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Table ‎4.9: The stego noise probability for the methods of embedding in two LSBs 
Embedding 
methods 
Payload (bits) 
Distortion 
0 ±1 ±2 ±3 
2LSB 2Np   
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
I2LSB 2Np     
  
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
Hence, the intensity histogram of the stego image could be estimated as follows: 
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[               ]   (4.11) 
Where       and       represent the number of pixels in the stego and clean images with the 
grey-scale value of   respectively. 
As could be noted from Table ‎4.9, the independent 2LSB (I2LSB) changes more pixels than 2LSB 
replacement for the same embedding rate. So, the embedding efficiency of the 2LSB would be 
better (higher) than the embedding efficiency of I2LSB. Hence, the 2LSB replacement is 
considered for analysis and comparison with the proposed method. 
Even if equal probabilities of having Match/Mismatch     ̅  cases are considered, the stego 
noise probability would be the same. Based on the fact that there are four cases, each case will 
have the probability of 25%, as shown in Table ‎4.10. 
Table ‎4.10: The equal probability of Match/Mismatch cases in 2LSB steganography 
Match/Mismatch cases Probability of occurrences 
   25% 
  ̅ 25% 
 ̅  25% 
 ̅ ̅ 25% 
 
Hence, the intensity histogram of the stego image could be estimated by the following formula, 
assuming the embedding rate of p: 
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Again,       and       represent the number of pixels in the stego and clean images with the 
grey-scale value of   respectively. In both cases, the expected number of modifications per pixel 
(ENMPP) is 0.75. Hence, the embedding efficiency of 2LSB replacement is 2.666 bits per 
embedding change. 
The bit-level ENMPP of the 2LSB replacement is also another important perspective to be 
analysed, especially for detection methods that rely on the binary similarity measures between 
low bit-planes (Avcibaş et al., 2005). The bit-level ENMPP of the 2LSB replacement could be 
estimated by multiplying the probability of different Match/Mismatch cases by the number of bits 
required to change. 
For the probabilities considered by (Andrew D Ker, 2007c), the bit-level ENMPP would be 
estimated as follows: 
                ∑                                                       (4.13) 
                         ̅ ̅         ̅        ̅      
                                                       
                               
                                        
So, the overall bit-level ENMPP of 2LSB replacement is 0.875 bits for each pair of the secret bits, 
having different probabilities of Match/ Mismatch cases. 
However, if equal probabilities of having Match/ Mismatch cases are considered, this bit-level 
ENMPP would be even higher by equation 4.13, which is 1 bit per two message bits, as shown 
below: 
                             ̅ ̅         ̅        ̅      
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4.9 Single Mismatch 2LSB Steganography (SM2LSB) 
Both methods of two LSB steganography, I2LSB and 2LSB replacement, are vulnerable to 
steganalysis attacks with a high probability of detection. Hence, the new proposed method, single 
mismatch 2LSB steganography (SM2LSB) is proposed to improve the embedding efficiency and 
undetectability of 2LSB replacement. The proposed method can be applied for the embedding 
rate of 1, without restrictions on the features of the cover image. 
Hence, the SM2LSB is a non-adaptive embedding method that can be applied on any pixel values 
of the cover image without restricting the image capacity. It is also intended to reduce the 
number of bit changes required for embedding the same amount of the secret message 
embedded with 2LSB replacement. 
The proposed method considers a single mismatch between the 2LSB of the selected pixel value 
and 2-bits of the secret message and uses the third LSB as a pointer to the index of the mismatch. 
Based on the Match/ Mismatch cases, there are four possible combinations, as shown in 
Table ‎4.8, where  and ̅  denote the match and mismatch between the secret message bit and 
the bit-plane of the pixel value. 
In the case of   and ̅ ̅, the embedding process changes one of the 2LSB of the selected pixel 
value to get  ̅ or ̅  according to the binary value of the third least significant bit. If the third 
LSB of the selected pixel value was 0, then the mismatch would be in the first-LSB and the result 
after embedding would be (  ̅). If it was 1, the mismatch would be in the second-LSB and the 
result after embedding would be ( ̅ ), as shown in Table ‎4.11. 
Table ‎4.11: The relation between third LSB and single mismatch 
Third LSB Match/ Mismatch cases 
0   ̅ 
1  ̅  
 
For the other two cases (  ̅ and  ̅ ), the embedding method changes the third LSB of the 
selected pixel value according to the index of the mismatch. It sets the third LSB to 0 for  ̅ and 
sets it to 1 for ̅  cases, as shown in Table ‎4.11. However, there is a probability of 50% that the 
third LSB already have a right index value and therefore no change would be done to the pixel 
value. Using the third LSB will affect the transparency of the embedding algorithm, but as shown 
in section ‎4.9.2, the stego images are still imperceptible. The embedding algorithm for a single 
pixel value and 2-bits of the secret message is shown in Figure ‎4.21. 
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Figure ‎4.21: Proposed embedding algorithm (SM2LSB) for 2-bits of the secret message 
Table ‎4.12 shows some examples of embedding cases. As can be noted, for each embedding case 
there is a maximum of 1-bit change or no change to the three LSBs of the cover pixel values. 
Changes are highlighted by shading the cell.  
Table ‎4.12: Examples of embedding pairs of message bits into cover image 
Cover’s 3LSB Secret message Stego’s 3LSB 
C3 C2 C1 m2 m1 S3 S2 S1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
4.9.1 Analysis of SM2LSB Embedding 
The analysis of SM2LSB is done in three perspectives: the embedding process with its embedding 
efficiency, the changes to the intensity histogram, and the bit-level cost of change. The 
embedding process relies on the Match/ Mismatch cases between the 2LSBs of the selected pixel 
value and 2-bits of the secret message. Hence, the transitions of the pixel values are different 
from 2LSB replacement, as shown in Figure ‎4.22. 
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Figure ‎4.22: Possible pixel value transitions with SM2LSB embedding 
As can be seen in Figure ‎4.22, the SM2LSB eliminates the value transitions caused by changing 
both LSBs, indicated by dashed red arrows. It adds other pixel value transitions of (±4), caused by 
changing the third LSB, drawn with bold arrows. This difference in pixel value transitions would be 
one of the reasons of reducing the probability of detection, as shown in section ‎4.9.2. 
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The embedding algorithm of the SM2LSB could be formally represented as follows: 
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      (4.14) 
Analysing the influence of SM2LSB on the intensity histogram would be done for both equal and 
different probabilities of Match/ Mismatch cases. According to (Andrew D Ker, 2007c), the 
probabilities of having Match/ Mismatch cases are different, as shown in Table ‎4.13. 
Table ‎4.13: The different probabilities of Match/ Mismatch cases for 2LSB steganography 
Match/ Mismatch cases Probability of occurrences 
     
  
 
 
  ̅ 
  
 
 
 ̅  
 
 
 
 ̅ ̅ 
 
 
 
 
Hence, the intensity histogram of the stego image could be estimated by the following formula: 
      (  
   
  
)      
  
  
[                               ]  
  
  
[               ]  (4.15) 
Where       and       are the number of pixels in stego and clean images with the grey-scale 
value of  . 
The changes to both  ̅ and ̅  cases are 
  
  
, but due to having the probability of 50% that the 
third LSB already contain the right index value, this rate is changed to 
  
  
. For the other two cases 
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   and ̅ ̅, the overall probability of pixel value changes would be 
  
 
. Hence, 
  
  
 for each case 
of change (±1 and ±2). As could be noticed, the rate of unmodified pixel values is higher than 
embedding with 2LSB replacement, which directly affects the probability of detection by the 2LSB 
steganalysis methods. 
However, if an equal probability of Match/ Mismatch cases are considered, then each case 
(     ̅  ̅   ̅ ̅) will have the probability of 
 
 
 for the embedding rate of p. Then, the 
intensity histogram of the stego image would be estimated as follows: 
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Again the overall probability of having  ̅ and ̅  cases are 
 
 
, and there is a probability of 50% 
that the third LSB of the pixel value contains the desired value. Hence, the probability of changing 
pixel values of   ̅ and  ̅  would be 
 
 
, or 
 
 
 for each pixel value changes (±4). For other two 
cases    and  ̅ ̅, the overall probability of pixel value changes is 
 
 
, or 
 
 
 for each pixel value 
change (±1 and ±2). 
The proposed method, SM2LSB, is still better than 2LSB replacement in terms of bit-level ENMPP, 
as explained in the following paragraphs. The expected number of modifications per pixel, 
ENMPP, would be different for different probabilities of Match/ Mismatch cases. For the 
probabilities considered by (Andrew D Ker, 2007c), the ENMPP is 0.6875 for the proposed 
method, which is less than I2LSB and 2LSB replacement (0.75). However, if equal probabilities of 
having Match/ Mismatch cases are considered, the ENMPP for the proposed method is 0.75, 
which is equal to 2LSB replacement. Moreover, as it has different pixel value transitions from 2LSB 
replacement, it also gives less probability of detection, as explained in section ‎4.9.2. 
The last aspect of the analysis is the bit-level ENMPP, which is also important, especially for 
steganalysis methods that rely on the binary similarity measures (Avcibaş et al., 2005). This 
method uses the seventh and eighth bit planes in an image to compute several binary similarity 
measures. The bit-level ENMPP is found by multiplying the probability of having Match/Mismatch 
cases by the number of bits needed to change. 
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For the probability of Match/ Mismatch cases considered by Ker (Andrew D Ker, 2007c), based on 
equation 4.13, the bit-level ENMPP could be estimated as follows: 
                             ̅ ̅         ̅          ̅        
                                            
                           
                                  
The cases with either match or mismatch are very clear, as it changes 1-bit to match its index in 
third LSB. For other cases, Match-Mismatch and Mismatch-Match, the proposed embedding 
method would look at the index of the mismatch and sets the third LSB of the pixel value 
accordingly: 0 if the mismatch was in first-LSB and 1 if it was in second-LSB. However, there is a 
probability of 50% that the third LSB contains the right index, which needs no change, and the 
other 50% needs only 1-bit to change, so in this case it needs only 0.5 bits to change for 
embedding 2-bits of the secret message. 
The bit-level ENMPP for 2LSB replacement was 0.875, with equal probabilities of having Match/ 
Mismatch cases. Hence, the embedding process with SM2LSB reduces the number of modified 
bits (to 0.6875) for embedding the same amount of secret data compared with 2LSB replacement. 
Moreover, if equal probability of having Match/ Mismatch cases is considered, by equation 4.13 
the bit-level ENMPP is estimated as follows: 
                             ̅ ̅         ̅          ̅        
                                                     
                                    
                                           
This rate (0.75) is again less than the 2LSB replacement rate, which is 1. Hence, for both cases of 
equal and non-equal probabilities of Match/ Mismatch cases, the bit-level ENMPP for the 
embedding method is less than that for the 2LSB replacement. This is one of the advantages of 
the proposed method over 2LSB replacement. 
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The bit-level ENMPP is always equal to the normal ENMPP for the proposed embedding method. 
However, for 2LSB replacement, the bit-level ENMPP is always higher than the normal ENMPP. 
Table ‎4.14 shows the analysis results of both 2LSB replacement and the proposed method. 
Table ‎4.14: Analysis results of 2LSB replacement and SM2LSB 
Embedding 
method 
Match/ Mismatch 
Probabilities 
Stego noise 
probability 
Embedding 
efficiency 
ENMPP 
Bit-level 
ENMPP 
2LSB 
replacement 
Different (Andrew 
D Ker, 2007c)   
  
 
 2.666 0.75 0.875 
2LSB 
replacement 
Equal (0.25% 
each) 
  
  
 
 2.666 0.75 1 
SM2LSB 
Different (Andrew 
D Ker, 2007c) 
  
   
  
 2.909 0.6875 0.6875 
SM2LSB 
Equal (0.25% 
each) 
  
  
 
 2.666 0.75 0.75 
 
This shows theoretically that the proposed method causes fewer changes to the cover image and 
is expected to result in lower probability of detection for the same secret message embedded by 
2LSB replacement. To confirm this practically, three standard images, shown in Figure ‎4.19, were 
chosen and embedded twice with a maximum capacity of random messages for 2LSB embedding; 
one with 2LSB replacement, and the other with SM2LSB. The stego images then analysed by the 
detection method proposed by (Niu et al., 2009). The SM2LSB embedding causes more distortions 
than 2LSB replacement, as shown by calculating the PSNR, which is still acceptable, as the changes 
could be noticed only when the PSNR value is less than 38dB according to (K. Zhang et al., 2009). 
Table ‎4.15 shows the distortion and the probability of detection in both cases. It can be seen that 
the proposed method has less probability of detection than 2LSB replacement by 44.6%. 
Table ‎4.15: Probability of detection vs. distortion 
Images 
Probability of Detection PSNR 
2LSB SM2LSB 2LSB SM2LSB 
Lenna 0.396 0.222 44.79 40.98 
Pepper 0.407 0.220 44.79 40.97 
Baboon 0.425 0.238 44.79 40.96 
 
The same experiment is repeated for both sets of the compressed and uncompressed images, on 
average the PSNR of the SM2LSB was 3.8 dB less than the 2LSB replacement. 
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4.9.2 Experimental Results 
To evaluate the proposed method, two sets of compressed and uncompressed images were used. 
The first set consists of 3000 random images from ASIRRA public corpus images, and 3000 never-
compressed images from Multimedia Forensics Group image database of Sam Houston State 
University, as explained previously. Both image sets were used as cover images after converting 
them into grey-scale, without changing their dimensions. One of the latest and most accurate 
targeted 2LSB detection methods (Niu et al., 2009) was used to find the probability of detection. 
The cover images were then loaded with a random message, to be close to the encrypted version 
(Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000), with the length of maximum capacity for 2LSB embedding. 
The embedding is done twice with the same random bit-stream of the secret message, one with 
2LSB replacement and the other with SM2LSB. On average, for the 6000 images, the probability of 
detection is reduced by more than 44% compared to 2LSB replacement. This reduction results in a 
very high false negative rate for the same threshold that suits 2LSB replacement. 
To visualise the difference in detection between 2LSB replacement and SM2LSB embedding, the 
true positive rates were taken in relation to the threshold of detection. As shown in Figure ‎4.23 
and Figure ‎4.24, which show the scaled to the area of difference, the same true positive rate 
could be gained only when the threshold of detection is reduced by more than 44%, which implies 
increasing sensitivity of detection. 
The only disadvantage of the proposed method is the additional distortion to the cover image, 
which makes the value of PSNR on average 3.8 dB less than the 2LSB replacement according to 
the experimental results on the set of 6000 images, which is still much more than the perceptible 
value - 38 dB (Petitcolas & Anderson, 1999; K. Zhang et al., 2009). 
 
Figure ‎4.23: The probability of detection for SM2LSB and 2LSB replacement - uncompressed images 
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Figure ‎4.24: The probability of detection for SM2LSB and 2LSB replacement - ASIRRA images 
Again, it could be noticed that the probability of detection for the compressed set of images 
sharply falls down which is not the case with uncompressed set of images. Hence, again 
uncompressed images are preferred to be used as a cover object. 
4.9.3 Extraction Process of SM2LSB 
The extraction process looks at the third LSB of the stego image’s pixel value, if it is 1; the 
message would be the complement of the second-LSB and the first-LSB (  ̅  ), otherwise, if it is 0; 
then the secret message is (    ̅), as shown in Table ‎4.16. 
Table ‎4.16: Extraction process 
The stego’s 3LSBs 2-bits of the secret message 
0            ̅ 
1         ̅̅̅    
 
Table ‎4.17 shows some examples of the pixel values and the recovered 2-bits of the secret 
message. 
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Table ‎4.17: Examples of SM2LSB extraction process 
The stego images pixel pair Extracted message bits 
xxxxx000 01 
xxxxx100 10 
xxxxx001 00 
xxxxx101 11 
xxxxx010 11 
xxxxx110 00 
xxxxx011 10 
xxxxx111 01 
4.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter the proposed embedding method (single mismatch) was applied in two different 
types of embedding methods, LSB and 2LSB steganography. Both methods attempt to create a 
single mismatch cases. 
The detection results of the proposed method showed that the proposed method (SMLSB) can 
effectively improve the embedding efficiency in comparison to LSB replacement and LSB matching 
from 2 to 8/3 and reduce the probability of detection with both LSB steganalysis (LSB replacement 
and LSB matching). It also leaves a higher rate of pixel values unchanged for embedding the same 
amount of secret messages compared with the two LSB steganography methods. Moreover, the 
proposed method outperforms the LSB matching revisited, which has the same embedding 
efficiency in terms of detection. Also, the new method, unlike the other methods discussed in 
section ‎4.5, can be applied to any pixel without skipping the saturated values (0 and 255). 
Another important point is that all LSB embedding methods are analysed in detail, including 
SMLSB, and the cause of reducing the probability of detection is also highlighted. As could be 
noticed, the proposed method is very simple to implement, with no complex calculations, less bit-
level ENMPP on the cover image, and no reduction in the embedding capacity compared to the 
other two LSB steganography methods, LSB replacement and LSB matching. 
In addition to the lower probability of detection, the proposed method would result in a wrong 
estimation of the message length by any detection method. Consequently, it misguides the 
investigator by having insufficient information about the attributes of the hidden message. 
Since it modifies some of the pixel values during the embedding process, reducing the probability 
of detection by LSB steganalysis methods is limited and the new method cannot totally avoid it. 
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Also, it results in slightly more distortion in comparison to LSB replacement and LSB matching 
methods. 
The other proposed embedding method, SM2LSB, allows embedding the same amount of data 
with less change to the cover image. There is a probability of changing only 0.6875 pixel values of 
the cover image for each pair of the secret message, while this probability is 0.75 for 2LSB 
replacement. Hence, the proposed method has a higher embedding efficiency, which directly 
affects the probability of detection. On average, the proposed method reduces the probability of 
detection by more than 44% compared to embedding the same amount of the secret message 
with 2LSB replacement. 
The chosen steganalysis method can maintain the detection accuracy only when the threshold 
value is about half the value of the 2LSB replacement detection threshold. As shown in the 
experimental results, the proposed method affected the performance of the detection and forced 
it to give a very low true positive rate for the same threshold that suits 2LSB replacement. 
The proposed method also costs less bit-level changes than the 2LSB replacement for both 
probabilities of having Match/ Mismatch cases. For unequal probabilities, the bit-level ENMPP of 
the proposed method is 0.6875 bits, and 0.875 bits for 2LSB replacement. For equal probabilities, 
the bit-level ENMPP of the proposed method is 0.75 bits, and 1 bit for 2LSB replacement. This 
reduction in bit-level modification reduces the probability of detection by the steganalysis 
methods that rely on binary similarity measures between low bit-planes. 
In addition to all previously mentioned advantages, the proposed method affects the 
investigation process of recovering the secret message by giving a shorter estimated message 
length than the actual length, as the recovery process relies on the estimated properties of the 
hidden message. 
Finally, as in some cases the proposed method modifies the third bit of the pixel value, this results 
in a lower PSNR by 3.8 dB on average compared to 2LSB replacement. However, the PSNR values 
are still much higher than the perceptible value, which is 38 dB (Petitcolas & Anderson, 1999; K. 
Zhang et al., 2009).  
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CHAPTER 5: DETECTING THE 2LSB STEGANOGRAPHY VIA EXTENDED PAIRS 
OF VALUES 
5.1 Introduction 
Usually, multimedia digital objects are excellent media for steganography, as they have a high 
degree of redundancy (Chandramouli & Memon, 2001). Thus, digital images are one of the best 
and most commonly used digital media for this purpose. The most commonly used method of 
image steganography is the LSB embedding. The reason behind the interest in LSB steganography 
is that it is easy to implement, has a reasonable capacity, and is visually imperceptible. However, 
it could be easily detected due to the imbalance distortion on the intensity histogram of the 
image and producing ‘Pairs of Values’. There are numerous studies on LSB steganography in 
images (Chutani & Goyal, 2012), and lots of methods have been proposed to detect the existence 
of embedded message. As a result, extensions to LSB steganography received great attention by 
steganographers, and nowadays there are a number of publicly available steganography tools that 
could be used for this purpose, for example SilentEye (Chorein, 2008), which allows the use of 
more than one LSB and different colour components (RGB; red, green, and blue) for embedding. 
One of the extensions of the LSB steganography method is 2LSB data embedding, which has even 
higher capacity than LSB method with more complicated changes on the intensity histogram of 
the cover image, making it harder to detect. 
The reason behind considering targeted steganalysis method is that the universal steganalysis 
methods are less accurate (Kharrazi et al., 2006), it does not need to know what embedding 
method is used, and a number of detection techniques have to be deployed on the analysed 
image. It was also observed by previous studies (Avcibaş et al., 2005; Kharrazi, Sencar, & Memon, 
2005) that the universal methods do not perform equally over all steganographic methods. 
Furthermore, the universal classifier needs to be trained using a set of sample cover and stego 
images, which is computationally expensive based on the type of classifier, the size of sample 
dataset and the differentiation of cover and stego images in the feature space. Additionally, the 
universal steganalysis methods may suffer from cover source mismatch, because it has to be 
trained with a certain sample set of cover and stego images (Pevný & Ker, 2013). 
In this chapter, an EPoV analysis is presented to detect and estimate the amount of secret 
messages embedded with 2LSB replacement in digital images, based on chi-square and standard 
deviation attacks. In chi-square attack, the detection process is separated from the estimation of 
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the hidden message length, as it is the main requirement of any steganalysis method. Hence, the 
detection process can act as a discrete classifier, which classifies a given set of images into stego 
and clean classes. The method can accurately detect 2LSB replacement even when the message 
length is about 10% of the total capacity. It also reaches its best performance with an accuracy of 
higher than 0.96 and a true positive rate of  more than 0.997 when the amount of data is 20% to 
100% of the total capacity. However, the method puts no assumptions either on the image or the 
secret message, as it is tested with two sets of 3000 images, compressed and uncompressed, 
embedded with a random message for each case. This method of detection could also be used as 
an automated tool to analyse a bulk of images for hidden contents, which could be used by digital 
forensics analysts in their investigation process.  
However, the standard deviation attack measures the amount of distortion in the stego image 
made by the embedding process of 2LSB replacement, which is directly proportional with the 
embedding rate. It is shown that it can accurately estimate the length of the hidden message and 
outperform the other methods of the targeted 2LSB steganalysis in the literature. The proposed 
method is also more consistent with the steganalysis methods reported by previous studies by 
giving the amount of difference to the expected clean image. According to the experimental 
results, based on analysing 3000 never-compressed images, the proposed method is more 
accurate than the current targeted 2LSB steganalysis methods for low embedding rates.  
This chapter starts with a brief description of the principle of pairs of values with its analysis and 
the 2LSB steganography in digital images, then it explains the proposed new form of pairs of 
values with the 2LSB steganalysis methods in the literature. Subsequently, the chi-square and 
standard deviation methods of attacks are proposed, and their detection accuracy is 
experimentally tested.  
5.2 Pairs of Values 
The concept of PoV is obtained from the pixel value transitions of LSB replacement in digital 
images. The LSB replacement embeds the secret message by replacing the LSB of the cover 
image’s pixel value with each bit of the secret message. Hence, the value transitions between the 
cover and stego images will be limited by having differences only in their LSB value. Moreover, 
adding one to even values and subtracting one from odd pixel values will produce pairs of values 
with grey-scale value of 2k and 2k+1, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 127, as shown in Figure ‎5.1. These pairs of 
values are used as a base of detection by (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000) via pairs of values 
analysis. 
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Figure ‎5.1: Pixel value transitions between cover and stego images with LSB replacement 
5.3 Pairs of Values Analysis 
Most LSB embedding steganography overwrites the LSB of the pixel values with the secret 
message bits. This transforms pixel values into other values that differ only in their LSB. These 
values are known as pairs of values (PoV), as explained in previous section. 
The chi-square attack, proposed by (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000), can detect the sequentially 
embedded LSB steganography in images. The nearly equal distribution of bits in the secret 
message, especially in encrypted versions, affect the LSB of the pixel values and will generate a 
close to equal number of occurrences of values in each PoV after embedding. These close to equal 
occurrences are usually not found in clean images. As the embedding process transforms pixel 
values into each other in PoVs, the theoretically expected frequency for stego image will be the 
arithmetic mean of PoVs. Hence, the probability of having secret messages embedded would be 
measured by the degree of similarity between the theoretically expected frequency and the 
observed sample distribution, as explained below: 
- The method considers K categories (K=128 for 8-bit pixel values) of PoVs and each observed 
pixel value from the image lies in one of them, for example values from (2k and 2k+1) will fall 
in category k (where in this case; 0 ≤ k ≤ 127). 
- The arithmetic mean of occurrences in each PoV represents the theoretically expected 
frequencies; any values of theoretically expected frequencies less than 5 will be omitted. 
  
  
|{                             {       }} 
 
                (5.1) 
- Without loss of generality, the even values of frequency of occurrences in the observed 
sample have been taken in each PoV and measured by the following: 
    {                             }                  (5.2) 
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- Then the chi-square (  ) is applied with     degree of freedom: 
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- The integration of the density function is used to find the probability of embedding ( ), 
assuming the equal distributions of    and   
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The probability of embedding   becomes nearly 0 when     
  approaches to infinity, and it 
approaches to 1 for small value of     
 . 
5.4 Extended Pairs of Values 
Embedding in 2LSB can be divided into two major types (Andrew D Ker, 2007c; K. Zhang et al., 
2009): 2LSB and I2LSB. 2LSB directly replaces both 2LSB of the selected pixel values with two bits 
of the secret message, while I2LSB replaces the 2LSB of the chosen pixel values independently. 
For example, it can start with replacing the first LSBs of all selected pixel values and then the 
second LSBs separately, or vice versa. 
Both methods of 2LSB steganography, 2LSB and I2LSB, are clearly transferring pixel values into 
each other in such a way that their pixel values are different only in their first and/or second LSBs. 
This transition bounds the pixel values into groups of four, as shown in Figure ‎5.2. It also leads to 
breaking the correlation between 7th and 8th bit-planes in each pixel value, by inserting random 
stream of binary values. However, this correlation between 7th and 8th bit-planes is not random in 
clean images, which would be the base for the proposed detection method. 
The 2LSB steganography transfers the pixel values into each other in such a way that they will be 
different only in their 2LSB values. Hence, it bounds the transitions into groups of four values (4k, 
4k+1, 4k+2, and 4k+3), where k value ranges from 0 to 63, as shown in Figure ‎5.2. These groups of 
four values will be named as Extended Pairs of Values (EPoV), which could be used as a base for 
proposing a new 2LSB detection method. 
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Figure ‎5.2: Pixel value transitions between cover and stego images with 2LSB replacement 
The sum of frequency of occurrences of pixel values within each EPoV will stay the same for a 
specific image before and after 2LSB embedding has taken place. Also, data embedding in any bit-
plane lowers down its correlation with other contiguous bit-planes (Avcibaş et al., 2005), and the 
data to be hidden is usually more random than the cover component it replaces (Wayner, 2002). 
Hence, the correlation between the low bit-planes in a stego image pixel values would be 
different from its clean version. Basically, as the 2LSB replacement inserts noise signal to the two 
lower bit-planes, the stego images are expected to have more random binary values in their 2LSB 
of the pixel values. Thus some statistical analysis of the random 2LSBs of the pixel values could be 
used to detect the 2LSB embedding. 
Starting with some basic investigation of the pixel values within the EPoV would be very useful, 
which is the comparison between pixel values with the same 2LSB (xxxxxx00, and xxxxxx11) and 
different 2LSB (xxxxxx01, and xxxxxx10) within each EPoV. Hence, the regularity rate will be used 
to refer to the average of all rates of same to different 2LSB pixel values in each EPoV, as shown 
below: 
                                             (5.5) 
                                                    (5.6) 
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For each k, if Same2LSB(k) or Different2LSB(K) values were 0, then it set them both to 1 to 
eliminate the effect of this type of occurrence and improve the accuracy. Now, the regularity rate 
would be the average of all rates between same to different 2LSBs in each category, as shown in 
the equation below, where K=64: 
               
∑                             
     
   
 
  (5.7) 
Naturally more random 2LSBs are expected in the stego image pixel values than in the clean 
version. In other words, more rates of different 2LSBs (xxxxxx01, and xxxxxx10) are expected than 
the same 2LSBs (xxxxxx00, and xxxxxx11) in stego image pixel values. For this purpose, 49303 
images are analysed; 24,761 of them were random images from Google (O. S. Khalind, Hernandez-
Castro, & Aziz, 2013), 19,392 images were from ASIRRA (Animal Species Image Recognition for 
Restricting Access) public corpus pet images (Douceur et al.), and 5,150 never-compressed images 
from Multimedia Forensics Group image database of Sam Houston State University ("Never-
compressed image database,").  
On average, 96.8% of them had a higher rate of same 2LSB (xxxxxx00, xxxxxx11) than different 
ones (xxxxxx01, xxxxxx10) in their pixel values (RGB) for each EPoV, as shown in Table ‎5.1. 
However, almost all the regularity rates have a very close values to 1, which means that the rate 
of same to different 2LSBs pixel values are very close, considering the EPoV. These rates 
completely change after 2LSB steganography has taken place, as shown in section ‎5.6.2. 
The sequential 2LSB embedding is considered, starting from the top-left pixel to the bottom-right, 
and each 2LSB of the pixel value is replaced with 2-bits of the random message. 
Table ‎5.1: The percentage of all clean images with overall regularity rates equal to or greater than 1  
Image Group No. of Images Red Green Blue 
Random images from Google 19392 98.0% 96.9% 98.5% 
ASIRRA pet images 24761 95.6% 93.7% 96.5% 
Never-compressed images 5150 97.3% 97.2% 97.8% 
 
According to the experimental results, the regularity rate is reduced after converting them into 
grey-scale. As two sets of 3000 images are considered for experimental results, compressed and 
uncompressed, to evaluate the proposed method, both sets are converted into grey-scale images 
and Table ‎5.2 shows the regularity rate of the grey-scale version. This reduction results from the 
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calculation of transforming the pixel values from RGB to grey-scale. However, the regularity rates 
were again very close to 1. 
Table ‎5.2: The percentage of all clean images with overall regularity rates equal to or greater than 1 
Image Group No. of Images Regularity Rate 
ASIRRA pet images 3000 82.4% 
Never-compressed images 3000 79.4% 
5.5 Steganalysis of 2LSB Embedding Method 
The steganalysis methods of 2LSB detection are quite new, and during the past decade a number 
of detection methods have been proposed to detect extended methods of LSB. Some methods 
proposed to detect multiple LSB steganography which are expected to have lower accuracy than 
the 2LSB specific steganalysis methods. Other methods are specific to the detection of 2LSB 
steganography, as explained below. 
(Luo et al., 2006) proposed a detection method of 2LSB steganography in digital images based on 
quartic equation. The method constructs a finite state machine based on the sample pairs of the 
image pixel values, and then builds a quartic equation via the relation of the conversion states to 
obtain the estimated embedding rate. However, as claimed by Niu et al. (Niu et al., 2009), the 
calculations are too complex and take too long time for analysis purposes. Another drawback is 
that the authors took a set of only 100 images for testing without showing the ROC graph to show 
the performance of the classifier. 
Ker (Andrew D Ker, 2007c) also proposed a steganalysis method to detect 2LSB message 
embedding in digital images by extending the structural analysis of the image. This method uses 
statistics of many variances to form the equation that estimates the message length. This method 
is also considered as a complex detection method because it involves lots of calculations. This 
method has been superseded (i.e. outperformed) by the detection method proposed by Niu et al. 
(Niu et al., 2009), discussed below. 
Another method of detecting 2LSB steganography was proposed by Zhang et al. (K. Zhang et al., 
2009) based on the statistical characteristics in the 2LSB of the pixel values in the image. The 
detection accuracy can reach 90% only when the embedding rate is 0.2 or more. Thus it limits the 
performance of detection for lower embedding rates. 
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The last and the most accurate detection method of 2LSB steganography in digital images was 
proposed by Niu et al. (Niu et al., 2009). They estimate an approximately the cover image through 
a local masked estimation function, and then they construct a weighted stego image. The 
equation of detection is formulated as a simple optimisation problem between weighted stego 
and approximately cover image. This method can accurately detect and estimate the length of the 
embedded message by constructing a weighted stego image and using least square equation. The 
authors compared their results with the detection method proposed by Ker (Andrew D Ker, 
2007c) and demonstrated better accuracy and faster detection for the same set of images. Hence, 
this method is considered to be compared with the accuracy of the proposed method. 
Also, there are some methods for detecting multiple LSB embedding steganography of which 2LSB 
is a component, including WS (Fridrich & Goljan, 2004), which was extended by Yu et al. (X. Yu et 
al., 2005) to detect n-LSB steganography, which could also estimate the message length. This 
method, as claimed by Yu et al. (Xiaoyi Yu & Babaguchi, 2008), has drawbacks of low accuracy and 
assumptions like a symmetric property in the pixels of the cover image. 
Another estimation method of detecting n-LSB embedding was proposed based on WS image 
(Xiaoyi Yu & Babaguchi, 2008), which puts no assumption on the cover image. As claimed by the 
authors, their method has very low computation complexity with a clear estimation formula. The 
method could accurately detect the existence of the secret message and estimate the embedding 
ratio. 
Also, a method of detecting MLSB (multiple least significant bits) steganography was proposed by 
Yang et al. (Yang et al., 2008) based on the transition relationships among some trace subsets. The 
method could estimate the amount of embedded secret messages and is also defined as a very 
accurate method of detection by the author. 
Based on SP analysis, Luo et al. (Luo et al., 2012) proposed a method to estimate the embedding 
ratios of multiple bit-planes image steganography combining suitable trace sets to estimate the 
modification ratios in grey code bit-planes. As claimed by the author, the proposed method can 
estimate the embedding ratios of multiple bit-planes with smaller errors in comparison to 
previous steganalysis methods. 
We propose the concept of extended pairs of values (EPoV) that relies on the arithmetic mean of 
the histogram of each group of extended pairs, which stays unmodified after embedding process. 
So, it is expected to be more accurate especially for low embedding rates. 
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5.6 EPoV Analysis and the Chi-square 
Changes to two LSB values are much harder than one, due to complex changes in pixel values. 
Like conventional PoV analysis, this method uses the chi-square attack with a new form of EPoV. 
Each EPoV consists of four values based on the fact that 2LSB steganography changes these four 
values into each other, as shown in Figure ‎5.3. It can be seen that the sum of frequency of 
occurrences in each EPoV remains constant, before and after embedding, as it puts boundaries 
for each group and values are changing within these scopes. Moreover, because the embedding 
process inserts noise to the pixel values, it is expected to have more frequencies of different 2LSB 
values (xxxxxx01, xxxxxx10) than the same 2LSB values (xxxxxx00, xxxxxx11) in each EPoV. 
The seventh and eighth bit-planes of pixel values are not totally random in clean images, which 
will be the case after embedding process has taken place. Hence, it is uncommon for observed 
EPoVs (4k+1, 4k+2) and (4k, 4k+3) to be far from their arithmetic means in clean images. Also, for 
clean images it is more likely to have a higher rate of similar 2LSB values in each EPoV. Thus, the 
theoretically expected frequency after embedding would be far from the arithmetic mean of the 
values in each EPoV. Because of this, the arithmetic mean is still considered important in each 
EPoV. The similarity measure between the observed sample and the arithmetic mean would be 
the base of detection; being close to arithmetic mean indicates that the image is clean. Otherwise, 
if it was far from the arithmetic mean, this indicates the existence of hidden content. 
 
Figure ‎5.3: Possible transitions and grouping of pixel values with 2LSB embedding 
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The proposed method of detecting 2LSB steganography uses the chi-squared attack, as explained 
below. 
- As shown in Figure ‎5.3, K categories of extended PoVs were considered. Since it groups every 
four values in one category and pixel values (or colour component values RGB) ranging from 
0 to 255, the value of K=64. Each colour value from the image pixels lies in one of those 
EPoVs, such as the values (4k, 4k+1, 4k+2, and 4k+3), all of which belong to category k. 
- Two vectors with K elements are used,       and      , such that: 
                                 
                                   
- The frequency of values with similar 2LSBs in each category is held by  , and different 2LSBs 
by  . 
- Without loss of generality, this method considers the similar 2LSB values in the EPoVs in such 
a way that    measures the frequency of occurrences in category k. 
- The theoretically expected frequency of occurrences for a stego image should be far from the 
arithmetic mean in each category. However, this is not the case for clean images, which are 
closer to the arithmetic mean. That is why the arithmetic mean of each category is vital and 
calculated as follows: 
   
     
 
  (5.8) 
- To measure the degree of similarity between the observed frequency of occurrence and the 
arithmetic means, the chi-squared (  ) is applied with     degree of freedom: 
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      (5.9) 
- Unlike clean images, the     
  is expected to be relatively high for stego images, as the    
should be relatively far from   . 
- The probability of embedding   is calculated by integration of the density function with an 
upper limit of     
 , under the condition that the distributions of    and    are not equal and 
relatively highly different. 
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      (5.10) 
The probability of embedding   converges to 1 as     
  approaches infinity, and for relatively 
small     
  becomes much less than 1, which is affected by embedded message. 
Hence, the key difference between the proposed method and the conventional PoV analysis is 
that it creates a new form of pairs of values which reduces the number of categories from 128 to 
64. Also, it assumes a noticeable difference between the observed frequency of occurrence and 
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the arithmetic mean in each category. Finally, it finds the final probability of embedding (P) from 
the average of all Ps calculated from 1% to 100% of the entire image separately. 
To analyse the image, the method checks the value of P from (1% - 100%) of the total image 
pixels. The continuity of P being equal to 1 within the entire image shows the availability of 
hidden content, otherwise the image is considered as clean. To visualise this we analysed the 
standard image of Lenna 512x512 twice, before and after embedding for colour and grey-scale 
versions (see Figure ‎5.4 to Figure ‎5.7). However, according to experiments, the value of P will not 
be stable until 5% of the images’ total pixels are analysed. As a refinement of the results we 
omitted the first 4% in finding the final value of P, which become the average of all Ps from 5% to 
100% of the image’s total pixels. 
 
Figure ‎5.4: The probability of embedding for Lenna’s 512x512 colour clean image 
 
Figure ‎5.5: The probability of embedding for Lenna’s 512x512 colour stego image 
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Figure ‎5.6: The probability of embedding for Lenna’s 512x512 grayscale clean image 
 
Figure ‎5.7: The probability of embedding for Lenna’s 512x512 grayscale stego image 
It can be seen from Figure ‎5.4 and Figure ‎5.5 that the P value in the case of the clean image varies 
in all colour components (RGB), as coloured accordingly, and for the stego image it continues 
being 1 for all colour components. This is also the case with the grayscale version of the Lenna 
image, as shown in Figure ‎5.6 and Figure ‎5.7. 
5.6.1 Experimental Results 
To analyse the performance of the proposed 2LSB steganalysis method, two sets of compressed 
and uncompressed images are considered to show the differences via their experimental results. 
The first set is a group of 3000 compressed random images from ASIRRA pet images (Douceur et 
al.), taken as cover objects after converting them into grayscale. The reason of choosing this set of 
images is that they are random images, originally taken from petfinder.com. Although this will 
negatively affect the performance of the proposed method, it is practical, especially for digital 
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forensics analysis. The second set is a group of 3000 never-compressed images ("Never-
compressed image database,") from Multimedia Forensics Group image database of Sam Houston 
State University, as they are considered as normal images. 
Each image is loaded with a random message with a certain percentage of the total capacity (5%, 
10%, 20%, 30%... 100%). For each percentage the detection method is fed with 6000 images; 3000 
stego images with the specified amount of embedded message together with 3000 original ones 
for classification. Each image set is examined separately, as follows. 
5.6.1.1 Compressed Images 
The performance of the detection method is evaluated in two perspectives, as a discrete 
classifier, as in Table ‎5.3, and as a continuous classifier, like in Figure ‎5.8. According to the 
experimental results shown in Table ‎5.3, the detection method can accurately detect 2LSB 
replacement, especially when the embedding rate reaches 10% of the image’s total capacity. The 
true positive rate was very high, especially for the message length of 20% to 100%, which was 
0.997 to 0.999 with accuracy greater than 0.96. Also, the false positive rate was 0.074, which is 
very low in comparison to the very well-known steganalysis tools like Stegdetect, which scored 0.1 
for a random set of images from Google for the default sensitivity value of 1 (O. S. Khalind et al., 
2013). 
Table ‎5.3: The experimental results of compressed images; alerts, positive rates, and accuracy 
Embedded 
data amount 
True + True - False + False - 
True + 
Rate 
False + 
Rate 
Accuracy 
5% 815 2778 222 2185 0.272 0.074 0.599 
10% 2499 2778 222 501 0.833 0.074 0.879 
20% 2991 2778 222 9 0.997 0.074 0.962 
30% 2996 2778 222 4 0.999 0.074 0.962 
40% 2995 2778 222 5 0.998 0.074 0.962 
50% 2998 2778 222 2 0.999 0.074 0.963 
60% 2996 2778 222 4 0.999 0.074 0.962 
70% 2998 2778 222 2 0.999 0.074 0.963 
80% 2997 2778 222 3 0.999 0.074 0.963 
90% 2995 2778 222 5 0.998 0.074 0.962 
100% 2997 2778 222 3 0.999 0.074 0.963 
 
There are some very small variances in number of true positives between different amounts of 
embedded data, especially from 30% to 100%, which result from the randomness of embedded 
messages for each case. Also, as it could be noted, the False positive rate is constant because for 
every embedding rate we have the same set of clean images. 
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The performance of the classifier is shown in Figure ‎5.8, in the form of ROC curve. The straight 
line from (0, 0) to (1, 1) indicates the random guess. Any curve located above this line is 
considered as better than random guess, and a larger the area under the curve indicates better 
performance of the classifier. For the proposed method, there are three curves labelled with the 
specified percentages (5%, 10% and 20-100%), so the classifier was in its best performance when 
the amount of data was from 20% to 100%. 
 
Figure ‎5.8: The ROC curve of the compressed image set 
5.6.1.2 Never-Compressed Images 
Again, both discrete and continuous classifier types are considered. The experimental results for 
uncompressed image set were slightly different from the compressed one. The experimental 
results showed that the detection threshold value should be reduced from 1 to 0.99 to get the 
highest accuracy due to having a weaker (lower) bit-planes similarity in never-compressed images, 
as their pixel values are taken without any sort of image processing. 
Again, the proposed method can accurately detect the existence of the secret message, especially 
from the embedding rate of 10%. For the embedding rates of 20% - 100%, the true positive rate 
was very high at 0.999 to 1, with accuracy of more than 0.98. As shown in Table ‎5.4, the false 
positive rate were only 0.036, which is even less than the compressed set. Again, the false positive 
rate is constant because for every embedding rate we have the same set of clean images. 
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Table ‎5.4: The experimental results of uncompressed images; alerts, positive rates, and accuracy 
Embedded 
data amount 
True + True - False + False - 
True + 
Rate 
False + 
Rate 
Accuracy 
5% 561 2890 110 2439 0.187 0.036 0.575 
10% 2249 2890 110 751 0.749 0.036 0.857 
20% 2998 2890 110 2 0.999 0.036 0.981 
30% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
40% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
50% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
60% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
70% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
80% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
90% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
100% 3000 2890 110 0 1 0.036 0.982 
 
As could be noticed from Figure ‎5.9, the proposed method was more accurate on the never-
compressed image set, except for the embedding rate of 5%, which was better in the compressed 
image set. 
 
Figure ‎5.9: The ROC curve of the uncompressed image set 
5.6.2 Estimating the Message Length 
The detection method only gives a decision of ‘Stego’ or ‘Clean’ for each image without specifying 
the embedded message length. This helps the proposed method to be used as an automated tool 
for analysing a bulk of images and reduce an overhead of setting the appropriate threshold by the 
digital forensics analyst. 
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To estimate the embedded message length, the regularity rate is considered, which is directly 
affected by the amount of embedded message, as in equation 5.7. Based on the experimental 
results of our set of 6000 images, as shown in Table ‎5.5 and Table ‎5.6, the regularity rate can be 
divided into five ranges: less than 0.65, 0.65-0.8, 0.8-0.95, 0.95-1, and greater than 1. 
Table ‎5.5: Regularity rate versus embedding rate for compressed image set 
Message amount 
Regularity Rate 
< 0.65 0.65-0.8 0.8-0.95 0.95-1 > 1 
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.82 
5% 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.52 0.43 
10% 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.45 0.23 
20% 0.00 0.01 0.74 0.19 0.07 
30% 0.00 0.10 0.83 0.05 0.02 
40% 0.00 0.45 0.53 0.01 0.01 
50% 0.01 0.78 0.21 0.00 0.00 
60% 0.11 0.82 0.06 0.00 0.00 
70% 0.46 0.52 0.02 0.00 0.00 
80% 0.77 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
90% 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100% 0.97 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Table ‎5.6: Regularity rate versus embedding rate for uncompressed image set 
Message amount 
Regularity Rate 
< 0.65 0.65-0.8 0.8-0.95 0.95-1 > 1 
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.79 
5% 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.52 0.39 
10% 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.38 0.20 
20% 0.00 0.02 0.78 0.13 0.07 
30% 0.00 0.15 0.76 0.05 0.03 
40% 0.01 0.52 0.43 0.02 0.02 
50% 0.03 0.75 0.21 0.01 0.01 
60% 0.12 0.76 0.10 0.01 0.01 
70% 0.45 0.49 0.05 0.01 0.00 
80% 0.72 0.25 0.03 0.00 0.00 
90% 0.84 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.00 
100% 0.91 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Each value of regularity rate represents the percentage of values within the specified range. 
Based on Table ‎5.5 and Table ‎5.6, we can derive another table that maps the regularity rate with 
the embedding rate (Table ‎5.7). The proposed method can now accurately estimate the 
embedded message length. Of course, there is some overlap between certain ranges of the 
regularity rate and the message size, but the boundaries could still be identified with a high level 
of certainty. 
Table ‎5.7: Regularity rate and the amount of embedded message  
Regularity Rate Estimated amount of embedded data 
larger than 1 0% 
between (0.95 – 1) 5% - 10% 
between (0.8 – 0.95) 20% - 40% 
between (0.65 – 0.8) 50% - 70% 
Less than 0.65 80% - 100% 
5.7 EPoV Analysis and the Standard Deviation 
The 2LSB steganography results in more complicated changes on the intensity histogram of the 
pixel values than LSB methods, which makes the detection process harder to perform. It changes 
the two lower bit-planes (7th and 8th, for 8-bit pixel values) and bounds the transition of pixel 
values into groups of four values called EPoV, which can be used for detection analysis (O. Khalind 
& Aziz, 2014). Instead of separating the detection from the estimation of the hidden message 
length, here another method is proposed to measure the amount of change in the stego image by 
the embedding process. 
As mentioned earlier, the 2LSB embedding causes the insertion of random sequence of binary 
values, resulting in a broken correlation in lower bit-planes (7th and 8th), which is not random in 
clean images. Moreover, it is expected that there will be more different pairs of bit values in lower 
two bit-planes (xxxxxx01, xxxxxx10) after embedding with 2LSB steganography. Hence, they are 
grouped into similar (xxxxxx00, xxxxxx11) and different (xxxxxx01, xxxxxx10) 2LSBs pixel values, as 
shown in Figure ‎5.3. 
If   indicates the index of the EPoVs, which could range from 0 to 63 for 8-bit pixel values, then 
the same and different 2LSB pixel values within a certain EPoV would be (       ) and 
(         ) respectively. 
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The sum of frequency of occurrences within each EPoV stays unchanged before and after the 
embedding process. Hence, taking the arithmetic mean of the frequency of occurrences of both 
same and different 2LSB pixel value groups in each EPoV would be considered to measure the 
imbalance between same (00, 11) and different (01, 10) 2LSB in the image before and after the 
embedding place has taken place. 
According to analysing 3000 never-compressed images, more than 97% of the standard deviation 
of the set of arithmetic means of frequency occurrences for both groups (same and different) in 
each EPoVs was very close to the standard deviation of the set of frequency of occurrences for the 
same 2LSBs in each EPoVs. Thus, dividing the standard deviation of the arithmetic means of both 
groups in the EPoVs by the standard deviation of the same 2LSBs group would be very close to 1 
in clean images. 
Based on this conclusion, to find the amount of changes by the 2LSB embedding, we subtract the 
expected value of the clean image, which is 1, and the remaining will be the modification rate. 
According to the experimental results this value will reach up to 1.5 in the corresponding stego 
image for the embedding rate of 1. So, the expected value for clean images will be subtracted 
from the observed value and the result will be 0.5, which implies that half of the image is 
modified. In other words, the total capacity of the image has been used by the embedding 
process. Hence, the modification rate, after subtracting 1, ranges from 0 to 0.5, which is directly 
proportional to the embedding rate. The detection process is shown in Figure ‎5.10. 
 
Figure ‎5.10: The pseudo-code of detection algorithm 
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Figure ‎5.11 and Figure ‎5.12 clearly show the differences between the clean and stego versions of 
the Lenna image. They show the frequency of occurrences for the same 2LSB pixel values (X), the 
arithmetic mean of same and different 2LSB pixel values (Z) in each EPoVs, and their standard 
deviation. It can be seen that they are very close for the clean version of the image and different 
for the stego version, with an embedding rate of 1. Moreover, as shown in Figure ‎5.13, the 
detection result is very close to zero for the clean version and 0.5 for the stego version of the 
Lenna image with the embedding rate of 1, after subtracting the expected value of the clean 
image, which is 1. 
 
Figure ‎5.11: Analysis of Lenna clean image 
 
Figure ‎5.12: Analysis of Lenna stego image with an embedding rate of 1 
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Figure ‎5.13: The detection results of the clean and stego version of Lenna image 
5.7.1 Experimental Results 
As a basic evaluation, the three common images among steganographers (Lenna, Pepper and 
Baboon) are taken into consideration. The results of the estimated amount of the image that has 
changed are shown in Table ‎5.8 and Table ‎5.9 for both proposed method and the existing one 
(WS2) (Niu et al., 2009). 
Table ‎5.8: Detection results of the proposed method 
Images 
Embedding rate 
0% 5% 10% 20% 50% 75% 100% 
Lenna 0.005 0.031 0.054 0.096 0.205 0.340 0.497 
Pepper 0.000 0.020 0.045 0.103 0.246 0.367 0.505 
Baboon 0.002 0.015 0.023 0.047 0.168 0.301 0.498 
Table ‎5.9: Detection results of the WS2 
Images 
Embedding rate 
0% 5% 10% 20% 50% 75% 100% 
Lenna 0.008 0.024 0.038 0.072 0.174 0.270 0.385 
Pepper 0.007 0.028 0.039 0.076 0.181 0.287 0.398 
Baboon 0.028 0.035 0.056 0.086 0.189 0.278 0.403 
 
The estimation of the message length (or the modification rate of the image) could also be 
evaluated by comparing it with a perfect classifier, which is practically does not exist. Table ‎5.10 
shows the average of differences for all embedding rates of the three images with the perfect 
classifier. It can be seen that the proposed method is more accurate than the WS2. 
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Table ‎5.10: The difference between the detection methods and the perfect classifier 
Detection methods Average difference 
Proposed method  0.018 
WS2  0.046 
 
To evaluate the proposed steganalysis method, a set of 3000 never-compressed images ("Never-
compressed image database,") are used as cover objects after converting them into grey-scale. 
For each embedding rate (5%, 10%, 20%, 50%, 100%) the images are loaded with a stream of 
pseudo-random bits as a secret message, to have all the statistical properties of the encrypted 
version of it (Westfeld & Pfitzmann, 2000). The stego images are then fed into both the proposed 
method and the most accurate detection method of the targeted 2LSB steganalysis (Niu et al., 
2009) for comparison. The results are shown in the form of ROC graphs for both detection 
methods in Figure ‎5.14 and Figure ‎5.15. It can be seen that the proposed method outperforms 
WS2 for low embedding rates (less than 50%). This is because the weighted stego method relies 
on the probabilistic model of the cover image, which is expected to not always be very accurate, 
especially for low embedding rates. However, the proposed method relies on the arithmetic mean 
of the frequency of occurrences in each EPoV which has the same value for both clean and stego 
versions of the image with any embedding rate. 
 
Figure ‎5.14: The ROC graph of the proposed method for 3000 images 
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Figure ‎5.15: The ROC graph of the WS2 for 3000 images 
5.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a new method of detecting 2LSB steganography in still images was proposed 
based on a new form of pixel value analysis. The EPoV analysis was used twice, with the chi-
square attack and the standard deviation. 
The chi-square method separates the estimation of the message length from the detection 
process, which could be used as a discrete classifier by giving a label (Stego or Clean) to the 
analysed image. This classifier type does not need the setting of the threshold value, which 
practically becomes more useful for the digital forensics analyst by eliminating the overhead of 
putting a right threshold value. Moreover, since the practical side is considered, as a discrete 
classifier, it is tested against two sets of images; the random compressed and uncompressed 
images. The experimental results showed that the detection method can accurately detect the 
existence of the secret message, especially when the embedding rate reaches 10% of the image’s 
total capacity. It also could estimate the amount of embedded message in stego images as a 
second level analysis based on five ranges of regularity rate. 
Moreover, the method is very simple to understand and implement without any computational 
complexity, and it could actively work on both sets of 3000 images, compressed and 
uncompressed, with random messages. As mentioned earlier, the method could also be applied 
on colour images to indicate which colour components (R, G and/or B) have been used by the 
embedding process. Also, it could be used as an automated tool by digital forensics analysts in 
their investigation process to analyse a bulk of images for hidden contents without the overhead 
of choosing an appropriate threshold. 
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The standard deviation method of the EPoV can also accurately detect the 2LSB steganography in 
digital images. This method gives better accuracy in detection for low embedding rates than 
existing methods. It can also accurately estimate the length of the hidden message for any 
embedding rate. Therefore, it can be more useful than the chi-square attack and improve the 
current accuracy of the 2LSB steganalysis methods in the literature. Moreover, as it considers the 
arithmetic mean of the frequency of occurrences in each EPoV, which would be the same before 
and after embedding for a certain image, the proposed detection method can maintain its high 
accuracy for low embedding rates as well. Also, this method is more consistent with other 
detection methods in the literature by giving the image membership probability to the stego 
class. Thus, it acts as a continuous targeted 2LSB steganalysis method.  
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CHAPTER 6: THE FORENSIC EVALUATION OF STEGANALYSIS TOOLS 
6.1 Introduction 
The evaluation of any steganalysis tool is a difficult task and also a very time-consuming process. 
In chapter three, the performance evaluation of steganalysis methods was shown for very simple 
detection methods. However, the traditional evaluation process of steganalysis tools could be 
more complicated when the steganalysis tools are capable of detecting multiple embedding 
techniques. One such tool is Stegdetect (N Provos, 2008). 
Preparing a suitable testing set for image steganalysis tools is a challenging task, as it needs the 
choice of embedding process and embedding rate. This could be even more challenging if the 
evaluation of the steganalysis tool is done by digital investigators, who are expected to use 
steganalysis tools as a black box without knowing the very technical details of the detection 
method. 
Another reason is that most authors of steganography and steganalysis demonstrate their 
techniques under laboratory conditions, thus practical applications remain largely unsolved 
(Andrew D Ker et al., 2013) since the embedding algorithm, the source of cover objects, and the 
objects to be examined are perfectly known in laboratory simulations. Thus normal images in 
steganography laboratories (uncompressed, non-modified, and without any processing on the 
image) do not reflect normal images in real-world. For example, the digital forensic investigator 
may analyse a bulk of digital files on a suspicious storage media. One might expect to find these 
public images, audio files, games, applications and documents (which could be compressed or 
modified). Hence, from the digital forensics point of view, it could be possible to say that the 
random look of the files could prove the nonexistence of the hidden communication. 
If the model of covers is absent, the feature-based steganalysis and machine learning could act as 
the best detection method of image steganography (Andrew D Ker et al., 2013). It represents the 
media using a much smaller dimensionality feature, then after creating a training database from 
cover and stego examples, a binary classifier is trained to differentiate these two classes. 
However, the correct cover source highly affects the detection accuracy. Hence, the reliability of 
detection varies from a training database to another. Therefore, the classifier may suffer from 
decreased accuracy because of the cover source mismatch. 
Moreover, it could be even more challenging for digital forensic investigators, because everyone 
has a certain set of digital files (images, audio files, games etc.) on their devices, which might be 
116 
 
downloaded from different sources over the Internet. All these digital media files are certainly not 
clean, they may contain hidden contents for copyright protection or ownership fingerprints etc. 
Thus it is highly likely to have hidden contents in some media files without any connection to 
cybercrimes, hence it is better to consider the similarity with a random set of digital media as a 
baseline, and not only a pure laboratory-based set of digital media. 
As a result, real-world steganography can be expected to be difficult to detect. Hence, real-world 
steganalysis is required to have very low false positive rates (Andrew D Ker et al., 2013). Hence, 
this chapter considers the study of false positive rate of Stegdetect; a well-known image 
steganalysis tool. In the study, more than 40,000 images were processed, which were randomly 
downloaded from the Internet using Google Images, together with 25,000 images from ASIRRA, as 
explained previously. The aim of this study is to help digital forensic analysts, aiming to study a 
large number of image files during an investigation, to better understand the capabilities and the 
limitations of steganalysis tools like Stegdetect.  
The results obtained show that the rate of false positives generated by Stegdetect depends highly 
on the chosen sensitivity value, and it is generally quite high. This should support the forensic 
expert to have better interpretation in their results, and to consider the false positive rates during 
their investigations. Additionally, a detailed statistical analysis is provided for the obtained results 
to study the difference in detection between selected groups (close groups and different groups 
of images). This method can be applied to any steganalysis tool, which gives the analyst a better 
understanding of the detection results, especially when they have no prior information about the 
false positive rate of the tool.  
6.2 Steganalysis Tool Assessment 
Steganalysis methods could be modelled as a classification problem, and the output of analysing a 
bulk of digital media files could be a true positive, false positive, true negative, or false negative. 
These terms are explained in chapter three with regard to the confusion matrix (Fawcett, 2003). 
A lot of performance measures can be calculated from the confusion matrix, including precision, 
accuracy, F1 score and error rate. Unfortunately, assuming the predictive accuracy as the best 
way to measure the performance of the classifier is not necessarily true, as it highly depends on 
the comparative size of the actual stego and clean instances (Max, 2007). 
The ROC graph is also another way of showing the performance of the steganalysis classifier via a 
two-dimensional graph between the false positive and true positive rates on the horizontal and 
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vertical accesses, respectively (Fawcett, 2003). The classifier with a larger area under the plotted 
curve represents better detection accuracy. As mentioned earlier, all these evaluation methods 
are performed in laboratory settings, which do not reflect the real-world evaluation of 
steganalysis tools. 
We use Stegdetect, instead of EPoV steganalysis method proposed in chapter five, as a case study 
for the proposed statistical analysis of the detection results. This is because the Stegdetect has a 
wider range of detecting steganographic techniques, in which we can get a larger set of detection 
results to be fed to the proposed statistical method. Also, since it can analyse the lossy 
compressed images like JPG, it would make the investigation process be closer to the real-world 
and not work under the in-laboratory condition. 
6.3 Stegdetect 
A number of steganalysis tools (software) are available on the web for different types of 
embedding algorithms and for various digital media. This research focuses on Stegdetect, an 
automated tool developed to detect hidden content in digital images. Stegdetect can detect 
secret content in images embedded with a number of different steganographic tools like jsteg, 
jphide, outguess, f5, appendX, camouflage and alpha-channel (N.-I. Wu & Hwang, 2007). 
Moreover, it also shows the level of confidence in its detection by appending stars (*), (**), (***). 
A single star means low confidence and three stars mean high confidence. 
Stegdetect uses statistical test for detecting hidden contents and is capable of finding the method 
used in the embedding process. It is a very popular tool among security and forensic practitioners 
and can be considered a de facto standard due to its excellent capabilities and the fact that it is a 
free and open source. There are some options that could be set during the testing phase. This 
study focuses on the sensitivity option, as it greatly affects the sensitivity of the detection 
algorithm. The default sensitivity value is 1.0, as highlighted in Table ‎6.2 and Table ‎6.6; we explore 
the whole range (0.1 – 10.0) permitted by Xsteg- the graphical user interface (GUI) of Stegdetect. 
As claimed by (Cole & Krutz, 2003, p. 209), the value of the sensitivity parameter should be set 
carefully as it affects both the false positive and false negative rates. 
Stegdetect outputs the list of all steganographic methods found in each image which could be 
negative, appended alpha-channel, camouflage, false positive or others like jphide, outguess, 
jsteg, and f5, with the confidence level shown by appended stars. (N Provos & Honeyman, 2001) 
tested Stegdetect tool on two million images linked to eBay auctions and showed that over 1% of 
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the total images appear to have hidden content. However, their study did not show all the results 
and the details of the testing process are unclear. This research provides the results with all 
details in simplified tables, taking every result into consideration and analysis. The researcher 
believes that this is the first example of such detailed study. 
6.4 Digital Forensics Investigation 
A wide range of criminal investigations use digital evidence that points to a crime, leads to some 
investigation, supports witness statements or disproves them. Computer or digital forensics in its 
simplest definition, derived from (Carrier, 2002), refers to the science of recovering materials or 
data found in digital media to be used as digital evidence for further investigations, especially in 
relation to computer-related crimes. 
Nowadays steganalysis is considered as an important and essential tool to law enforcement, 
especially in cybercrime and copyright-related cases (Fridrich & Goljan, 2002). However, as it 
hides information in plain sight, it made a big challenge for law enforcement to detect the 
existence of hidden content in digital images through visual examination (Craiger et al., 2005). 
There are several automated steganalysis tools, but these should be used carefully by forensic 
analyst as they are not reliably accurate. 
As stated by (Reith, Carr, & Gunsch, 2002), the methods of obtaining reliable and analysed 
evidence should be well proved. Thus, the rate of false positives in any tool should be known at 
the beginning of the investigation process, otherwise there would be a biased investigation and 
potentially catastrophic results. 
(Orebaugh, 2004) tested Stegdetect with 100 images from a digital camera and got 6% false 
positive rate in their study, whereby all the images were clean, and all detection methods were 
jphide content. 
6.5 Methodology 
Stegdetect is chosen for analysis to study the false positive rate aiming to help digital forensics 
analysts who want to investigate analysing a bulk of digital images. For that purpose, 
Stegdetect0.6-4 is installed as a Debian package on an Ubunto11.10 operating system running on 
a laptop with 2.10 GHz Intel Core2 Duo processor and 3 GB of RAM. Also, more than 40000 
random image files were downloaded from Google images with Multi Image Downloader (version 
1.5.8.4) and tested by Stegdetect with different sensitivity values in the range of (0.1 – 10). In this 
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study, it is assumed that almost all downloaded images are clean due to the randomness in 
selection and variation of the source. Additionally, 25000 images are downloaded from the 
ASIRRA pet images in a compressed folder. 
6.6 Finding and Downloading of Images 
In this study, the most popular search engine (Google Images) was used to collect more random 
images with no restrictions to a particular website. The process of searching and downloading of 
images was undertaken from 9th-13th of February 2012 using Google’s Advanced Image Search. 
The process started first by searching for single English letters (a, b, c… z) and then some common 
keywords (nature, people, sport, animal, computer, technology, cars and jpg). The resultant 
images are downloaded by feeding the search’s URL to the Multi Image Downloader. The Multi 
Image Downloader downloads images after refining the URL, adding the start parameter and 
getting image links. The following are two examples of the search URLs with a single letter ‘a’ 
where we turned Safe Search option on and off, respectively. 
- http://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&um=1&hl=en&biw=1366&bih=673&cr=&safe=
images&q=a&tbs=ift:jpg 
- http://www.google.com/search?tbm=isch&hl=en&biw=1366&bih=673&gbv=2&cr=&safe
=off&q=a&tbs=ift:jpg 
The purpose behind turning the Safe Search on and off with the same keywords is to get two 
close, but not identical, sets of images. This will help us to analyse the difference in detection 
rates between close groups and different ones. 
After downloading all image files, the duplicated and some non-jpg images were filtered out to 
make the results more reliable and robust. This was done for both cases of Safe Search options 
(on and off). 
All other parameters stayed unchanged as shown below: 
 Image attribute: 
o Image size: Any 
o Aspect ratio: Any 
o Type of image: Any 
120 
 
o Source of image: Any 
o Colour in image: Any 
 Usage rights: All images, regardless of license labelling. 
 File type: JPG files 
 Region: Any region 
The other group of images, ASIRRA pet images, were downloaded in a compressed folder from 
the link (ftp://research.microsoft.com/pub/asirra/petimages.tar) on 11th of June 2012. 
6.7 Results  
After analysing and recording the results of all 40,303 random images from Google Images, the 
detection results are distinguished according to the sensitivity value for further investigations on 
their detection rate. Additionally, it is noticed from the two groups of image results that no 
significant difference was affected by enabling or disabling Safe Search. The values from the 
above mentioned groups are all summed up and presented as one overall result. The raw data 
and other figures of the analysis can be seen in Appendices A and B. 
Sensitivity independent results including error, appended, alpha-channel, camouflage, false 
positive likely, jsteg and f5 stayed unchanged during the analysis with different sensitivity values, 
as shown in Table ‎6.1. As mentioned earlier, the stars indicate the level of confidence in 
detection. 
Table ‎6.1: The rate of sensitivity independent results of 40303 images from Google 
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0.1-10 3.16% 0.76% 0.01% 0.02% 10.76% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 
 
The errors are the cases where Stegdetect could not analyse the image because of the image 
format incompatibility (for example, non-RGB images). The highest ratio from the sensitivity 
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independent results is for ‘false positive likely’, which is quite high at 10.76%. Other results were 
low, and nothing special was noted for further discussion. 
Sensitivity dependent results including negative, jphide, and outguess(old) were affected by the 
sensitivity value. There were changes in the level of confidence as well for jphide and 
outguess(old), as shown in Table ‎6.2. 
Table ‎6.2: Sensitivity dependent results of 40303 images from Google 
Sensitivity negative 
jphide outguess(old) 
(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) 
0.1 84.80% 0.25% 0.03% 0.00% 0.14% 0.06% 0.03% 
0.2 83.73% 0.87% 0.22% 0.07% 0.21% 0.08% 0.16% 
0.4 82.19% 1.35% 0.56% 0.59% 0.19% 0.12% 0.33% 
0.8 78.80% 3.17% 0.88% 1.63% 0.23% 0.10% 0.54% 
1.0 77.41% 3.80% 0.88% 2.08% 0.24% 0.13% 0.57% 
1.6 69.55% 9.01% 2.17% 3.52% 0.34% 0.14% 0.72% 
3.2 50.52% 19.20% 6.65% 8.05% 0.21% 0.23% 0.97% 
6.4 32.29% 18.63% 11.00% 22.90% 0.02% 0.02% 1.39% 
10 26.90% 6.41% 17.64% 33.96% 0.01% 0.01% 1.41% 
 
Negative results were high (84.8%) at the beginning, with low value of sensitivity parameter (0.1) 
and a gradual decrease between (0.1 – 1.0), then it decreased dramatically between (1.0 – 6.4) 
and went back to its normal decrease ratio afterwards. This means that the tool is more sensitive 
in detecting hidden content between (1.0 – 6.4) sensitivity, as shown in Figure ‎6.1. 
 
Figure ‎6.1: Changes in negative ratio with sensitivity value 
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There is a slight change in jphide results between (0.1 – 1.0), as shown in Figure ‎6.2. The overall 
detection of jphide (*, **, ***) increased very much between (1.0 – 3.2). For jphide(**) the rate 
of change was stable up to (10) and jphide(*) was stable between (3.2 – 6.4), then this goes down 
afterwards. On the other hand, jphide(***) remains on its rapidly increasing ratio. 
 
Figure ‎6.2: Changes in jphide ratio with sensitivity value 
From the above graph description we can conclude that the level of confidence is increasing 
directly with the value of sensitivity, and there is a great increase in overall detection confidence 
between the sensitivity values (3.2 – 10). 
Outguess results were different; the outguess(old)(*) increased between (0.1 – 1.6) and fell down 
between (1.6 – 6.4) while outguess(old)(**) increased between (0.1 – 3.2) and then fell down 
afterwards. Finally, outguess(old)(***) increased rapidly between (0.1 – 6.4) and the overall 
outguess(old) nearly became stable between (6.4 – 10), as shown in Figure ‎6.3. 
 
Figure ‎6.3: Changes in outguess(old) ratio with sensitivity value 
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In general, the level of detection confidence quickly increases between (0.1 – 6.4) and it almost 
stabilizes between the sensitivity values (6.4 – 10). 
Detecting multiple methods of steganography in the same image yielded one of the interesting 
results in relation to the change in sensitivity value, as shown in Table ‎6.3. Table ‎6.4 shows some 
images where multiple methods of steganography were detected. 
Table ‎6.3: Examples of detecting multi-methods of steganography 
Sensitivity No. of images Detected steganographic methods 
0.1 27 Appended + false positive likely 
1 F5(***) + false positive likely 
0.8 27 Appended + false positive likely 
1 F5(***) + false positive likely 
2 Jphide(*) + appended 
1 Jphide(*) + outguess(old)(***) 
1 Jphide(**) + appended 
1 Jphide(**) + outguess(old)(*) 
2 Jphide(***) + appended 
Table ‎6.4: Examples of detecting multi-methods of steganography 
 
Sensitivity Detection result 
0.1 appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
0.2 appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
0.4 appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
0.8 appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
1.0 appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
1.6 outguess(old)(*) 
appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
3.2 outguess(old)(**) 
appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
6.4 outguess(old)(***) jphide(*) 
appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
10 outguess(old)(***) jphide(**) 
appended(575)<[nonrandom][data][......JFIF......]> 
 
Sensitivity Detection result 
0.1 negative 
0.2 negative 
0.4 negative 
0.8 negative 
1.0 negative 
1.6 negative 
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3.2 outguess(old)(*) jphide(*) 
6.4 outguess(old)(***) jphide(**) 
10 outguess(old)(***) jphide(***) 
 
Sensitivity Detection result 
0.1 negative 
0.2 negative 
0.4 outguess(old)(*) 
0.8 outguess(old)(***) jphide(*) 
1.0 outguess(old)(***) jphide(*) 
1.6 outguess(old)(***) jphide(**) 
3.2 outguess(old)(***) jphide(***) 
6.4 outguess(old)(***) jphide(***) 
10 outguess(old)(***) jphide(***) 
 
To simplify the results of detecting multi-methods of steganography, only the relation between 
the sensitivity value and the ratio of detecting multi-methods of steganography is shown in 
Figure ‎6.5. 
 
Figure ‎6.4: The detection ratio of multi-methods of steganography 
It is noticeable that the sensitivity value directly affects the detection of multi-methods of 
steganography, especially two-methods of steganography for sensitivity values (1.6 – 6.4). 
Considering all downloaded images as clean is not very accurate due to the possibility of having 
watermarked images. Nonetheless, the overall false positive rate is considered to be high even 
after excluding ‘errors’ and the ‘false positives’ considered by the tool itself, especially between 
the sensitivity values of (1.0 – 10). Moreover, the highest rate of false positives comes from jphide 
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with different levels of confidence. However, the overall false positive rate, in the worst case 
(sensitivity = 10.0) excluding the jphide, reaches 2.25%, which is much lower than jphide-only 
ratio (58.01%). This result benefits digital forensics analysts when examining bulk images, when 
this high rate of false positives should be taken into account for further investigations. Figure ‎6.5 
clarifies the overall picture of the false positive rate for Stegdetect. 
 
Figure ‎6.5: The overall false positive ratio 
For the other group of images, ASIRRA pet images (cat and dog), the ratio for error, appended, 
alpha-channel, camouflage, false positive likely, jsteg, and f5 stayed unchanged during the 
analysis with different sensitivity values, as shown in Table ‎6.5. 
Table ‎6.5: The ratio of sensitivity independent results of 25000 images from ASIRRA pets 
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Again, the highest ratio from the sensitivity independent results was in the case of false positive 
likely, which is 3.5%. Other results were low and nothing special exists to be discussed. 
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The ratio of negative, jphide, and outguess(old) were changed according to the sensitivity value 
and there were changes in the level of confidence for the cases of jphide and outguess(old), as 
shown in Table ‎6.6. 
Table ‎6.6: Sensitivity dependent results of 25000 images from ASIRRA pets 
Sensitivity Negative 
jphide outguess(old) 
(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) 
0.1 94.26% 0.54% 0.04% 0.01% 0.16% 0.04% 0.04% 
0.2 91.42% 2.70% 0.44% 0.16% 0.16% 0.11% 0.14% 
0.4 88.20% 3.13% 1.97% 1.34% 0.11% 0.09% 0.32% 
0.8 85.46% 2.61% 1.59% 4.85% 0.16% 0.06% 0.46% 
1.0 83.72% 4.91% 1.29% 5.75% 0.14% 0.10% 0.50% 
1.6 70.86% 14.58% 1.81% 7.23% 0.12% 0.07% 0.61% 
3.2 37.45% 33.57% 11.35% 12.27% 0.06% 0.05% 0.75% 
6.4 21.67% 15.97% 17.76% 39.44% 0.02% 0.00% 0.86% 
10 15.08% 7.51% 15.06% 57.30% 0.01% 0.01% 0.86% 
 
The graphs of the sensitivity-dependent results were very similar to the ones we got from 
Google Images in both shape and rate of change perspectives. However, there is a slight 
difference between ratios of detection. The graphs are shown in Figure ‎6.6 to Figure ‎6.9. 
 
Figure ‎6.6: Changes in negative ratio with sensitivity value 
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Figure ‎6.7: Changes in jphide ratio with sensitivity value 
 
 
Figure ‎6.8: Changes in outguess (old) ratio with sensitivity value 
 
Figure ‎6.9: The overall false positive ratio 
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6.8 Statistical Analysis 
Assessing and evaluating the accuracy of steganalysis tools and the reliability of their results is not 
easy, especially for digital forensics analysts. Doing such work involves good knowledge in 
steganalysis methods, which does not seem to interest most forensic analysts, as they use 
steganalysis tools as a black box. Providing a simplified method of statistical analysis would thus 
be very useful for assessing the accuracy of steganalysis tools. It also provides an opportunity to 
move the evaluation process from ‘in laboratory’ to the ‘real-world’ conditions, by considering a 
random set of images as a baseline of comparison without limiting its features. As mentioned 
earlier, the random look of digital media files could be assumed as a good indicator to prove the 
nonexistence of hidden communication. 
To study the difference between detection results obtained so far, a statistical method called two-
proportion z-test was used to test the hypothesis: ‘the two samples are identical’. The two-
proportion z-test is used to examine whether two groups differ significantly on some single 
characteristic. This hypothesis test requires the definition of both a null and an alternative 
hypothesis. 
Since in our case the null hypothesis H0 states that there is no difference between the two 
detection proportions, the alternative hypothesis Ha is that there is a difference. 
H0: p1=p2 
Ha: p1≠p2 
To get the p-value, which is the probability of observing a sample statistic as extreme as the test 
statistic, these steps are taken: 
- Since the null hypothesis is that p1=p2, the pooled sample proportion ( ) is used to 
compute the standard error of the sampling distribution: 
  
           
     
  (6.1) 
Where    and    represent the sample proportion from population 1 and 2 respectively, 
and    and    are the size of samples 1 and 2 respectively. 
- The standard error (  ) of the detection distribution difference between two proportions 
is computed by the following: 
   √        *
 
  
 
 
  
+  (6.2) 
Where   is the pooled sample proportion. 
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- Then, the z-score ( ), or the test statistic, is calculated by the following equation: 
  
     
  
  (6.3) 
Where    is the standard error of the sample distribution. 
- As the z-score is used as a test statistic, the normal distribution is used to evaluate the z-
score associated probability. 
- Finally, the interpretation of the results is given based on the comparison between the p-
value and the significant level; the null hypothesis would be rejected if the p-value was 
less than the significant level. 
The significant level is set to 0.05; in this case an error rate of 5% is accepted. Here, the p-value 
(the probability associated with the z-score) will be computed and compared with the significant 
level. If the p-value is less than 0.05, the null hypothesis would be rejected; i.e. there is a 
difference between the proportions of detection results, otherwise they would be considered as 
identical. 
According to the resulting p-value, the significance of the difference in detection proportions can 
be denoted as follows: 
Significant: p-value <0.05 
Non-Significant: p-value ≥ 0.05 
A statistical test was applied for the two sets of images; the results are shown in Table 6.7 and 
Table 6.8. The non-significant p-values are coloured with green and the significant ones with red. 
There are some cells with not applicable (N/A), resulting from having the value of zero from both 
results (Off and On), which is also coloured with green as there is no significant difference. 
The two groups of images from Google with Safe Search option (Off and On) were taken for the 
test and resulted in only 0.617% (1/162) of red cells, which is far less than 5%, as shown in 
Table ‎6.7. 
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Table ‎6.7: The difference of detection between Safe Search (Off and On) images 
 
This shows that the two groups have similar detection proportions and no significant differences 
were found. It also implies the acceptance of the null hypothesis (p1=p2), therefore a digital 
forensics analyst should not be worried about these two groups of images. 
For further investigations, the ASIRRA pet images are taken to perform the same test between the 
cat and dog images. The obtained results show that 20.37% (33/162) of red cells are obtained, 
which rejects the null hypothesis (p1≠p2). The red cells result from error, negative, and jphide as 
shown in Table ‎6.8. Another important point here is that a clear difference was detected between 
both groups of ASIRRA image sets (cat and dog), despite having the same source. 
Table ‎6.8: The difference of detection between ASIRRA (cat and dog) images 
 
(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
0.1 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.773 0.750 0.458 N/A 0.797 0.798 0.572 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
0.2 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.662 0.248 0.767 0.530 0.789 0.788 0.780 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
0.4 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.773 0.542 0.452 0.345 0.660 0.786 0.780 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
0.8 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.710 0.219 0.590 0.396 0.773 0.784 0.782 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
1 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.654 0.417 0.002 0.506 0.750 0.786 0.770 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
1.6 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.388 0.289 0.392 0.787 0.576 0.626 0.796 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
3.2 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.191 0.497 0.354 0.443 0.746 0.483 0.753 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
6.4 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.105 0.764 0.517 0.195 0.740 0.751 0.798 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
10 0.725 0.090 0.678 0.740 0.745 0.107 0.759 0.730 0.093 0.719 0.672 0.798 0.798 0.482 0.486 N/A N/A 0.798
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(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
0.1 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.017 0.002 0.086 0.294 0.788 0.762 0.484 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.2 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.001 0.052 0.029 0.005 0.788 0.783 0.630 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.4 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.007 0.796 0.067 0.005 0.743 0.352 0.323 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.8 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.181 0.011 0.138 0.000 0.091 0.798 0.605 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.765 0.001 0.177 0.001 0.787 0.572 0.690 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
1.6 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.022 0.690 0.612 0.787 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
3.2 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.084 0.450 0.768 0.779 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
6.4 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.254 0.484 N/A 0.733 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
10 0.016 0.161 0.691 0.484 0.535 0.548 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.675 0.675 0.733 0.484 0.484 N/A N/A N/A N/A
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The digital forensics analyst will benefit from the results as they indicate the area of differences 
for further investigation process. Here, the detection results of error, negative, and jphide may be 
considered for further study by the digital forensics analyst. Certain image processing and filtering 
techniques may have been applied before publishing the ASIRRA pet images, which also should be 
considered by the digital forensics analyst. 
To test the randomness of the ASIRRA image set, the random set of images from Google images is 
considered as a baseline for comparison. The results show that there is a remarkable difference in 
detection between these two sets, as there are 79 red cells among the total of 162 cells, 
comprising more than 48% of the total. Hence, the null hypothesis is rejected, proving that the 
ASIRRA images do not have a random look, which reflects the reality, as shown in Table ‎6.9. 
Table ‎6.9: The difference of detection between random Google and ASIRRA images 
 
Another very interesting application is that it could be used to show the similarity between two 
sets of images after getting their feature representation, to avoid the cover source mismatch in 
the evaluation process of any steganalysis tool. The proposed statistical method can also be used 
to evaluate the steganalysis tools by applying two different detection methods on the same set of 
images and analysing their detection results to show the area of differences between them. 
6.9 Conclusion 
In this study, we analysed one of the well-known digital image steganalysis tools (Stegdetect) to 
examine its false positive rates. This study could benefit digital forensics analysts in their 
investigations. We concluded that the value of the sensitivity parameter strongly affects the 
detection rate for jphide and outguess(old), especially when the sensitivity value is between (1.0 – 
(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
0.1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.671 0.159 0.650 0.563 0.773 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
0.2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.331 0.344 0.611 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
0.4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.054 0.358 0.793 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
0.8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.164 0.362 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.426 0.341 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
1.6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.020 0.191 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
3.2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
6.4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.791 0.049 0.000 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.797 0.670 0.000 0.196 0.753 0.585 N/A N/A 0.124
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6.4). Another conclusion, possibly the more important one, is that we have noticed a high rate of 
false positives, particularly between sensitivity values of (1.0 – 10). For this reason, we can 
indicate the sensitivity value of 1.0 as an optimum value for detection, as the detection of 
‘negative’ sharply falls down after this point. This high rate of false positives should be taken into 
consideration by digital forensics analysts when processing, as is frequently the case, large 
numbers of images during an investigation using Stegdetect. 
Finally, a very useful statistical method has been proposed to show the differences in proportion 
of detection between two groups of images in a very simple way. The most random group of 
images could act as a baseline for this comparison (Google Images in our case). This would help 
the digital forensics analyst to take further informed decisions during an investigation process, 
likely arriving at better evidence. This statistical method could be applied to any other 
steganalysis tools, especially when the analyst has no prior information about the false positive 
rate of the chosen tool. 
The proposed statistical method can also be used to evaluate the steganalysis methods (tools) by 
applying two different detection methods on the same set of images and statistically analysing 
their results. The significant differences can be used as a base to improve a certain steganalysis 
method. 
There are two other related studies that could be addressed in future works: one is based on 
studying the false negative rate of Stegdetect, the other is applying similar analysis on other 
steganalysis tools. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
7.1 Overview 
Undetectability represents the most important aspect of any steganographic system. Thus, this 
thesis considered the undetectability in three related aspects of steganography: embedding, 
detection, and the analysis of detection results for evaluation and digital forensics investigation 
process. 
This thesis adds value to research and practice communities concerned with data hiding, image 
steganography, steganalysis and the digital forensics investigation process. The novel methods 
proposed in these relevant research areas also enhanced the value of contributions made in this 
research. These contributions are evaluated, peer reviewed, and published in four conference 
papers and one journal article. It has also been reviewed by a number of other top conferences 
and journals in the field of information hiding, steganography, steganalysis and digital 
investigation. 
This chapter discusses the conclusions and the future perspectives of this thesis by describing the 
research findings, limitations, and future research directions. 
7.2 Research Findings 
The contributions and the research findings of this thesis are discussed under three different but 
strongly related domains. The first important finding is about the novel steganography method, 
proposed in chapter four, that was applied in both LSB and 2LSB image steganography in such a 
way that it improved embedding efficiency. Thus, as the embedding efficiency directly affects the 
probability of detection, this novel approach significantly reduced the probability of detection, 
which is about 40% of the ordinary LSB and 2LSB steganography methods. The other 
improvement is that the proposed method reduced the bit-level cost of change to the cover 
image for the same message length, which would again reduce the probability of detection by 
binary similarity measure steganalysis methods. Moreover, the proposed embedding method 
could be applied for the embedding rate of 1 with no skipping of saturated pixel values (0 and 
255). 
The second important finding is about the detection method of the 2LSB image steganography 
discussed in chapter five. In addition to the high accuracy in detection, the discrete version of the 
classifier can give labels to the analysed images instead of the probability of having hidden 
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contents. This method eliminates the overhead of choosing the right threshold value for 
classification; hence, it could be used as an automated tool for classifying a bulk of images by 
inexperienced people in the field of steganalysis. The probabilistic version of the proposed 
detection method is also very accurate, and outperforms the current 2LSB steganalysis methods. 
This is due to the fact that the proposed method relies on some measurements that stay 
unmodified before and after the embedding process has taken place. Consequently, it could 
maintain its accuracy in detection for low embedding rates. 
For the evaluation of the steganalysis tools and the digital forensics investigation process, this 
research proposed a statistical method that could be applied on the detection results of the 
steganalysis tools, as discussed in chapter six. It could be used to evaluate the steganalysis tools 
without the need to have detailed knowledge about the detection method; in other words, for 
users who are using the detection tools as a black box. This could be achieved by applying and 
comparing the results of more than one steganalysis tools on the same set of images. 
The other usage of the proposed statistical method is to apply a certain steganalysis tool on two 
different image sets for investigation by the digital forensics analyst. The first set could be a 
random set of images that can act as a baseline for comparison, and the other set would be the 
testing set. Hence, the significant areas of differences between the two sets of images can be 
extracted from the detection results that let the digital forensics analyst do more investigation on 
those significant areas and neglect the insignificant ones. In this case, it reduces the cost, 
complexity, and time duration needed by the investigation process. 
7.3 Research Limitations 
In spite of having many contributions and additions to the current knowledge of steganography 
and steganalysis, there are also some limitations that can be considered in future researches. The 
proposed embedding method, single mismatch, adds a little distortion to the stego image and 
produces a lower PSNR value compared to other embedding methods discussed in chapter four. 
This extra distortion, from the fidelity point of view, resulted from involving few higher bit planes 
in the embedding process. However, this difference in PSNR value is only 1.75 dB for SMLSB and 
3.8 dB for SM2LSB that can be tolerated, as the PSNR values are very close to the other methods 
and very far from the lower limit value. Another limitation of the proposed embedding method is 
that it cannot totally defeat the detection methods, which is the case for every steganographic 
method, due to the modifications in the cover image pixel values. 
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The targeted image steganalysis methods usually consider the characteristics of the embedding 
process and its effects on the image pixel value transitions to detect the availability of hidden 
contents. The proposed 2LSB detection method (EPoV), just like other targeted steganalysis 
methods, has a limitation of differentiating the noise from the message embedding, when they 
cause the same changing pattern on the cover image. However, most steganographic references 
define the embedding process as adding noise to the cover media. 
The evaluation process of steganalysis methods (tools) and the digital forensics investigation 
process are both simplified by the proposed statistical method described in chapter six. However, 
it can only be applied on two sets of images. Hence, the inability to use three or more image sets 
could be counted as a limitation of the proposed method. Another limitation is that the proposed 
method does not consider the features of the image set used as a baseline for comparison, thus it 
would be possible to have a huge difference between both image sets in characteristics and 
causes of ‘source mismatch’, which could mislead the analyst during the digital forensics 
investigation process. 
7.4 Future Research 
As mentioned before, this thesis is built on a three-fold research, and future perspectives could 
also be discussed in three directions. The first one is about the proposed embedding method, 
single mismatch LSB and 2LSB steganography, which might be improved in two different ways. 
First, there is a possibility to develop some pre-processing methods on the secret message in such 
a way that needs less change during the embedding process. Secondly, it might be possible to 
modify the embedding method to produce a higher value of PSNR without affecting the reduced 
probability of detection. 
The second future perspective is about the proposed detection method, EPoV, for detecting 2LSB 
image steganography. It might be possible to improve the detection accuracy of the proposed 
method by applying other statistical methods. Also, there is an opportunity to use this detection 
method for attacking some publicly available steganography applications as a testing tool, 
especially the discrete classifier. In addition to the possibility of improving the detection accuracy, 
differentiating the noise insertion from the 2LSB data embedding could also be subject of further 
research, possibly considering some features of the image that could be affected differently by 
the embedding and noise insertion process.  
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The last future perspective is about the proposed statistical method for evaluating steganalysis 
tools and simplifying the investigation process by the digital forensics analyst. There is a possibility 
to extend the statistical method to be applied on more than two sets of images and to specify the 
significant areas of differences based on some other parameters. Another possibility is to add 
some feature selection methods to be applied on the testing images and then choose a suitable 
set of random images as a baseline for comparison. This would eliminate the source mismatch 
between the two sets of images, the baseline and the testing image sets, and reduce the 
probability of misleading the investigation process.  
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APPENDICES 
A. The following tables are the raw results of detection for each group of images. 
Table A.1: The detection results of Safe search option (On) 
 
  
Table A.2: The detection results of Safe search option (Off) 
 
(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
20063 0.1 626 170 1 4 2148 17023 49 5 0 29 12 5 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 0.2 626 170 1 4 2148 16821 160 42 12 43 15 31 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 0.4 626 170 1 4 2148 16500 282 105 109 40 25 64 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 0.8 626 170 1 4 2148 15790 665 184 312 47 20 109 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 1 626 170 1 4 2148 15504 785 144 403 49 26 117 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 1.6 626 170 1 4 2148 13898 1849 452 709 63 31 145 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 3.2 626 170 1 4 2148 10051 3891 1366 1644 44 41 198 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 6.4 626 170 1 4 2148 6384 3749 2236 4665 4 5 278 4 1 0 0 0 3
20063 10 626 170 1 4 2148 5308 1279 3555 6912 3 2 284 4 1 0 0 0 3
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(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
20240 0.1 647 135 2 3 2190 17155 53 9 0 29 12 8 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 0.2 647 135 2 3 2190 16924 190 45 17 42 16 33 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 0.4 647 135 2 3 2190 16626 264 122 130 35 24 67 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 0.8 647 135 2 3 2190 15969 614 171 345 45 19 107 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 1 647 135 2 3 2190 15694 748 210 434 46 25 114 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 1.6 647 135 2 3 2190 14132 1783 421 709 73 26 145 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 3.2 647 135 2 3 2190 10310 3848 1314 1599 41 51 193 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 6.4 647 135 2 3 2190 6630 3759 2197 4564 3 4 281 4 0 1 0 0 3
20240 10 647 135 2 3 2190 5534 1306 3554 6775 2 1 286 4 0 1 0 0 3
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Table A.3: The detection results of ASIRRA pet images (Cat) 
 
 
Table A.4: The detection results of ASIRRA pet images (Dog) 
 
  
(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
12500 0.1 98 14 46 0 425 11834 48 2 0 21 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 0.2 98 14 46 0 425 11507 308 42 10 21 14 19 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 0.4 98 14 46 0 425 11103 390 222 138 15 8 46 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 0.8 98 14 46 0 425 10731 363 217 533 13 7 62 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 1 98 14 46 0 425 10457 552 177 651 17 10 65 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 1.6 98 14 46 0 425 8698 2030 264 849 17 7 75 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 3.2 98 14 46 0 425 4942 3777 1554 1589 5 7 92 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 6.4 98 14 46 0 425 2854 2110 1932 4988 3 0 104 0 0 0 0 0 0
12500 10 98 14 46 0 425 1909 1073 1986 6929 2 2 104 0 0 0 0 0 0
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(*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***) (*) (**) (***)
12500 0.1 141 6 41 1 451 11732 88 9 2 20 5 3 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 0.2 141 6 41 1 451 11347 368 69 30 20 13 15 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 0.4 141 6 41 1 451 10946 392 271 196 13 14 34 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 0.8 141 6 41 1 451 10635 289 180 679 26 7 54 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 1 141 6 41 1 451 10474 675 146 787 18 14 59 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 1.6 141 6 41 1 451 9016 1615 189 959 14 10 77 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 3.2 141 6 41 1 451 4421 4615 1284 1479 9 6 95 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 6.4 141 6 41 1 451 2563 1882 2507 4871 1 0 110 1 1 0 0 0 0
12500 10 141 6 41 1 451 1860 804 1778 7397 1 1 110 1 1 0 0 0 0
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Table A.5: The detection results of ASIRRA pet images 
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B. The following graphs are the results of detection rate for each group of images: 
Google images - Safe search option Off Google images - Safe search option On 
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ASIRRA Cat images ASIRRA Dog images 
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